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Material Abstract 
‘She finds a metaphor for her condition without defining it’: Ann Quin and the British 
“Experimental” Novel of the Sixties 
PhD Thesis 
Jennifer Hodgson 
 
Department of English Studies 
Durham University 
2013 
 
Literary historians have positioned British experimental prose of the mid-century – 
that of Ann Quin, Christine Brooke-Rose, Brigid Brophy, B.S. Johnson, Alan Burns 
and others – as an adjunct to debates surrounding the post-war re-emergence of 
realism. Critical responses to anxieties about the situation of the novel at mid-century 
(linked to a wider crisis of identity in post-war Britain), in surveys by Lodge, Bergonzi 
and Bradbury, tend to set up an opposition between a detached, obscure and aloof 
experimentalism (belatedly and exhaustedly modern, overshadowed by Joyce and 
Beckett) and a liberal and more humane, indigenous tradition of realist fiction. 
Contemporary surveys have largely reiterated this dichotomy by avoiding rigorous 
engagement with the specific formal techniques of this mid-century experimentalist 
writing, and have therefore failed to engage with its complex and often hidden 
legacies.  
This study turns to the work of the neglected British writer, Ann Quin, as a focal point 
for an exploration of the experimental tendency within the fiction of the sixties. More 
broadly, it attempts to investigate the literary sixties as an important flashpoint in 
debates surrounding the role of the novel within British culture. 
Focusing, in equal measure, upon the close reading of Quin’s corpus, and the wider 
task of situating Quin within her many literary, intellectual and cultural contexts, this 
study seeks to position Quin within a “hidden” tradition of experimental writing in 
Britain. And, not only as an legatee of Joyce and Beckett, but also of a coterie of 
lesser-known (or “minor”) later modernists, such as Patrick Hamilton, Elizabeth 
Bowen and Henry Green. This study also seeks to trace British experimental 
writing’s under-theorised relationship with British postmodern writing.  
Through the reassessment of the troubled fate of British experiment writing, this 
study also attempts to make a timely intervention within current debates about the 
forms and functions of fiction in Britain: the role of the novel in culture, for example, 
the issues of canonicity and concerns about the nurturing of innovative writing in 
Britain. 
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Quinology: A Prologue 
 
Avoiding Ernest Hemingway, I detour instead towards Ann Quin. Disliking 
Hemingway, I detour instead towards Ann Quin. Avoiding Stein, I detour 
instead towards Ann Quin. Disliking Stein, I detour instead towards Ann Quin. 
Feeling Beckett is too obvious a point of reference, I detour instead towards 
Ann Quin. Despite ongoing rumours of a B.S. Johnson revival, I feel our 
attention could be more usefully directed towards Ann Quin.1 
 
 
Why Ann Quin? Why expend a doctoral thesis’ worth of work and words upon an 
irrevocably “minor” writer, whose star ascended briefly with the publication of her 
“promising” first novel, Berg (1964), but sunk, more-or-less without trace following her 
suicide in 1973, and, since then, has been glimpsed only on the lists of not-for-profit 
publishers of experimental fiction, or in the furthest, most esoteric corners of the 
literary blogosphere, or as something of a cause célèbre amongst only the most 
iconoclastically-minded literary critics of the mainstream press?  
If, as Franco Moretti has argued, the ‘history of the world is the slaughterhouse 
of the world… and of literature’2 then why attempt to pluck Quin, in particular, out of 
what Frank Kermode calls the ‘historical oubliette’3 to which neglected novelists are 
consigned?  And how, exactly, can the troubled fate of her literary legacy illuminate 
our contemporary situation? Today, to speak of an experimental novel, much less the 
possibility of a literary avant-garde, seems like a rather quaint anachronism, a literary 
Sealed Knot of an old culture war. An anti-tradition tradition of tradition-breaking is 
always dependent upon its other – the formal, structural and linguistic conventions of 
a unified tradition, which could no longer be said to govern a postmodern discourse 
that has been characterised by its “dispersal” and “dissemiNation”. Moreover, the 
binaristic categorisations of formalist models of literary history, Deconstruction has 
taught us, conceal a hidden hierarchical structure of domination, which the critical 
strategy of refocusing attention upon the “minor” only serves to reiterate. Thus, the 
term “experimental” can only ever be a negative definition. Our Adornian paranoia 
                                                          
1
 Stewart Home, 69 Things to Do with a Dead Princess (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2003), 169. 
2
 Franco Moretti, “The Slaughterhouse of Literature,” Modern Language Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2000): 207. 
3
 Frank Kermode, Forms of Attention (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 6. 
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about recuperation, re-assimilation and commodification, together with later claims 
about the avant-garde’s willing collusion with the culture industry, have undermined 
the very notion of such a space existing “beyond culture”. To attempt to speculate 
upon an alternative version of literary history, then, is surely to indulge in 
counterfactuals which, in the attempt to “right” historical “wrongs”, tend to reassert the 
very machinations of canonicity that they would seek to dispute.  
The canon debates and reclamation projects of the eighties and nineties 
sought to interrogate the notion of literary value and to re-assess the ways in which it 
is bestowed upon works of art, attempting to challenge both the prejudice of the 
academy and the verdict of the market by integrating the “great unread” back into the 
canon. But despite their apparently inclusive intent, increasingly it is being 
acknowledged that in merely replacing one set of value judgements with another, 
such projects failed to challenge canonical perceptions of literary history. John 
Guillory, via Pierre Bourdieu’s hugely influential work on cultural capital,4 argues that 
canon reclamation projects fundamentally misconceive of the problem of canonicity. 
Attempts at canon revision, argues Guillory, rest upon a reductive ‘hypothesis of 
exclusion’5 that occludes the more urgent project of a thoroughgoing examination of 
the conditions of canonical practice within institutions.  
Clearly, then, there are myriad pressing political and aesthetic issues at stake 
in this process of reclaiming “lost” authors: the possibility of reshaping hitherto 
unchallenged canonical perceptions of the post-war novel, the viability of creating a 
contemporary critical context for these works and the ethical challenges presented by 
authorial representation – those associated with the attempt to speak on behalf not 
only of times past but of an author more often noted, if noted at all, for the personal 
tragedy of her biography than for the value of her literary output. Moreover, all too 
often the apparent ethical impulse behind the attempt to elevate those “unjustly” 
forgotten by literary history might well belie the rather less ethically sound critical 
prospecting of new fields of enquiry and the claiming and naming of territories. The 
attempt to shine a critical torch upon those forgotten corners of literary history is a 
project embarked upon, ostensibly, in the service of intellectual generosity and 
curiosity. However, in practice, it can often be anything but.  
                                                          
4
 First articulated in Bourdieu’s essay “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, ed. J. Richardson (New York, NY: Greenwood, 1986), 241-258. 
5
 John Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004), vii. 
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And why choose Quin rather than, say, Alan Burns or Brigid Brophy or Eva 
Figes or Robert Nye or any other of the cadre of British experimental novelists of the 
sixties who, much to the chagrin of many literary critics of the period, had their wicked 
way with the ancient and venerable form of the English novel – only to quickly recede 
from view, despite the era being one so often associated within the popular 
imagination with the toppling of traditions and the overturning of norms. After all, 
argues Moretti, the rehabilitation of neglected literary figures amounts, in essence, to 
a simple numbers game: ‘Reducing the unreads from 99.5 to 99.0 per cent is no 
change at all’.6 ‘Who cares about Ann Quin?’ asks Guardian literary critic, Lee 
Rourke, in a recent profile.7 More appositely: why should we? 
‘[T]he majority of books’, Moretti writes, ‘disappear forever’.8 Some, however, 
re-emerge in untimely fashion. In his magisterial study of canonicity, Forms of 
Attention (1985), Kermode argues that it is not the “immanent value” of a work of art 
that ensures its canonic survival, but the forms of critical attention we bring to it. And 
in this way, writes Kermode, ‘those unusual objects which vanish from the “canon”’ 
are sometimes recovered.9 They come to be critically re-framed by changing 
historical circumstances and thereby to be studied and appreciated in new ways via 
the  
 
reappraisal of a past thought to have been undervalued by intervening 
generations, each partially blinded [in the de Man sense] by its own prejudices 
– each, that is, mistaking its custom for nature and its opinion for knowledge.10 
 
In recent years, Quin and her colleagues have looked to be on the verge of having 
their moment. The debates surrounding the “end of postmodernism” have finally 
provoked a postmodern approach to literary history, one sceptical of orthodoxies, of 
fixed positions and periodisations. The master narrative of twentieth-century British 
fiction is being reappraised. There is a new acknowledgement that insofar as such a 
model ever could anywhere, the one that bisects the twentieth century more-or-less 
down the middle, that divides its paper assets between the categories of modernism 
                                                          
6
 Moretti, “Slaughterhouse,” 209. 
7
 Lee Rourke, “Who cares about Ann Quin?” The Guardian, May 8, 2007, accessed July 28, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2007/may/08/whocaresaboutannquin. 
8
 Moretti, “Slaughterhouse,” 207. 
9
 Kermode, Forms of Attention, xiii. 
10
 Ibid., 71. 
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and postmodernism and leaves that bit in the middle, that bit that doesn’t quite fit, to 
languish in what Lyndsey Stonebridge and Marina Mackay have memorably called 
the ‘back bedroom of literary scholarship’,11 has never comfortably applied in Britain. 
And as the role of the novel is renegotiated, the question where do we come from? – 
to borrow Paul Gauguin’s catechism – is being asked just as urgently as where are 
we going? The narrativisations, genealogies and dynasties of British twentieth-
century literary history are beginning to be recast, and the mid-century’s ‘critically 
awkward phase of twentieth-century writing’12 has emerged as a key battleground.  
With the waning of the postmodern project, the dialectical opposition between 
modernism and postmodernism is being remapped. There has been much 
speculation upon possible successors to postmodernism. In answer to the question 
“what happens next?” Stephen Burn has proposed ‘post-postmodernism’,13 Garry 
Potter and José López, ‘critical realism’,14 Nicolas Bourriaud, ‘altermodernism’15 and 
Mikhail Epstein has theorised a return to the concepts of modernity with the prefix 
trans-.16 Others have attempted to articulate alternatives: for example, Bruno Latour’s 
‘non-modernism’,17 or Timothy S. Murphy’s ‘amodernism’.18 Elsewhere, the 
reassessment of modernist legacies has become the focus of many accounts. The 
hitherto widely accepted story of British twentieth-century fictional writing, in which 
modernism is succeeded by the post-war re-emergence of realism, which is, in turn, 
superannuated by postmodernism, is being reappraised. As Laura Marcus writes: 
 
The “realisms” of many mid-twentieth-century writers and beyond are 
beginning to look not only more interesting and more complex, but closer to 
the “modernisms” that they are conventionally held to have displaced.19  
 
                                                          
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Lyndsey Stonebridge and Marina MacKay, eds., “Introduction,” Fiction After Modernism: The Novel at Mid-
Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1. 
13
 Stephen Burn, Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism (London: Continuum: 2008). 
14
 José López and Garry Potter, eds., After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism (London: 
Continuum, 2005). 
15
 Nicholas Bourriaud, ed., Altermodern: Tate Triennial (London: Tate Publishing, 2009). 
16
 Mikhail Epstein, After the Future: The Paradoxes of Postmodernism and Contemporary Russian Culture 
(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995). 
17
 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993). 
18
 Timothy S. Murphy, Wising Up the Marks: The Amodern William Burroughs (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1997). 
19
 Laura Marcus, “The Legacies of Modernism,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Modernist Novel, ed. 
Morag Shiach (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), 82. 
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Now, after the end of postmodernism, as the early years of the twenty-first 
century categorically fail to deliver anything like the extraordinary flowering of artistic 
energies that emerged during the first decades of the twentieth, writers and critics 
(and publishers, with all the entrepreneurial spirit of the original Moderns) are 
beginning to reinvest anew in modernism’s achievements. Recent critical 
perspectives have sought to dispute what Marjorie Perloff calls ‘straw man 
modernism’,20 a caricature which, in Britain, comprised an elite company of 
Bloomsbury intellectuals presided over by T.S. Eliot, desperately clinging to their 
‘reactionary “grand narratives” of social and psychic order’.21 That stereotype of 
modernism as a toothless old crone comfortably installed, decades before, at the 
centre of Establishment good taste and none-too-threatening when busied with 
manifesting fevered daydreams of some prelapsarian Edwardian past – but all too 
susceptible to fifth columnist tendencies – although not easily shifted, finally seems 
to be ebbing away. The ‘great divide’ between high art and mass culture that had 
been employed to distinguish modernist discourse against its “anything goes” 
successor is being reappraised, with new critical interest in pulp modernism, late 
modernism, intermodernism, low modernism, middlebrow modernism and 
modernism’s engagement with the popular.22 These new accounts have sought to 
attest to the political and aesthetic diversity of a plurality and continuity of 
modernisms.  
Contemporary writers too have increasingly returned to modernist novels as, 
Marcus writes, ‘spaces in and through which questions of art, life and value can be 
reposed and reconfigured’.23 Novels like Ian McEwan’s Atonement (2001), Alan 
Hollinghurst’s The Line of Beauty (2004) and Zadie Smith’s On Beauty (2005) (and, 
one might add, Sarah Waters’ The Nightwatch [2006]), Marcus argues, give the 
                                                          
20
 Marjorie Perloff, Radical Artifice: Writing Poetry in the Age of Media (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2004), 243n.  
21
 Peter Nicholls, Modernisms: A Literary Guide (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), vii.  
22
 The categorisation and periodisation of modernism has of late been renegotiated and reassessed in books 
including Tyrus Miller’s Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the World Wars (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1999), which seeks to explore the influence of mass culture upon the late 
modernism of the interwar years, Kristen Bluemel’s Intermodernism: Literary Culture in Mid-twentieth-century 
Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), which focuses upon the specificity of modernism 
between the two world wars. Similarly, Marina Mackay’s Modernism and World War II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) seeks to attest to the significance of a modernist phase situated after 
modernism is generally assumed to have ended and Alissa G. Karl’s Modernism and the Marketplace (London: 
Routledge, 2009) challenges existing preconceptions about the ambivalent relationship between modernist art 
and commercial cultures.  
23
 Marcus, “Legacies,” 94. 
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realist flesh of plot, character and setting to the skeleton of a modernist inheritance 
(Virginia Woolf, Henry James, E.M. Forster and Henry Green respectively) in order 
to pose ethical questions about the redemptive power of art in a commodified world 
and to articulate a bedraggled, knowing and hard-won humanism. Even Ian 
McEwan, who notoriously declared against the ‘dead hand of modernism’24 – quite 
as if, the novelist China Miéville has quipped, ‘the dominant literary mode in post-war 
England was Steinian experimentation or some Albion Oulipo’25 – has written a 
modernist novel, if only, in Atonement, to rewrite modernism for its dereliction of duty 
and ethical failings.  
McEwan’s misgivings sound the tenor of the reinvention of modernism, 
twenty-first-century-style. Despite this new willingness to re-engage with its legacies, 
modernism has tended to be critically rehabilitated on the very same terms as the old 
prejudices. This is a modernism without the menaces, shorn of the dandified 
aestheticism that is still, even now, frequently thought to belie a questionable politics 
and a moral compass gone awry. Jed Esty’s influential account of late modernism in 
his A Shrinking Island (2004), for example, seeks to refocus critical attention upon an 
area of literary history that has suffered neglect, he argues, due to an ‘intuitive 
belief’26 amongst the critical establishment that the now pervasive declinist thesis 
about twentieth-century English letters ‘can be correlated to or even explained’27 by 
the collapse of British imperial power. ‘Yet few would argue that geopolitical power 
corresponds in a predictable way to literary creativity’,28 he rightly comments. But by 
tethering the scope and the preoccupations of the novel to shrinking Britain’s post-
imperial anxieties, Esty’s attempt to attest to the vitality and the continuity of 
modernist literary practice in Britain after an artificial twilight imposed by the 
strictures of periodisation becomes a kind of literary re-nationalisation project, 
wherein the rehabilitation of neglected late modern tendencies comes at the expense 
of submerging its cosmopolitanism, the persistence of its innovative impulse, the 
                                                          
24
 Zadie Smith, “Interview with Ian McEwan,” The Believer 26 (August 2005), accessed July 25, 2011 
http://www.believermag.com/issues/200508/?read=interview_mcewan. 
25
 China Miéville, “The Future of the Novel,” The Guardian, August 21, 2012, accessed August 22, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/aug/21/china-mieville-the-future-of-the-novel. 
26
 Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 1. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
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ways in which its interests continued to lay far beyond the encroaching boundaries of 
an empire.  
The late modernism of, for example, Henry Green, Elizabeth Bowen, William 
Sansom, Rayner Heppenstall, Elizabeth Taylor, Ivy Compton Burnett and others, a 
tendency which stretched well into the fifties and beyond, even as it registered 
Britain’s new diminished context did so in ways that signal not the terminus of 
modernist forms of knowledge and expression, but their transformation and renewal. 
Esty’s conceptualisation of “the late modern” as an older generation of literary 
modernists (Woolf, Eliot, E.M. Forster and Mary Butts) ‘caught in the act of becoming 
minor’29 – which itself draws upon Hugh Kenner’s earlier lament for a ‘sinking island’ 
after the demise of literary modernism30 – is in fact only one aspect of British 
modernism’s myriad legacies. And by focusing exclusively upon it as the official coda 
to the official story of the modernist project in Britain, Esty’s hugely influential 
account has elevated a revision of modernism which domesticates that most 
undomesticatable of art. Far from disturbing the critical intuitions it seeks to question, 
A Shrinking Island actually succeeds in reasserting the metaphysical relationship 
posited between literature and “the national” in Britain: for example, the assumption 
that literary innovation in Britain is somehow inextricably wed to cultural 
degeneration and the identification of the new with a creeping cosmopolitanism that 
threatens to contaminate the local produce.  
For others, however, modernism is being returned to as an unfinished project, 
as a fundamental turning point that British culture, ostrich-like as ever, seems to 
have missed. More recently, a rather different re-engagement with the idea of literary 
modernism has begun to emerge; one that seeks not to re-inscribe the recognisable 
tropes of modernism as a periodised aesthetic movement, or as an ever-looser 
aggregate of formal and linguistic conventions, but to invest anew in more diffuse – 
and more slippery – concepts of literary modernity. To ignore the avant-garde, writes 
novelist and critic Tom McCarthy, whose own burgeoning literary success is 
testament to a renewed appetite for innovation, ‘is the equivalent of ignoring 
Darwin.’31 ‘Are we ready for a new generation of experimental fiction?’ asks Rourke, 
                                                          
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Hugh Kenner, A Sinking Island: The Modern English Writers (New York, NY: Knopf, 1988). 
31
 James Purdon, “Tom McCarthy: ‘To ignore the avant garde is akin to ignoring Darwin’,” The Observer, 
August 1, 2010, accessed February 14, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/aug/01/tom-mccarthy-c-
james-purdon. 
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‘I certainly am’.32 So, too, is Gabriel Josipovici, whose kulturpessimismus polemic, 
What Ever Happened to Modernism? (2010) condemns the buttoned-up Englishry of 
a literary scene perceived as dreary and anecdotal, unable to distinguish between 
reality and l’effet de réel, its fictions notable only for their authors’ skill in ‘concealing 
the joints’.33 The blame for the impoverishment of contemporary writing is, for 
Josipovici, to be laid with a blinkered English literary establishment that has 
consistently misunderstood the modernist project, and thereby supressed its 
legacies:  
 
Modernism needs to be understood in a completely different way, as the 
coming into awareness by art of its precarious status and responsibilities, 
and therefore as something that will, from now on, always be with us.34 
 
A more thoroughgoing definition of the characteristics of Josipovici’s own “great 
tradition” – which spans roughly from Sophocles to Alain Robbe-Grillet – is rather 
difficult to locate. However, his calls for a kind of writing that knows its limits, that 
recognises what Josipovici calls its ‘arbitrariness’, and, in this way, might discover 
what it is that makes it meaningful, why it matters, speaks very directly to our 
contemporary moment.  
The legator of this emergent contemporary sensibility is less the poet-fencer 
Baudelaire and more the dog-tired Samuel Beckett, the emblematic figure of the 
writer who is ‘weary of puny exploits, weary of pretending to be able, of being able, of 
doing a little better the same old thing, of going a little further along a dreary road’.35 
This is a modernism denuded of its metaphysical ambitions, stripped of all 
pretentions about literature’s truth-telling capacity. In an era of simulacrum-anxiety, 
such a sensibility proposes a mode of writing that is, as Beckett famously declares, 
necessary but not sufficient. And it suggests that literary innovation and 
experimentation are the means by which literature might grasp the nettle of its new 
provisional and yet autonomous role within culture. McCarthy finds in the figure of 
Melville’s Bartleby an appropriate avatar for the age. His review of David Foster 
                                                          
32
 Lee Rourke, “The return of British avant garde fiction,” The Guardian, July 14, 2008, accessed October 27, 
2009, http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2008/jul/14/post27. 
33
 Gabriel Josipovici, What Ever Happened to Modernism? (London: Yale University Press, 2010), 11. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Samuel Beckett, “Three Dialogues,” in Samuel Beckett, Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic 
Fragment, ed. Ruby Cohn (London: John Calder, 1983), 142. 
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Wallace’s posthumously-published unfinished final novel, The Pale King, situates the 
late American novelist as a legatee of this new sensibility. The ‘melancholy impasse’ 
of the novel, writes McCarthy, inheres in the writer who, like Bartleby, ‘cannot will 
himself to complete the act of writing’:36 
 
This is the inheritance that Wallace earnestly, and perhaps fatally, grappled 
with. The outcome was as brilliant as it was sad – and the battle is the right 
one to engage in.37 
 
In recent years, Quin’s literary peer, the British experimental novelist B.S. 
Johnson, for his dogged, even belligerent, commitment to fictional innovation, has 
emerged as an unlikely anti-hero of this new sensibility. The attempt to rehabilitate 
Johnson, who, coincidentally, took his own life the same year as Quin, in 1973, has 
both within the academy and beyond become something of a cottage industry. There 
is a growing field of Johnson studies and the writer, who was once the self-styled 
bête noire of the literary establishment, has gained the patronage of the great and 
the good of contemporary British letters, including his biographer, Jonathan Coe, 
alongside Zadie Smith, Will Self, Hari Kunzru and Scarlett Thomas, amongst others. 
Picador have republished the lion’s share of his novels, and accompanying critical 
commentaries have appeared, including the essay collection Re-reading B. S. 
Johnson (2007), edited by Glyn White and Philip Tew, and Philip Tew’s monograph, 
B. S. Johnson: A Critical Reading (2001). Since his suicide, Johnson had been 
infrequently anthologised and occasionally name-checked as, Glyn White writes, 
‘emblematic of a period representative of the spirit of protest against the status quo in 
British fiction in the sixties and early 1970s’.38 In recent years, however, he has 
become iconic.   
Does the rediscovery of Johnson, then, signal a renewed and rigorous critical 
engagement with the experimental novel that might release him and his peers from 
their ‘historical oubliette’ and begin to demolish fossilised assumptions about 
experimental writing in Britain? The signs are no. Coe, in the introduction to his 
                                                          
36
 Tom McCarthy, “David Foster Wallace: The Last Audit,” New York Times, April 14, 2011, accessed July 3, 
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critically-acclaimed literary biography, Like a Fiery Elephant: The Story of B.S. 
Johnson (2004), acknowledges the apparent paradox of a ‘novelist who loves 
(traditional) novels writing the biography of a novelist who seemed to hate them’.39 In 
the end, it is, Coe decides – demonstrating the unquestioning and incoherent 
reverence towards the metaphysical value of the novel form that is characteristic of a 
certain strain of British literary criticism – Johnson’s faith in the novel, as the ‘heretic 
who is closer to God than the regular, unquestioning churchgoer’,40 that reconciles 
the biographer to his subject. Johnson’s technique, Coe comments, challenges ‘our 
most fundamental beliefs’ in the ‘moral integrity of “fiction’’’ and the ‘usefulness of 
storytelling’ and, as such, these ‘literary heresies’ vigorously attest to the value of 
novels. 41 But they do not, apparently, attest to the value of literary experimentation 
in and of itself, which, for Coe, has a ‘quality of QED’42. What makes Johnson ‘one of 
[Coe’s] greatest literary heroes’ is the ‘humanity that shines through even his most 
rigorous experiments’.43 Here, again, are those old assumptions. “Humanity” and 
“experimentation”, for Coe, are strictly mutually exclusive qualities. Johnson is 
deserving of rehabilitation on account of his residual humanism in spite of his 
apparently abhorrent creed for the ways in which his experimental effects fail to 
effectively conceal his warm, realist heart. Even the biography’s own tentative 
literary experimentation – its fragmentary form, which might suggest that Coe 
concurs with Johnson’s claim that ‘life is chaotic, fluid, random; it leaves myriads of 
ends untied untidily’44 – is undercut by a coda that seeks to tie up those loose ends, 
that attempts to explain the ‘something inexplicable’ about Johnson’s suicide. His 
experimental impulse is for Coe Johnson’s fatal flaw, one in spite of which Johnson 
is to be recovered. Working against the grain of Johnson’s own critical and fictional 
writing, then, Coe radically revises Johnson’s life and work in order to reassert the 
old polarities and prejudices about experimental writing in Britain.  
The twenty-first-century modernist impulse has begun to yield novels such as 
McCarthy’s C (2010) and Will Self’s Umbrella (2012), for example, which have been 
breathlessly praised as a kind of modernism après la lettre. Upon the publication of 
Self’s novel, the author confessed that despite his previous excursions into the 
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demotic and the grotesque, he’d really always been a closet modernist.45 Umbrella, 
he explains, with its four hundred pages of unbroken stream-of-consciousness 
prose, is the book he wanted to write all along. Self’s belated coming out is a 
measure of the extent to which the prejudices that were rife amongst modernism’s 
first- and second-generation legatees – C. P. Snow, Kingsley Amis, the Movement 
poets et al. – had persisted well into the closing decades of the twentieth century. As 
late as 1992, John Carey’s The Intellectuals and the Masses conspiracy-theorised 
about the Modern’s apparent systematic and pre-meditated attack on mass culture.46 
McCarthy’s novels, meanwhile, assert the impossibility of evading the towering 
legacies of modernism, soaked as they are in allusions to Freud’s the Wolfman, 
Alain Robbe-Grillet’s Jealousy, Robert Musil’s The Man Without Qualities, Futurism, 
Dadaism and Oulipo, for example. However, about the twenty-first-century 
modernism of Self and of McCarthy there is something of the Sealed Knot. For all 
their declarations and their (self-consciously) modernist effects, these are not 
modernist novels as such – and how could they be? – but novels about modernism. 
They might eschew McEwan et al.’s traditionalist frame of reference, swapping 
Woolf and Eliot for a fuller engagement with European high modernism and the 
avant-garde, but their “modernist novels” remain re-inscriptions of modernism. Ones 
that adopt its pre-existing codes, tropes and conventions for the sake of nostalgia – 
which, it bears repeating, doth not modernism make. The troubled category of 
literary modernism, ever loose to the point of unwieldy, now seems to mean simply a 
better class (that is, borrowed from the isms of the European avant-garde) of literary 
allusion. All too often, it is employed merely as a signifier of solidity, of seriousness, 
of authenticity or of difficulty.  
For Josipovici, what has been crucially ignored by British book culture are the 
ways in which modernism represents the ‘coming into awareness by art of its 
precarious status and responsibilities’ and will therefore ‘from now on, always be 
with us’.47 The problem is that, to a certain extent, it always has. The by now 
ritualised disavowal of the new in British fiction by Josipovici, McCarthy and co. 
tends to rely upon the same bowdlerised version of literary history as their sworn 
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adversaries. And by merely reiterating the “unjust” lore of literary history, they cast 
the experimental writer as a piously lachrymose figure, burdened by the “tragic flaw” 
of their ‘potentially fatal’ inheritance, engaged in a foolhardy yet heroic defence of an 
ailing art form – not to mention the problematic ways in which they tend to reiterate 
traditional associations between artistic outsiderdom and suicidal tendencies, quite 
as if unbearable emotional disturbance is naturally, even rightly, the price exacted 
for uncommon artistic creativity. Moreover, their romantic vision of the wearied 
writer, with its connotations of duty and commitment, resonates rather uncannily with 
the Eliot-Leavis orthodoxy’s creed of the moral aesthetic.  
Like Stewart Home, then, from whose self-consciously Quin-citing novel, 69 
Things to Do with a Dead Princess (2002), the epigraph to this section is borrowed, 
in this thesis I turn to Quin in order to broaden the critical focus beyond Johnson, 
whose elevation as the tragic icon of British experimental writing – the exception that 
proves the rule of British literary history – has tended to preclude the more rigorous 
and thorough engagement with this tendency. Equally, within critical accounts of the 
legacies of modernist experiment, Beckett has tended to overshadow his lesser-
known counterparts upon whom, by attempting to carve out a literary and cultural 
context for Quin in this study, I want to refocus attention. Hence, notably he too 
makes only a fleeting appearance here. 
But, besides this, and more importantly, by detouring towards Quin I will 
attempt to make a timely intervention in current debates about the forms and 
functions of fiction. Dominic Head has proposed that the ‘perennial debate about the 
health of the novel in Britain’48 has been sustained by the blind spots in twentieth-
century literary history, that twenty-first-century British fiction lacks an anxiety of 
influence, an historical awareness of its own precedents. Without a ‘proper sense of 
historical continuity’,49 Head writes, the British contemporary novel has been left to 
‘wither on the vine’50. This study, via the reassessment of Quin’s fictional oeuvre, will 
seek to refocus critical attention upon a period of fictional innovation in the sixties 
which, despite the recent attempts to reshuffle literary history, has largely remained 
consigned to that ‘back bedroom’. Whilst the thirties, forties and fifties have in recent 
years been subject to renewed critical attention, the splendid isolation of the 
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innovative writing of the sixties has remained broadly unrelieved. Picador, Dalkey 
Archive Press and Carcanet have republished significant numbers of these novels. 
But accompanying critical commentaries have often sought to place them within an 
already-constituted canon, without recognising fully the ways in which such writing 
challenges established canonical premises. Thus the British experimental novel has 
remained an aberrant appendage tacked onto the master narrative of literary history. 
By returning to the sixties, to re-examine their cultural and intellectual climate, this 
study will attempt to investigate the historical forces that have precipitated its 
marginalisation and seek to attest to its significance: for the ways in which by 
developing and modifying the achievements of modernism, whilst self-consciously 
warning against the easy consolations of postmodernism, the novels of this 
tendency speculate upon a “hidden” history of the development of the novel in the 
late twentieth century and beyond.  
Against the recent critical elevation of these aesthetically and theoretically 
problematic historical revisions and reinventions of modernism, this study will 
attempt to develop an alternative account of the legacies of modernism and 
modernist experimentation. I have argued that as surety of the mode’s moral and 
aesthetic integrity, in response to pre-existing claims about its “decadence”, critics 
and authors have sought to assert a meek and mild version of modernism, or else 
situate it as in the main a spiritually and geographically exilic phenomenon which, in 
its dotage, via an older generation of modernist writers, returned “home” and went 
gently into the good night, before being categorically snuffed out by World War II. By 
exploring its influence upon Quin, in part this study will attempt to recast the story of 
British modernism. Against, on the one hand, Josipovici, McCarthy et al.’s elegies for 
modernism as the great lost cause of twentieth-century literary history and, on the 
other, those accounts that, as the aforementioned commentators rightly point out, 
persistently neglect the on-going influence of a vital and innovative mode of 
modernist literary practice in Britain, I will explore the ways in which Quin and others 
engage with, navigate and transform the legacies of modernism. This study will 
attempt to situate Quin in relation to a lineage of the late-modern, after-modern, not-
quite-post-modern writers, such as Elizabeth Bowen, Henry Green, William Sansom, 
Rayner Heppenstall, Muriel Spark, Iris Murdoch and others who occupy a peculiar 
literary no man’s land between, on the one hand, what is perceived as a tenor of late 
modernism thought to be too quirky to categorise or merely the outlying death throes 
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of modernism proper and, on the other, an even more critically “awkward” mode of 
fifties and sixties writing in which authors like Spark and Murdoch have tended to be 
situated as the – albeit brilliantly singular – adjuncts to a dominant mode of post-war 
realism. And in this way, a different picture of the experimental writer will emerge: 
not as a tragically out-of-time and fatally outlying figure, whose dissembling of the 
novel form parallels the dissembling of their self, a kind of human sacrifice to the 
effort in vain to make art count. But one working within an – albeit often “hidden” – 
tradition who sought not to martyr themselves for their art, but who was driven by the 
rich, generative possibilities of an art that was necessary but not sufficient, a 
literature not of exhaustion, to use the term popularised during the time in an 
eponymous essay by the American writer, John Barth, but as Barth’s less 
remembered amendment to his earlier article has it, a ‘literature of replenishment’.51  
This study’s methodology will attempt to draw together the critical practices of 
close reading and narratological analysis with the exploration of cultural, intellectual 
and literary history. And as such, it represents not only a kind of apologia for Quin, 
but also for a way of criticism: an approach to the literary object of study that seeks 
to re-integrate textual analysis, with theoretical engagement, with the exploration of 
historical contexts. On the one hand, by re-stitching and re-situating Quin’s work 
back into its cultural contexts, I seek to circumvent the theoretical approach of the 
literary criticism that was pre-dominant within the academy after the importation of 
continental theory in the mid-to-late seventies – and to which literary critics still 
frequently make recourse when attempting to engage with “difficult” or “unreadable” 
experimental texts: where the literary work is “grafted on” as a textual exemplar of 
the theoretical insights of Deleuze, of Derrida, or of Levinas, for example. By 
situating experimental writing as mere grist to the mill of “Theory” this ahistorical 
approach neglects to account for the ways in which the work of fiction participates 
reciprocally in the contexts within which it was (and continues to be) written and read 
and, in this way, simply serves to reiterate the old misconceptions about the 
“marginality” of experimental writing. And by overburdening the literary work with 
obligations to the theory, this approach enacts a kind of critical confirmation bias, 
which consistently draws the text towards the theory and not the theory towards the 
text, at the expense of fully and sensitively engaging with the formal and aesthetic 
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dimensions of fiction. Moreover, it asserts an implicit hierarchy of knowledge which 
privileges theory over fiction, and in which it invariably falls to the theory to 
assimilate the fiction into the cultural master text. And in doing so, these critical 
accounts fail to acknowledge how the novel tradition, with its complex mediations 
between referential and aesthetic functions, is an inherently sceptical mode that is 
‘from the very first self-conscious’52. More specifically, such accounts fail to 
recognise the ways in which theoretical practice, especially in Britain, given the 
liberal temper of Britain’s intellectual tradition, has long been the domain of the 
novel. Iris Murdoch notes, in her 1961 essay “Against Dryness”, that prose fiction 
has taken on the tasks of philosophy as the ‘guide and the mirror of its age’.53 These 
theory-heavy accounts neglect the ways in which throughout its history the novel in 
Britain has been employed to intuit and work through systems of knowledge that 
elsewhere would belong to other fields of culture. 
On the other hand, my methodology is a response to the more recent critical 
approaches of the explicitly political new historicism and cultural materialism of the 
eighties (seen in the work of Stephen Greenblatt, Louis Montrose, Peter Stallybrass, 
Alan Sinfield and Catherine Belsey, for example) and the more socially-preoccupied 
“new new historicism” (of, for example, Joy Wiltenberg, Frances E. Doran and Ann 
Jensen Adams) that superseded it during the nineties. Itself a reaction to the 
predominance of theory, these approaches sought variously to refocus critical 
attention upon the ordinary, the familiar, the low – that which de Certeau influentially 
designates as ‘the everyday’54 – by employing a rubric of objects and practices and 
privileging anecdotes over schemata. This critical tendency has precipitated a rash 
of readings peculiarly preoccupied with, for example, luggage, coins, mirrors and 
furniture, deploying these goods as an optic through which to gain access to their 
cotemporal context. But – leaving aside the critiques of their lack of historical rigor 
and disciplinary specialism that this school of literary criticism has met with, and the 
objection sustained by Marxist thinkers to their lack of attention to the material 
conditions in which these objects were produced and therefore the class tensions 
                                                          
52
 Patricia Waugh, “Postmodern Fiction and the Rise of Critical Theory,” in A Companion to the British and 
Irish Novel 1945-2000, ed. B.W. Schaffer (London: Blackwell, 2011), 93. 
53
 Iris Murdoch, “Against Dryness,” in The Novel Today: Contemporary Writers on Modern Fiction, ed. 
Malcolm Bradbury (London: Fontana, 1977), 23. 
54
 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).  
21 
 
they embody55 – in their efforts to dismantle cultural hierarchy these accounts tend 
to flatten out the history of cultural practices and representations. And in doing so, 
the novel becomes just one more historical phenomenon amongst many, its 
singularity, and the complex mediations between the novel and the social world, 
submerged.  
 The question remains: why Quin? As a literary figure of the sixties, I argue, 
her credentials were unimpeachable. Chapter One of this study records her myriad 
connections and affiliations amongst the great and the good of British, European and 
American countercultural and avant-garde scenes. But, more importantly, Quin’s 
novelistic oeuvre seems to lend itself to the remapping of the literary sixties, 
stretching, as it does, from the British noir, Patrick Hamilton-esque fiction of the 
absurd of Berg (1964), her well-received debut, to the supremely “texty”, avant-pop, 
Tripticks (1971), a Burroughsian romp through the furthest reaches of mediatised 
man, via the late modernist and nouveau roman inflected Three (1966), a self-
conscious mediation upon the nature of fiction and Passages (1969), a Durrellian 
journey-without-maps that presses the possibilities of liberation. As a bridge across 
the no-man’s land of mid-century fiction, from the world of Woolf and Lawrence, to 
that of William Burroughs and Kathy Acker, and from the preoccupations of the 
Angry Young Men, to those of the nouveaux romanciers, in this study, Quin’s scant 
corpus provides a focal point around which to corral the writing, the thought and the 
events of the sixties. This study returns to these four novels, together with around a 
dozen short stories and occasional pieces,56 to explore their resonances with the 
work of both fellow experimental novelists such as Christine Brooke-Rose, Brigid 
Brophy and Alan Burns, and with those more mainstream writers of the sixties 
whose literary-historical fate has been luckier: Lessing, Muriel Spark, Iris Murdoch, 
John Fowles and Lawrence Durrell, amongst others. I also look across the channel, 
to examine the influence upon Quin of the Sadeian tradition of French writing and 
the nouveau roman, both of which are frequently pinpointed as likely progenitors for 
Quin’s work but the complexities of these lines of transmission between French and 
British writing and, I argue, the reciprocal nature of this relationship, seldom 
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interrogated. Rooting further into the back bedroom of British fiction, I attempt to 
develop a literary lineage for the experimental writing of the mid-century amongst the 
work of Elizabeth Bowen, William Sansom, Henry Green, Ivy Compton Burnett and 
others and attest to the existence of a native version of experiment which draws 
sustenance from modernism but persists long after its generally agreed-upon 
terminus: the literary watershed of World War II.   
From the close readings of these texts and their literary contexts, my 
discussion branches out to examine the work of Quin and her coterie in dialogue 
both with their social world and with the thought of the period. Within this study, I 
want to reorient the problematic relation between the novel and history, which 
perceives a necessary connection between the luminosity of the events of history 
and the value of artistic representation, which has tended to govern existing literary-
historical accounts of twentieth-century fiction. Eschewing an approach that is more 
attuned to the vagaries of historical periodisation, location and positioning than to the 
practice of writing itself – and with the caveat that adversity and dissonance are 
surely the meat and bread of artistic energies – I want to more rigorously interrogate 
the ways in which the novels of the period attempted to navigate the pressing 
questions raised by the history and the thought of the period: those of truth, identity, 
gender, contingency, faith and meaning.  
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Quin the Sorceress: A Biographical Disclaimer 
 
She was striking, pale, brilliant red lipstick on full lips, jet black hair about her 
shoulders in a black page boy, sharp, Irish features and the body of a 
voluptuous young model. I don’t know what her story was with Bob, but at a 
picnic in a green square with eight or nine guests she took the can of beer in 
her hand and from about four feet away on the grass, hurled it at him. Her aim 
was off, and it struck Michael Hamburger instead. I can still hear Hamburger’s 
high, thin voice, incredulous, asking, “What did I do?”1 
 
She can be, variously, the expected demure young lady, or else the barstool 
swinging drunken broad. It doesn’t really seem to matter that much to her. She 
is an age hard to determine. Very young, quite probably, five or six, in her own 
mind, but also markedly old, looking down on it, whatever, some other persons 
or circumstances, from that abstract wiseness.2 
 
Bob was reading with Ted Hughes and, I think Auden at that grand theatre by 
the Thames, Festival Hall, during that season’s poetry festival. Ann and I for 
some reason came late… The reading had begun and… [w]e were asked not 
to push into the hall until applause signalled that one of the poets had 
concluded and another was about to begin. There were huge nickel chrome 
cuspidors filled with sand, of a kind that mostly harboured cigarette butts but 
were originally spittoons. As the foyer’s leather doors, studded with brass 
nails, closed leaving us alone, Ann suddenly hoisted herself up on one of 
these spittoons, lifted her dress and “went to the bathroom.” I looked away – 
afraid we were going to be hauled off to the Tower. The applause broke out 
before anyone else joined us and we pushed into the hall to hear Bob read. As 
I glanced back, I saw two long turds sitting in the sand.3 
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As the anecdotes above attest, Ann Quin presents the very juiciest of biographical 
subjects. In the profiles of her that appeared within the literary press at the time, one 
can almost detect the lascivious licking of literary journalists’ stiff upper lips when 
confronted with this “Miss Quin” with her shapely legs and her propensity for candid 
self-reflection upon her peripatetic lifestyle, unconventional relationships, prolific drug 
use and episodic mental illness. To paraphrase her contemporary Christine Brooke-
Rose’s wittily furious essay “Illiterations”: to be an experimental author is one thing, 
but to be British, and not only British but a woman, and not only a woman, but 
working class, is quite another.4 For Brooke-Rose, the three words experimental 
woman writer presented three difficulties, a trilemma. Quin, however, confronted 
rather more.  
Ann Quin was born in Brighton in 1936, the only daughter of unmarried 
parents – her mother, Ann Reid, a Scot and her father, Nicholas Montague, a 
sometime opera singer, Irish – who separated soon after she was born. A non-
Catholic, she was educated for eight years at the Convent of the Blessed 
Sacrament, East Sussex, a period she recounts in the memoir “Leaving School – XI”, 
where, she writes, her mother hoped she might ‘be brought up ‘a lady’.5 In the event, 
Quin was more interested, she comments, in speculating upon ‘the colour of 
Mademoiselle’s bloomers’, ‘what the nuns wore in bed’ and whether ‘they stripped 
completely for a bath’ than learning ‘the coal fields… [t]he Corn Law… [a]mo, amas, 
amat [and] “Ode to a Nightingale” off by heart.’6 That said, convent school seems to 
have bestowed upon Quin a fervent adolescent religiosity, although one, typically, 
more imaginatively attuned to Sadeian notions of natural depravity and 
transcendence through suffering than the dogmas of divine purity: ‘A ritualistic 
culture that gave me a conscience. A death wish and a sense of sin. Also a great lust 
to find out, experience what evil really was.’7 The cosmography of Catholic doctrine 
had a powerful influence upon Quin’s burgeoning metaphysical imagination. She 
certainly had no truck with heaven and hell but identified deeply with the idea of 
Limbo, that border land of the afterlife reserved for those who die without sin but 
whose original sin has not been baptised away, where souls are suspended in 
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oblivion, debarred both from the punishments of hell and the eternal existence with 
God in heaven. ‘Not being baptized, that was where my soul, uncleansed from 
Original Sin, would end up, I believed in that then’, she writes.8 In both writing and in 
life Quin was to occupy this liminal region, a place beyond the quotidian, but from 
whence it is impossible to ascend. She is, perhaps, the chronicler par excellence of 
the non-place of earthly oblivion. Her fictions measure, and then press in vain 
against, the boundaries of the mundane world. They are peopled with locked-in 
characters making fruitless attempts to ward off the void of immanence by, for 
example, constructing elaborate oedipal plots of self-mastery (Berg), building 
cathedrals of bourgeois materialism (Three), attempting to invoke divine madness 
(Passages), or committing existential crimes of passion (Tripticks) who are finally 
consigned to an oblivion that is inexorable, inescapable, that simply revolves in 
perpetuity. Berg abandons its protagonist to bed-sitting extinction, the 
admonishments of his unwillingly-taken Jocasta ringing in his ears. We leave Ruth 
and Leonard, the protagonists of Three, to the death-in-life of middle-class 
mediocrity with its cover blown. Passages is a quest that is finally without an object 
but equally ‘[n]o country we can return to’.9 Tripticks closes with its aphasiac 
protagonist no longer even able to voice his protest.  
Quin was a woman of the sixties who eschewed both of the dual feminine 
roles – the equally oppressive options of becoming a domestic maven and thereby 
sacrificing one’s wider aspirations or of becoming a career-oriented professional in 
the male-dominated world of work – that those of her gender found themselves so 
impossibly torn between during the era. The first she was categorically 
unpredisposed to, and the second, as a non-university educated working class 
woman, was out of reach. She, as was so often her wont, chose a third: that of the 
“gonzo” novelist, creating her own biographical picaresque of writing, journeying and 
free-loving across Europe and America, living hand to mouth by the grace and favour 
of her publisher’s advances, Arts Council grants and university fellowships.  
Few British writers of the period were so “tuned in” to the countercultural 
demi-monde of the sixties in both Britain and America. Quin was part of a 
remarkable stable of authors published, or more properly, patronised, in the old-
fashioned sense of providing financial support on the never never that was only ever 
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loosely related to sales, and a vaguer kind of emotional nurturing, intellectual 
sympathy and cultural steering, by John Calder and Marion Boyars of the celebrated 
publishing house, Calder and Boyars. During the sixties their list included translated 
classics by Chekov, Goethe and Zola alongside banned books by American writers 
like Henry Miller and William Burroughs, the “new novels” of nouveaux romanciers 
like Alain Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie Sarraute, Marguerite Duras and Claude Simon, the 
work of other European writers and playwrights like Heinrich Böll, Eugene Ionesco 
and Peter Weiss, experimental novels by British writers such as Alan Burns, Eva 
Tucker and R.C. Kennedy and the work of Samuel Beckett. Theirs was a list so 
singular and so audaciously experimental, that amongst the literary press it inspired 
the epithet “Calderism” used to denote pejoratively a high literary style of “wilful” 
difficulty and “ostentatious” avant-gardism.10 Calder himself remains indelibly 
associated with the cultural ferment of the sixties for his founding of the Society for 
the Defence of Literature and the Arts in 1968 in response to a late sixties backlash 
against permissiveness and his defence in the obscenity trials of Alexander Trocchi’s 
Cain’s Book in 1964 and of Hubert Selby Jr.’s Last Exit to Brooklyn in 1968, which 
were to become flashpoints in sixties debates about permissiveness. Her links within 
the world of film are equally unimpeachable. Berg was optioned and considered by 
producers and directors including Roman Polanski, Robert Altman and Richard 
Lester (who directed the Beatles films A Hard Day’s Night and Help! as well sixties 
comedies like The Bed-Sitting Room).11  
Quin also, rarely amongst the British writers of the period – with the significant 
exception of Alexander Trocchi, in whose freewheeling footsteps she followed – 
made the transition to America. Though she appears to have been somewhat less 
keen at first on Americans themselves, calling them, in one of her many letters back 
to her publishers, ‘Yankee Apple Icecream people’ whose ‘lives [are] like gobbled 
gum with the teeth marks showing’ and who ‘even have a schedule (skedule!) for 
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suffering',12 Quin, writes her friend Paddy Kitchen, ‘immersed herself in aspects of 
America with relish’13. She was even enlisted, as part of a short-lived gig with the 
Scotsman, to report back on her exploits Stateside as a Joan Didion-style “gonzo” 
journalist.14 In 1965, on the strength of Berg, and recommended by her then lover, 
the American poet, Robert Creeley, whom she had met on his book tour in London 
the year before,15 Quin was awarded the D.H. Lawrence Fellowship by the University 
of New Mexico, of which she was the first female recipient. That same year, 
proposed by Creeley and her (rather unlikely) alleged former lover, the British writer 
and fascist sympathiser, most famous for his 1927 novel, Tarka the Otter, Henry 
Williamson,16 she was awarded the Harkness Fellowship for most promising 
Commonwealth writer under thirty. Arriving in Placitas, New Mexico, in the spring of 
1965, where she cohabited with Creeley and his wife, Bobbie, Quin plunged herself 
into the alternative living scene, and mixed with the great and the good of American 
poetry, forming romantic relationships first with Creeley, one of the founding fathers 
of the Black Mountain school, and later with Robert Sward, who taught at the 
prestigious Iowa Writer’s workshop.17 She stayed two years, leaving New Mexico for 
San Francisco, California in late 1965, where she took a flat in Sausalito overlooking 
the Golden Gate Bridge and near to where Alan Watts, author of hippy bible, The 
Way of Zen (1957), had moored his houseboat.18 Later, she moved to Iowa where 
Sward, her then boyfriend, taught at the University of Iowa’s prestigious Writer’s 
Workshop. She and Sward returned to England in mid-1967, but returned to the 
Americas in April 1968, where she stayed first in Mexico City with the editor of 
countercultural literary magazine, El Corno Emplumando, Meg Randall, then in San 
Miguel, and then with the American writer, Robert Cohen, with whom Sward and 
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Quin collaborated,19 before returning to England without Sward, after their 
relationship ended.20 
Although her published oeuvre comprises novels, that is, extended works of 
narrative fiction – notwithstanding her wicked way with notions of narrative linearity 
and causality which, I argue, demand a timely expansion in our thinking of what such 
a category might mean – Quin wrote poetry throughout her life, and tended to refer 
to herself as a poet, rather than a novelist. As “Leaving Home – XI” recounts, it was 
with poetry that she enjoyed her first literary success, winning a 10s. prize for a 
sonnet entitled “The Lost Seagull”.21 The critical reception of Quin’s novels in Britain, 
like those of her experimentalist peers like Johnson, Brooke-Rose and Brophy, was 
marked by hostility towards the audacity of her reworking of the ancient and 
venerable tradition of the novel form. With Quin, critics reserved their ire for her 
novels’ admixture of the techniques of fictional narrative with the language of poetry; 
her prose is infused with the ambiguity, indeterminacy and rhythms that are, 
traditionally, the domain of that which is enshrined as the poetic. In their approach to 
Quin’s writing, literary critics, preferring their novels to be novels and their poems to 
be poems, tend to invoke the critical paradox that appears again and again in the 
press cuttings devoted to – but, by no means devotional towards – the innovative 
writing of the period: where literary experimentation is perceived, at once, as an 
insolent neologism and a time-worn anachronism. For Daniel Stern, reviewing Three, 
Quin’s novel is ‘what used to be called “experimental”’.22 It is an unwelcome literary 
throwback, which belongs ‘[s]omewhere back in the dim mists of B.F.M.F. (Before 
Ford Madox Ford)’.23 That is, back when ‘someone decided that what the modern 
novel needed to give it new vitality was an infusion of the materials of poetry’.24 Her 
‘digressive […] unfortunate [and] almost arbitrary experimentalism’ speaks with the 
poetic, ‘old-fashioned tongue’ of the historical avant-garde.25 But in America, where 
Quin was inducted into the post-Beat poetry scene of New Mexico and California, 
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shacking up with Robert Creeley and his wife in Placitas, and mixing with local poets 
including Larry Goodall, Bill Dodd and Neil Nelson with whom she drove across the 
mesa to attend the Berkeley Poetry Congress of 1965 (which Creeley attended with 
his wife),26 Quin’s writing was to find a kind of home in exile amongst what became 
known, after Donald Allen’s 1960 anthology of the same name, as the New American 
Poetry, which drew together the poets of the Black Mountain School – of which 
Creeley, her lover, was a leading figure – the New York School and the San 
Francisco Renaissance. Sward, reviewing his then lover, counts her alongside 
Sorrentino, Philip Whalen and Harold Fleming, as ‘poets at novels’ and recognises 
the boon that poetic endeavour within the novel form presents to the  poet-novelist in 
terms of its ‘varying shades of attention, duration […] and the building or setting-forth 
of people-place interactions of some size and complexity.’27 In fact, for Sward, Quin 
was less a poet and more a sorceress after Jules Michelet, the well-spring of 
uncontainable and rebellious poetic energies who disrupts official discourse.  
But despite these credentials that attest to Quin’s neglected significance as a 
key literary figure of the sixties – the ways in which, for example, she bridges the 
divide between European and American avant-garde traditions of writing and her 
uncommon status as a female, working-class, experimental writer – still, I am leery 
about tackling her life here by way of the conventional exercise in setting it as the 
immediate context for her writing. The definitive mode of the Barthesian critical 
dogma that insists upon the textual dispossession of the author, upon the careful and 
thorough bisection of writer and work might, more-or-less, have lapsed, but with 
Quin, it seems ethical to invoke it. For in the drawing together of the life and the 
work, the very attributes that make Quin such a singular and significant biographical 
subject threaten the eclipse of the singularity and significance of the fiction. Writing 
from female-ness, from working-class-ness and, especially, from madness, have all 
similarly and all too often been related, associated with romantic notions about 
artlessness, “emotionality” and a lack of control. Both affirmatively and negatively, 
this critical approach to writing from these – and other – margins tends to subsume 
the discrimination, organisation, craft and, indeed, graft that is the necessarily 
intentional scaffold of so-called creative “genius”, burying these hard-earned skills of 
the trade under magical talk of savant intuition and the tapping of muses. For many 
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critics, the vision of Quin as an autodidact, an outsider novelist, even a literary idiot 
savant, whose abilities can be credited to her careful genning up on the backlist 
during her lunch breaks whilst she worked as a secretary at the publisher 
Hutchinson’s prior to the publication of her first novel, has been a seductive one. But 
the elevation to the status of icon of the writer as some quasi-mystical vessel for lyric 
inspiration from the beyond tends to result, on the one hand, in the usurping by a cult 
of personality of the work itself as the rightful focus of criticism; on the other, it 
produces the somewhat paradoxical disappearance of the writer as the rightful 
author of their own work, the detached locus of meaning, agency and control.  
Invoking the troubled legacies of Sylvia Plath here feels almost unavoidable. 
Perhaps more so than any other literary figure, the American writer’s work – along 
with her posthumous dignity – has all but receded beneath a biographical clamour. 
Most recently, this year, the fiftieth anniversary of her death, in a review of two new 
biographies of Plath by Andrew Wilson and Cary Rollyson, the critic Terry Castle has 
written vituperatively of the ‘unsavory… ongoing interest in Plath’s story’ and the 
‘inflaming conflict and scandal’ surrounding her biography.28  
The American writer Joyce Carol Oates has coined the term “pathography” to 
denote the kind of exposing biographical attention that has been brought to bear 
upon subjects like Robert Frost, Sylvia Plath and John Berryman, amongst many 
others.29 As ‘hagiography’s diminished and often prurient twin’, the pathographer 
attempts to support claims for the cultural significance of their subject not by 
focussing upon their creative achievements, or the important ways in which the story 
of their lives and the story of the era dovetail, but by chronicling the scandalous and 
seamy underbelly of their lives, posing the question, writes Oates: ‘How did such a 
distinguished body of work emerge from so undistinguished a life?’30 The 
pathography’s emphasis lies not with accomplishment or a life well-lived, but on 
‘“failed promise” if not outright “tragedy”’:31  
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Its motifs are dysfunction and disaster, illnesses and pratfalls, failed marriages 
and failed careers, alcoholism and breakdowns and outrageous conduct. 32 
 
Perhaps the most notorious, most intimate and arguably most astonishingly unethical 
of this ilk is Diane Wood Middlebrook’s titular biography of the American poet, Anne 
Sexton, which draws upon Sexton’s medical records and more than 300 audiotapes 
of therapy sessions released by her psychiatrist, Dr. Martin T. Orne with the 
permission of Sexton’s literary executor, her daughter, Linda Gray Sexton.33  
Sexton herself famously declared in the New York Times in 1969: ‘I hold back 
nothing’34. And indeed Quin’s own psychiatrists in 1970 wrote to Marion Boyars to 
request copies of her books, perhaps hoping to find therein the kind of brutally frank 
novelistic self-exposure that might solve the riddle of Quin’s psychic distress.  Since 
their mid-century heyday, the relative “truth” of these poets’ “confessions” has 
occupied both their pathographers and critics alike. But it would be a critical blunder 
to look, like Quin’s clinicians, to the writing to extrapolate the life. Certainly, Quin’s 
work might be called auto-biographical; it is deeply intimate, wickedly indecorous 
and, like the confessional poets with whom Sexton is affiliated, explores a gamut of 
provocative themes which in those tranquilised times were generally considered best 
swept under the carpet: infidelity, sadomasochism, childhood neglect and mental 
illness. Like them, Quin was concerned with the discovery and the expression of an 
authentic, private self. However, she was by no means convinced about the abilities 
of language to uncover and lyrically express this self, and she remained deeply 
sceptical about what this psychological liberation might provide.  
Quin, who suffered frequent and extirpative bouts of mental illness and, like 
so many of these pathographical subjects, died young, at thirty-seven, and by her 
own hand, drowning off the coast of Brighton in the summer of 1973, left behind a 
cache of four published novels, several more that remain wholly or partially 
unpublished or unfinished and around a dozen short stories to be stashed in the 
furthest corners of twentieth-century literary history.35 She too would certainly 
present a ripe enough subject for the pathographer. Kitchen, in a 1979 essay 
chronicling their friendship prior to the publication of Quin’s debut novel Berg in the 
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late fifties, recalls Quin’s early ‘depressions’. She suffered her first psychic 
breakdown whilst working as a waitress in the Cornish fishing village of Mevagissey, 
of which she wrote: 
 
I collapsed one morning… I lay in bed for days, weeks, unable to face the 
sun. If I went out into the garden, I dug holes and lay in them weeping. I woke 
up in the middle of the night screaming, convinced my tears were rivers of 
blood.36 
 
Quin consulted a psychiatrist who, writes Kitchen, ‘found Ann’s wild imaginings way 
beyond her scope’,37 and decided that ‘[t]he loneliness of going over the edge was 
worse than the absurdity of coping with day to day living’.38 But by the end of the 
sixties the delicate balance between these two poles had shifted. In 1969 she used 
an Arts Council grant she had been awarded for her third novel, Passages (1969), to 
fund her own extended journey across Ireland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
where she was apprehended by police as she lay naked in a snowdrift and brought 
back to London by her publisher, Marion Boyars.39 This was, she writes to Kitchen, ‘a 
fantastic and most disturbing… crisis in my life’: 
 
If it hadn’t been for a few guardians several weeks ago I might well have been 
in the Cassel [the Surrey mental health hospital] or some such place 
undergoing various ‘shock’ treatments to ‘rehabilitate’ me back to this insane 
society. Ah well, so I live, I hope, I love, and feel much like a five year old 
child.40  
 
Her worries about the possibility of undergoing electro-convulsive therapy 
were well-founded. She did, in the end, undergo the treatment in Sweden and also in 
London upon returning, where she sought ‘space/stillness in which to gather 
strength’.41 Following the publication of Tripticks, during the writing of which she had 
supported herself by waitressing in Notting Hill, Quin upped sticks again to 
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Switzerland, where she suffered another psychic breakdown and an attack of 
aphasia, whereupon she spent a month in a London hospital unable to speak.42 In 
what follows, I explore how the idea of speechlessness was to become central to her 
oeuvre.  
The ‘voyage out’ was like this for Quin; travels on the map and travels in the 
mind were inextricably linked – as she depicts in fiction in her earlier novel, 
Passages – and venturing too far off the edge of the latter would result in a reluctant 
homecoming. In The Unmapped Country, Quin’s final unpublished novel, which was 
written circa 1973 and remained unpublished at the time of her death, she draws 
upon her experiences of mental illness and of psychiatric institutions. Notably, this is 
the most broadly realist of her works and, like Ken Kesey’s One Flew over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest (1962) or Kate Millett’s later novel, A Loony-Bin Trip (1990), is a 
trenchant critique of mainstream psychiatric care set in a Foucauldian world of 
regimentation, medication and infantilisation. Protagonist Sandra is a rebellious 
internee who has been sequestered there for ‘losing control’43 and who resolutely 
refuses to drink the kool aid. She disputes her diagnosis, flushes the pills down the 
toilet, runs rings around her psychiatrists and attempts to resist the babying, invasive 
care of the nurses: 
 
“Sandra do her peepees now. Sandra do her two-twos now…Put on that coat 
Sandra. Put that book down when I’m talking to you… Don’t go in for petting 
with men Sandra it leads to other things. Sandra do you hear me…?” 
Yes I hear you all my mothers and fathers will you ever stop? Stop.44  
 
Quin’s intimate and affectionate correspondence with her publisher, Boyars, 
missives typewritten often on the backs of envelopes and postcards from far-flung 
locales all sealed with her spiky, anarchic signature, provide a kind of graphological 
chronicle of her psychic debilitation. Her first, tentative letters prior to the publication 
of Berg are thoroughly fifties-formal and altogether business-like, but are quickly 
superseded by type-written dispatches from exotic locations that giddily describe 
new romances, places and experiences, interspersed with frequent and self-
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consciously brazen requests for speculative advances upon unwritten books and 
eager enquiries about the placement of stories in magazines like Vogue, Penthouse 
and Harper’s and Queen and the selling of foreign rights. But in the final years of 
Quin’s life there is a marked change in tone. The audacious buoyancy and 
bedraggled optimism of her earlier letters is replaced by gloomy lassitude. The 
letters are a handwritten, almost illegible scrawl now; they even more frequently ask 
for further advances upon books that have still not appeared and relate a much 
diminished life spent in the main caring for her ill, elderly mother. However, there 
were bright spots in her final years. She was galvanised by a period of study at a 
further education college in Surbiton and in the autumn of 1973 was due to take up a 
place on the University of East Anglia’s prestigious creative writing course, taught by 
Malcolm Bradbury and Angus Wilson, whose first intake, in 1970, had comprised as 
its sole student one Ian McEwan. But in late August she waded out to sea just east 
of the Palace Pier in Brighton and her body was washed up the next day west along 
the coast at Shoreham Harbour.  
 
 
On the Difference Between Waving and Drowning 
  
Drowning is the quintessentially female way of death. With its symbolic associations 
of engulfment, disintegration and dissolution, in art and literature since at least the 
time of the ancient Greeks, the trope has been employed to depict woman’s 
anguished subsumption by the “dark waters” which themselves correspond 
elementally to the fluidity, irrationality and flux associated with female 
consciousness. Typifying the sublime in nature, water is edgy, at once seductive and 
threatening, and with it artists and writers have sought to metaphorise the 
ambivalence of the overflowing feminine.  ‘You can never bathe in the same river 
twice,’ goes Heraclitus’s proverb. Water is a force of life, identified with birth and 
sustenance, with the womb and the enveloping of the maternal body. As any school-
level literature student will eagerly identify, in previous, more censorious times, sex 
was frequently coded via water. Swimming, they know all too well, always stands for 
the female protagonist’s sexual awakening. But water is also a force of destruction, 
representing the unbridled and mysterious power of nature, identified with 
35 
 
irrationality and the threat of annihilation and death, it is the engulfing abyss that 
overcomes the human.  
And in this way, the lethal immersion and dissolution of the female self has 
been employed to portray the tragic resolution of her impossible predicament. Adrift 
in the masculine world of rationality and reason, female drowning is a ritualised 
sacrifice, it represents symbolically the return of the woman from whence she came. 
For drowning is a form of self-consumption, the means by which women can vanish 
without a trace, without a ripple. In these depictions, by drowning the woman 
scarcely commits suicide at all, but allows herself to drown to death. It connotes the 
feminine surrender of self-sacrifice rather than self-murder. Indeed, as a “passive” 
form of self-immolation, as Olive Anderson explains, during the nineteenth century 
amongst women drowning was the preferred method of killing oneself; via the death 
certificate euphemism “found drowned” the victim and her family were able to evade 
both the social stigma and the legal ramifications of suicide.45  
The best-known example of female drowning in literature is perhaps Hamlet’s 
Ophelia, whom Elaine Showalter, in her landmark study The Female Malady, 
identifies as the archetypal figure of the literary madwoman.46 By the nineteenth 
century, the trope of the drowned woman is almost inescapable, seen in, for 
example, the women Romantic poets’ invocations of Sappho, the Pre-Raphaelite 
paintings of George Frederic Watts and John Everett Millias, the popular sculpture 
Shipwrecked Woman and Child by Edward A Brackett, and in Kate Chopin’s The 
Awakening, in George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, Stephen Crane’s Maggie: A Girl 
of the Street and in the novels of Dickens who, Barbara T. Gates notes, ‘presented a 
phalanx of fallen women moving towards the Thames’47.  
Drowning is a potent and recurring metaphor throughout Quin’s work. It 
appears in cross-gendered form in Berg’s protagonist’s haplessly Oedipal attempts 
to drown his father-surrogate. We infer it to have been the fate of S. in Three who is 
missing presumed to have drowned and who, her diaries reveal, like her nineteenth-
century predecessors, chooses drowning as a way of death for its ambiguity and 
blamelessness: ‘How easy for a body to drift out, caught up in a current, and never 
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be discovered, or for anyone to ever be certain’.48 It would be a grave mistake, 
however, to read Quin’s body of work, albeit one so thoroughly powered by the death 
drive, as a kind of extended suicide note in which she repeatedly foreshadows in 
fiction the taking of her own life by drowning in 1973. To do so would not only be to 
literalise the metaphor, to make the undergraduate assumption that the fiction 
somehow patterns the life, but to fundamentally misunderstand it. For Quin, as for 
her nineteenth century forebears, the metaphor of drowning operates in more 
complicated ways. It represents not simply the desire for death but also, and at once, 
the potential for living: the final rapprochement of the duelling forces of Eros and 
Thanatos which for Quin are always inextricably bound together. The possibility, that 
is, of transgressing human limits, of accessing a register of experience characterised 
by freedom and formlessness, the falling away of everything except the innermost 
self, and thereby the sweet relief from the inexorably reflexive dilemma of human 
self-consciousness.   
For R.D. Laing, the figurehead of the antipsychiatry movement of the sixties, 
an important context in which the work of Quin is read within this thesis, madness is 
‘the oldest voyage in the world.’49 In his writing, Laing frequently turns to the images 
of the sea and sea-faring to metaphorise his notion of madness as rebirth, a water-
bound “journey” into the depths of the self through which one might return renewed 
and with a greater and more authentic form of “sanity”. ‘[M]adness’, Laing writes, 
‘need not be all breakdown. It may also be breakthrough. It is potentially liberation 
and renewal as well as enslavement and existential death’.50 So, ‘[t]hat sea forever 
starting and re-starting’51 is where ‘everything begins again’ and the means by which, 
as Paul Valéry writes in ‘The Graveyard by the Sea’, we escape from and are ‘hurled 
back to living’,52 souls restored:  
 
One sees the old and the familiar in a new and strange way. Often as though 
for the first time. One’s old moorings are lost. One goes back in time.53 
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In the fiction of the sixties and seventies, Laing’s myth of descent becomes a new 
kind of monomyth, which was drawn upon, alongside earlier nineteenth-century 
depictions of health-giving madness in novels like Kate Chopin’s The Awakening an 
Charlotte Perkins Gilmore’s The Yellow Wallpaper, especially by the proto-feminist 
and feminist writing of the period. It patterns stories in which a hero embarks upon a 
quest to claim decisive victory over a hostile and indecipherable world, but contrary 
to the hero’s journey described by Joseph Campbell, in the novels of the period that 
world is not of the supernatural realm but our own, and what Campbell calls the ‘belly 
of the whale’, the very nadir of this unknown world, is located within the mind. 
Examples include Maggie’s moral and spiritual struggles within the “sea of love” in 
Margaret Drabble’s The Waterfall (1977), Iris Murdoch’s The Sea, The Sea, which 
chronicles the watery rebirth of its protagonist Charles Arrowby, the images of diving 
into and re-emerging out of the depths of the unconscious in Margaret Atwood’s 
Surfacing (1972), Marian’s fears of dissolution in The Edible Woman (1969) and the 
submarine underworld of elemental nature that is juxtaposed against the domestic 
sphere in Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping (1980). It is present also in the poetry 
of the period, such as the lone female underwater explorer of Adrienne Rich’s poem, 
“Diving into the Wreck” (1973), in Sylvia Plath’s myriad images of baptism and ritual 
cleansing, and, indeed the motif of drowning, ‘the kindest way to die’, in her novel, 
The Bell Jar.  
In Lessing’s The Golden Notebook, drowning functions in similar ways. 
Protagonist Anna is suspended in that hypnogogic state between sleep and 
wakefulness: ‘all the time I was conscious of lying on the bed, and conscious of 
sleeping, and thinking extraordinarily clearly… I was myself, yet knowing what I 
thought and dreamed’.54 She becomes conscious of another self overlooking the bed 
‘a personality apart from the Anna who lay asleep’.55 As she ‘lay[s] on the surface of 
the dream-water… ready to give in… wanting to go down into the black depths under 
her’,56 the figure attempts to prevent her surrender to disintegration, to draw her 
back, admonishing her: ‘“Anna, you are betraying everything you believe in; you are 
sunk in subjectivity, yourself, your own needs.’”57 This is surely the Communist Anna 
of the red notebook, the rational, reason-orientated, socially-engaged self. Anna (the 
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woman) however, longs for the freedom and formlessness of total immersion in the 
depths: ‘the Anna who wants to slip under the dark water would not answer’.58 The 
psychic disintegration that is signified by Anna’s watery vision is, in the end, 
productive and rejuvenating. For Lessing, as for Laing, of whom she was a keen 
follower during the period, breakdown is a kind of transcendental initiation, the ego-
loss it entails a necessary antidote to society’s psychosis and the cure for the self 
that has taken refuge from a hostile world in solipsism. The journey into madness 
effects the opening up of the self and thereby the possibility of forging healthy 
intersubjective relations with others and the happy truce between the internal and 
external worlds.  
But unlike the work of Lessing, the disintegration of the self in Quin’s novels 
never results in the benign resurrection of the happy and unified consciousness. 
Drowning, for Quin, represents the possibility of transcendence that can only ever 
remain as such. For this state of bliss lies on the friable edge, in fact, just beyond the 
edge of experience, just prior to or concomitant with the self-annihilation of death, 
which is the end of all experience. In this way drowning, for the ways in which it 
represents a kind of bliss, of jouissance, even, that can never be reached, is perhaps 
the central trope of Quin’s oeuvre. These are novels which task their protagonists 
with navigating the supremely delicious and supremely dangerous risk of 
transgressing society’s prohibitions, sexually, psychically and socially pushing 
against the Name of the Father, to explore the limits of reason, rationality and sanity. 
But crucially their liberation projects are never realised and, moreover, the very 
possibility of achieving these promised freedoms is consistently called into question.  
 For the ways in which her novels attempt to articulate the experience of limits, 
Quin’s work could be said to have affiliations with a long tradition of French thinking 
about the concept of écriture that has manifested variously in the Sadeian eroticism 
of Georges Bataille’s The Story of the Eye (1928) and Madame Edwarda (1941), in 
The Story of O (1954) by the pseudonymous author, Pauline Réage (Anne Desclos), 
in Antonin Artaud’s ‘Theatre of Cruelty’ of the thirties and in Maurice Blanchot’s 
radical reinvention of literary language (theorised most notably in his The Space of 
Literature (1955) and fictionally explored in his “récits” and elsewhere). This lineage 
was preoccupied by the pursuit of experience towards (and beyond) its very limits, 
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the attainment of a state of transcendence that requires the inevitable extinction of 
the human; the ‘assent to life even in death’ as Bataille defines it. Refuting Freud’s 
theorisation of the typology of Eros and Thanatos as duelling forces that compete for 
domination of the instincts, within this French tradition of writing, the two converge in 
pursuit of the transgression of the limits of the human, towards a state of 
transcendence which, paradoxically, in the achievement of the fulfilment of the 
human entails the inevitable extinction of it. In her brilliant study of the Sadeian 
tendencies of Bataille, Réage, et al., “The Pornographic Imagination” (1967), Susan 
Sontag, following Roland Barthes’ earlier essay, “The Metaphor of the Eye” (1963), 
argues that through the unwitting, involuntary arousal produced by ‘obscenity’ and 
‘perversity’, the kind of French writing that was perceived within the cultures of 
Anglo-American moralism as that of “dirty books” was capable of suspending the 
reader’s consciousness and thereby of delivering the reader to an affective domain 
of productive uncertainty and of feeling that precedes cognition, reason and 
culture.59 In this way, Sontag argues, the erotic is profoundly – and potentially, highly 
productively – disruptive. Certainly, this tradition of thought, which theorised an 
oppositional space within “deep consciousness” and speculated upon the ways in 
which language, as an agent of the dominant order, might be turned against itself in 
order to access this realm, surfaces again in the sixties and its aftermath, with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of the ‘body without organs’ and, relatedly, 
écriture feminine’s understanding of ‘writing with the body’, which I discuss with 
relation to Quin’s novel Three later in this study. Elaborating upon the insights of the 
symbolist poet, Stéphane Mallarmé, and especially influenced by his essay “Mystery 
in Literature” (1896), in which he advocates a kind of anti-realist writing that is 
capable of conveying (but crucially not revealing) what he calls the ‘something occult 
in men’s hearts,60 these writers and thinkers understand writing as a vehicle of 
sublimity, transcendence, in Bataille’s terms, ‘sovereignty’. Via a mode of corporeal, 
affectively embodied writing, they sought variously to develop a form of expressionist 
rendition that was not subject to the constraints of discursivity, inter-personal 
communication, or the ideological construction of individual selfhood. By 
encouraging us, as Cixous puts it, to ‘hear before comprehension’, their works 
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privilege the matter over the meaning of sense-making, the sensuous pleasures of 
the text over Kantian aesthetic judgement, Nietzschean rapture over realist 
readability, the bodily and the mysterious over the rational and the knowable. And in 
doing so this tradition confronts the quintessential impasse of so-called 
“experimental” writing, posing myriad questions surrounding the hermeneutic issues 
of readability, decipherability and the availability of meaning: How might we read 
texts such as these? Are we capable of the work of interpretation that they task us 
with? Moreover, are the objects of discovery of such a quest capable of being 
communicated? And if we are not or they are not, then what can the role of writing 
be? The writers of this lineage tend to circumvent these issues via the invention of a 
phenomenology of reading and of writing that seeks to reaffirm the capabilities both 
of language to convey authentic truths and of a kind of ideal reader to be open, 
receptive – in Cixous’ words ‘non-resistant’ – to them. But, crucially, Quin is by no 
means so convinced.   
Unlike the French lineage with which her work resonates, Quin’s oeuvre holds 
in delicate, anxious tension a commitment to an intimately expressive mode that 
sought a private language with which to capture the différance of individual 
experience and a no less deeply felt preoccupation with finding a means by which to 
communicate those experiences, with being understood. In “Leaving School”, she 
writes of her reaction to receiving the galleys of Berg: 
 
The dream had been realised, but reading what I had written seemed 
someone else’s dream. A kind of involuntary commitment. And like Camus I 
became aware that, ‘There is in me an anarchy, a frightful disorder. Creating 
costs me a thousand deaths, for it involves an order and my whole being 
rebels against order. But without it I would die scattered.’61 
 
And in this way, despite their uncanny resonances with her extra-textual fate, Quin’s 
fictions are not so much proleptic as analeptic in orientation.  
So many of her characters are troubled by the affliction of belatedness, that 
peculiarly paradoxical sense of temporality designated by Freud and later elaborated 
by Lacan and Derrida, in which the future is experienced as earlier than the past, 
                                                          
61
 Quin, Ann. “Leaving School – XI,” London Magazine 4 (July 1966), 68. 
41 
 
and the past as later than the future. Therefore experience can only be apprehended 
après coup and, in becoming meaningful, is depleted of its presence. Lacan’s 
account of the situation of the decentred, barred human subject, ceaselessly 
chasing, pursuing, their originary loss across the chains of signification, describes 
the ‘retroversion effect’ that is operant upon the self. The language that structures 
the world both precedes those who speak it and is made meaningful only in the 
terms that accede it. And therefore the self can recognise itself only by projecting its 
past into the future: 
 
the subject becomes at each stage what he was before and announces 
himself – he will have been – only in the future perfect tense. [I]n this “rear-
view”, all that the subject can be certain of is the anticipated image coming to 
meet him that he catches of himself in the mirror.62 
 
Similarly, for Derrida the present can never be entirely present, immediate or 
comprehensible. His famous designation of the future anterior in Of Grammatology 
describes a temporal modality governed by a retrospective logic in which ‘[t]rue 
time… is what has been’, where the endlessly-deferred present is merely a future 
memory of what will have happened.63  
Quin’s protagonists arrive too late at life. We find them mired in Orphic 
predicaments, contemplating their hapless and unwitting former selves and trying to 
recover what they can of those unexperienced presents – or even just to articulate 
their loss – furnished only with the insubstantial tools of language and their unreliable 
memories, which, in any case, cannot recover the presence of the past, how it really 
was or how it really felt. They grapple with the Sartrean quandary, elucidated in his 
novel Nausea, wherein the nature of living is profoundly opposed to the nature of 
fiction. Fiction’s false promise of retrospection distorts the nature of real experience 
by retrospectively imposing a narrative order upon that experience. The unnamed 
narrator of Passages, for example, attempts to recall a party she previously 
attended, but finds that the event, dissociatively experienced at the time, recedes 
even further under the attention of memory: 
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What did I see, for when the scene reappears it merges with a dream, fallen 
back into slowly, connected yet not connected in parts. So what I saw then 
was as much a voyeur’s sense. And since it has become heightened. 
Succession of images controlled by choice. I chose then to remain outside. 
Later I entered, allowed other entries. In that room a series of pictures thrown 
on the walls, ceiling, floor, some upsidedown. Only afterwards I could see 
things. More so now in specific detail.64  
 
Or S., the third wheel of Three:  
 
Times when vowing I shall remember this now, which are never so real as 
those flashes – a door unexpectedly opens upon an unfamiliar scene, until 
gradually certain landmarks are retrieved. Nostalgia almost experienced at the 
time, the knowledge in that moment of something never going to be exactly 
the same again. The image frozen. As standing in a lift going neither up nor 
down.65 
 
Brigid Brophy has a neat and typically Rabelaisian image for this human 
quandary. Humans, she comments, cruise the waters of life like whales, their ‘jaws 
wide to snow-plough in the present tense, the plankton of experience’, then ‘excrete 
re-hashed into a continuous narrative in the past tense… You eat; you excrete; but 
you never catch your cells in the act of creating themselves out of your food… No 
more can you detect your personality and its decisions in the course of being created 
by your experience. You know only that you ingest the present tense and excrete it 
as a narrative in the past.’66 For Brooke-Rose (after Lacan) in Thru, the car rear view 
mirror, or ‘retrovisor’, the ‘blueish rectangle that reflects the rear before you’67 
designates the subject’s position between a past that lies behind and a future into 
which the images of the past are projected.  
  Novels are like this too. Peter Brooks, in his synthesis of Freud and 
narratological theory, Reading for the Plot (1984), in which he explores the curious 
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temporal logic operant upon the reading of narratives, describes narrative desire as 
‘the arousal that creates the narratable as a condition of tumescence, appetency, 
ambition, quest, and gives narrative a forward-looking intention’ whilst plot is ‘a 
postponement in the discharge that leads back to the inanimate’: 
 
If the past is to be read as present, it is a curious present that we know to be 
past in relation to a future we know to be already in place, already in wait for 
us to reach it. Perhaps we would do better to speak of the anticipation of 
retrospection as our chief tool in making sense of narrative, the master trope 
of its strange logic.68 
 
Quin, like Brophy and Brooke-Rose, metafictionally employs the self-metaphorising 
capacities of fiction for the ways in which novelistic writing’s innate pastness mimics 
the belatedness of human experience: the disjunction between the past events and 
the narrative present mirrors life’s own asynchronicity. Self-consciously, her novels 
chronicle the struggle in vain to recover the pure presence of experience, that which 
Derrida calls the ‘metaphysics of presence’, through the attempt in language to find a 
singular lexicon with which we can, at best, only metaphorise it. And by pressing the 
logic of the liberation project of the sixties in fiction, Quin’s work raises broader 
questions about whether the self can be known, whether it can ever be rendered in 
words and, moreover, if it can, then whether that written self is ever capable of being 
communicated. Fully engaged and in dialogue with the radical thought of the period, 
her characteristically ambivalent novels nonetheless provide an exploration and 
throroughgoing critique of the moral hypocrisies, antiquated norms and impossible 
dreams of a decade that was, she reveals, certainly not as “right on” as all that.   
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Introduction: The Novel and the Sixties 
 
Whilst the “cultural revolution” of the sixties remains much contested, the image of a 
radical and transformative decade, an era decadent and Dionysian, characterised by 
radical politics, youthful rebellion and sexual permissiveness, has become a heady 
myth of origins for contemporary culture.  
 
[F]or all the importance of the Twenties and the Thirties, the years of the two 
World Wars, and the grim, destructive Eighties, the Sixties seem to stand in 
the centre of it all, sucking in the influences of the past, creating the 
touchstones of the future.1  
 
The legacies of the global convulsions of the high sixties remain, over forty years 
later, open to debate. In the last major speech of his 2007 presidential campaign, 
and with the anniversary of les événements just around the corner, French 
candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, echoing an earlier declaration by British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, pledged to ‘liquidate’ the ‘heritage of May ’68… once and for 
all’.2 The myth of the sixties is one that many, from across the political spectrum, are 
eager to demolish. The utopian thinking of that legendary decade has been 
demystified variously as that of a bunch of hopeless long-hairs with an ill-thought-out 
pipe dream of standing “beyond culture”; or a despatch from the misspent youth of a 
culture that now rather regrets its juvenilia; or that of a baby boomer generation that 
should have and did not and, worse, is directly to account for the rise of neo-
conservatism; or a mere fairytale that seeks to console us with the redemptive 
possibilities of radical resistance whilst tacitly affirming the status quo.  
Of course, there would be neither a May ’68, nor even an April ’71, in Britain. 
Countercultural rabble-rouser, Jeff Nuttall, prefaced his semi-autobiographical 
account of the ‘nuclear generation’, Bomb Culture (1968), with the words:  
 
[T]he plain obvious fact is that between the autumn of '67 when I completed 
this manuscript, and the summer of '68 when I am writing this preface, 
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young people under various pretexts made war on their elders, and their 
elders made war on them. The war continues.3 
 
But he is vamping a “revolution” that would never quite arrive. Throughout the 
decade, the Left remained frustrated by its inability to gather popular support, or to 
gestate a significant student movement. In marked contrast to the political ferment of 
Paris, San Francisco, New York, Berlin and Amsterdam – and the anti-colonial wars 
and revolutions in the Third World that, as Frederic Jameson points out in his 
important essay “Periodizing the Sixties”,4 lit the touch paper on their Western 
counterparts – and with the significant exception of the conflict in Northern Ireland, 
only in recent years beginning to be framed by historians in terms of broader civil 
rights global movements, the high sixties in Britain never reached a peak of 
revolutionary ferment. The counterculture in Britain had great difficulty gaining 
dialectical purchase on a culture that was, the American poet and critic Kenneth 
Rexroth argues, a ‘special case’: 
 
British society assimilates all things – the ceremonies of the monarchy, the 
country house orgies of high life, the stodgy Communist Party of Great 
Britain. Today the Teddy Boys are middle-aged; the Angries lunch in the 
Reform Club; and even Mods and Rockers, no longer young, have been 
digested by a homogenous and homogenizing society… The subculture of 
secession in Great Britain is a kind of Fabian anarchism, slowly penetrating 
all structures of the society by metastasis… Can you imagine an American 
president making the very influential American anarchist, critic, poet, 
psychiatrist, urbanist and educator, Paul Goodman, a knight like Sir Herbert 
Read, or Bob Dylan an M.B.E. like John Lennon?5 
 
The broader social and political impact of the utopian thinking of the decade 
beyond (and even amongst) a minority of (upper-middle-class) turned-on initiates, 
and its effect, in real terms, upon the social relationships and personal freedoms of 
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ordinary people have remained open to debate. Recent accounts of the period from 
historians like Arthur Marwick (The Sixties [1998]) and Dominic Sandbrook (Never 
Had It So Good [2005] and White Heat [2006]) have sought to palliate the myth of 
the sixties. They dispute the significance of the loose-to-the-point-of-unwieldy 
complex of radical politics, alternative society movements, experimental artistic 
practices and counterpublic anti-institutions conceptualised by Theodor Roszak as 
“the counterculture”,6 arguing that it was not the counterculture’s “great refusal”, but 
its willingness to collude with or be co-opted by the mainstream that permeated and 
transformed culture.  
As it had done for Marx in the nineteenth century, Britain in the sixties 
became a likely case study for Frankfurt School theorisations of the culture industry. 
Catalysed by the explosion of mass communications technologies and the 
emergence of an unprecedented cultural pluralism underwritten by rising affluence in 
the years following World War II, a mature and well-established popular culture 
(which had arrived comparatively early in Britain in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries), rapidly assimilated (or appropriated) the experimental 
energies of the counterculture’s avant-garde cultural practice, to ferment an 
innovative and freewheeling mainstream milieu. The revolution in Britain was to be, 
George Melly proposed with the title of his study of pop in the sixties, a ‘revolt into 
style’.7 And, as Jenny Diski, in her autobiographical memoir of the decade, writes 
(with the modesty that is characteristic of those rare sixties survivors who both 
remember the period and were really there): ‘In truth the only thing that is absolutely 
certain is that the music was better.’8 
But still, the period remains indelibly associated with a rule-breaking, 
convention-flouting spirit of rebelliousness. Even Marwick, for whom the 
counterculture amounts to the ‘Great Marxisant Fallacy’, admits that ‘things would 
never be quite the same again’.9 But whether viewed as a golden age or an era of 
moral and cultural decline, this new dawn did not, apparently, extend to the British 
novel. Although the decade opened with the Lady Chatterley obscenity trial, which 
was to become totemic of the libertarian energies of the period – but did not 
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necessarily, as we shall see, signal British culture’s belated reconciliation with 
literary modernism – the novel was perceived as ‘not much changed’; Marwick writes 
that ‘for literary innovation, it was necessary to go to the theatre.’10 Whilst drama 
found its feet as an audacious, oppositional force under the tutelage of “Sir Larry” at 
the newly-founded National Theatre, and found an outspoken, contumacious patron 
in theatre critic and dramaturge, Kenneth “Peacock” Tynan, Ginsberg packed out the 
Royal Albert Hall with experimental poetry and boom-time hit the New Wave of 
British cinema. And yet, in the declinist narratives that – even as London swung – 
were so pervasive within the national discourse, literary culture tends to figure as the 
terminally-moribund gatekeeper of what became known as the “stagnant society”.  
The impact of sixties radicalism upon the literature of the period in America is 
easily evinced: from the Romantic free-expressionism of the Beat Movement, to the 
radical politics of Amiri Baraka, to the picaresque-psychedelia hippy narratives of 
Ken Kesey’s Merry Pranksters and Tom Wolfe, to the Mennippean satires of Kurt 
Vonnegut, to the cabbalistic paranoia of Thomas Pynchon and William Gaddis. 
Literary figures – perhaps most notably Kesey, alongside elder statesman, Beat poet 
Allen Ginsberg – became the spiritual ringleaders of the wildly disparate groups and 
movements that comprise the counterculture of the sixties. In fact, perhaps when 
applied to America, the very epithet “countercultural literature” is a misnomer; it 
could well be argued that the subversive sensibility that characterises the American 
writing of the period is just another iteration of the dissident tradition that is central to 
an American canon which has its roots in the Transcendentalism of Emerson, 
Hawthorne and Thoreau. Equally in France, for example, literature was very 
conspicuously allied with the claims of the ‘68ers. Discourse was everything and 
everything was discourse: the revolution would be linguistic. For the radical forms of 
resistance that coalesced under the name of post-structuralism – including 
Situationism’s critique of the mass media spectacle of advanced capitalism, Tel 
Quel’s political interrogation of the sign system and Julia Kristeva and Hélène 
Cixous’ conceptualisation of the disruptive and deconstructive force of l’écriture 
féminine – debates about literary language were central to the événements of 
revolutionary ferment in France. In search of something similar in Britain we might 
perhaps look to obvious candidates like Beat, junky and countercultural leader-in-
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exile, Alexander Trocchi, or perhaps to the existentialist-manqué, Colin Wilson, but 
we would be hard-pressed to construct a similar native countercultural anti-tradition 
of tradition-breaking in Britain. In Britain, the literary-historical fate of fiction’s own 
experimental tendency during the decade – that of Ann Quin, B.S. Johnson, 
Christine Brooke-Rose, Brigid Brophy and Alan Burns, amongst others – was to 
become a Shandyean digression in the master narrative of British literary history. In 
what follows, I will explore why it is that at a time when British culture was apparently 
on the up and up, the novel was perceived as on its uppers. Positioned as the last 
man standing of an older and more conservative order, in accounts of the period, 
literary fiction is perceived to be lost in the long shadows of literary modernism, 
trapped within an insurmountable paradox wherein innovation meant degeneration 
and progress meant tradition and still unable to find its bearings in the post-war 
world.  
 
 
The Curious Death of the Novel 
 
During the period, what became known as the “death of the novel” controversy 
amongst literary critics and writers such as Roland Barthes, Gore Vidal, John Barth, 
Tom Wolfe, Leslie Fiedler, George Steiner and Italo Calvino sought to interrogate 
the prevailing sense, amongst whose earliest proponents was José Ortega y Gasset 
in his Decline of the Novel (1925), that the novel as an appropriate mode of 
expression was now defunct having been swamped by the events of recent history, 
its effects “used up” by modernism and its privileged position within the culture now 
superseded by the new mass arts of television, film and the mass media. In grand 
self-conscious style, the American writer Ronald Sukenick entitled his 1969 fictional 
meditation upon the quandary of the novelist and of novelistic writing during the 
period, “The Death of the Novel”. Commentators borrowed Ortega y Gasset’s 
metaphor of the novel as a ‘vast but finite quarry’11 to conceive of the form as a pool 
of limited resources which had been fruitfully and not-so-fruitfully spent by the radical 
innovations of the first decades of the twentieth century. ‘It is erroneous to think of 
the novel… as an endless field capable of rendering ever new forms,’ Ortega y 
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Gasset argues in “Notes on the Novel”, ‘present-day writers face the fact that only 
narrow and concealed veins are left them.’12 Malcolm Bradbury appears to concur, 
arguing that  
 
what the extraordinary achievement of that international and compelling 
tendency has seemed to imply was nothing less than the Death of the Novel – 
the death, that is, of the novel in its traditional form as the burgher epic, the 
novel of social reality, moral assessment, direct representation of life and 
history.13 
 
During the sixties, the challenge from literary modernism was held to account 
for, at best, prophesising about and, at worst, colluding with the collapse of an 
ancient and venerable tradition of liberal humanist thought. The movement – or 
rather, the loose agglomeration of artistic practices – we now know – or rather, even 
after its (disputed) centenary, still remain in the process of constructing and 
reconstructing – as “modernism” was only then, at some decades’ distance, 
beginning to be periodised by literary historians. The ‘huge and various collective 
phenomenon’ that Graham Hough identifies as a ‘revolution in the literature of the 
English language’ had ‘not yet acquired a name’.14 ‘Somebody should write a history 
of the word “modern”’, writes Frank Kermode in the mid-sixties.15 Then, as now, the 
epithet was prone to slippage, its meaning elusive; the “modern period”, the 
“moderns” and “modernism” were used interchangeably to denote both a historical 
period and a supra-historical mode, characterised as both innovative and 
traditionalist, humanist and fascist, arcane and colloquial and, under the auspices of 
New Criticism, frequently employed to ring-fence value judgements about literature. 
And within these belated attempts to take stock of the literary situation of the first 
half of the century, in works such as Stephen Spenders The Struggle of the Modern 
(1963), Hough’s Image and Experience: Studies in a Literary Revolution (1960), 
“What was Modernism?” by Harry Levin and Kermode’s “Modernisms” (1968), the 
insistence on “newness” and “novelty”, which – alongside a complex, often 
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paradoxical, appeal to tradition – had characterised both modernist self-perception 
and critics’ early, tentative definitions of “the modern” was replaced by a view shared 
amongst critics that modernism in Britain had drawn the novel to its aesthetic, 
political and ethical limits. Cyril Connolly lamented that ‘Flaubert, Henry James, 
Proust, Joyce and Virginia Woolf have finished off the novel. Now all will have to be 
re-invented as if from the beginning’.16 Henry Green, although himself an admirer of 
the work of Céline, Kafka and Joyce admitted that they were ‘like cats which have 
licked the plate clean. You’ve got to dream up another dish if you’re to be a writer.’17 
In the sixties, on-going debates about the health (or otherwise) of the novel 
were linked to broader concerns surrounding a crisis of identity in post-war Britain. 
Britain emerged from World War II a victorious but, in military, economic and geo-
political terms, much diminished nation. Accounts of the period frequently identify a 
“return to realism” as the dominant trend amongst mid-century writing, postulating 
that during the post-war years, novelists returned to a tradition of realistic writing to 
supply a stable, communal and indigenous system of values and beliefs and to re-
inscribe and reaffirm the rational and empirical values of “Englishness”. Bradbury 
glosses the conventional accounts of post-war British fiction thus: 
 
From the beginning of the century to the end of the thirties there was a high 
season of British fiction, dominated by major and innovative figures. The war 
broke the sequence, and British fiction drew away not only from the modernist 
experiment but from the significant developments in fiction taking place 
elsewhere, looking instead back to nineteenth- or eighteenth-century sources, 
returning to the novel of Bennett and Galsworthy, Dickens and George Eliot, 
seeking to reconstruct a pre-modern tradition. In the process the traditional 
preoccupations of British fiction, with class and morality, reasserted 
themselves, in part as a mode of documentation in a changing Britain, in part 
as a return to native and provincial artistic sources.18  
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Critical responses to anxieties about the “situation of the novel” in vast critical 
surveys by academic éminences grises such as Bradbury, Bernard Bergonzi and 
David Lodge amongst others have tended to situate the experimental prose of the 
sixties as an adjunct to debates surrounding the British novel’s so-called ”return”. 
Accounts like Bradbury’s Possibilities: Essays on the State of the Novel (1973), 
Bergonzi’s The Situation of the Novel (1970) and Lodge’s “The Novelist at the 
Crossroads” (1969), even whilst actively seeking to refute or at least problematise it, 
have tended to reiterate implicitly what Bradbury calls the ‘critical folklore’19 of British 
post-war fiction by employing a methodological approach that sustains a facile (and 
inaccurate) polarity between “realist” and “experimentalist" strategies of 
representation. Moreover, in their attempts to shore up the novel against portents of 
its imminent demise by establishing a coherent identity for it, these accounts rush to 
generically define a form which had historically broken all of the generic rules and 
whose emergence was itself concomitant with the birth of the genre system. Drawing 
upon Ian Watt’s thesis about “formal realism” from his seminal work The Rise of the 
Novel (1956), together with F.R. Leavis’ earlier concept of “significant form”, these 
accounts tend to reaffirm existing preconceptions about the synonymity of the realist 
genre and the novel form, assumptions that have, I argue, continued to inform the 
ways in which we conceive of the practice of fictional writing in Britain.20  
 
 
Novelist at the Crossroads? 
 
The sixties was an age with a seemingly unquenchable thirst for novelty, as Leslie 
Hornby, aka quintessential sixties icon, Twiggy, puts it, ‘anything modern was 
wonderful, and anything old was terrible… everything up to date, up to the minute, 
brand new and streamlined and contemporary – that’s what everything has to 
be…’21 For Christopher Booker, in his denunciation of the decade, The Neophiliacs 
(1969), which focussed upon the sixties’ passion for change, this ‘keeping pace with 
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pace’ amounted to a collective myth of pseudo-vitality that actually worked to 
occlude the political realities of the period: 
 
The element of black frenzy which had characterised the years up to 1963, 
the desparate attempts of the nuclear disarmers, the satirists, the playwrights, 
that ‘what’s wrong with Britain’ journalists, to force themselves into reality on a 
tide of sensation, had given way to a kind of fairy world where nothing 
seemed to matter any longer. The frenzy was still there, as we have seen 
from the pop world. But whereas the ‘explosion into reality’ of that former age 
– the Labour Party Conference in 1960, the mass arrest of the Committee of 
100, the Profumo Affair, even the Orpington by-election had been shattering 
and potent, like the surfacing of a poisonous boil – now, in 1964 they seemed 
simply like the popping of harmless, brightly coloured bubbles.22 
 
In literature, however, the synonymy between the idea of “the modern” and of “the 
contemporary” had lapsed. As Stephen Spender’s The Struggle of the Modern 
faithfully records, the modern was now very much on the back foot. Frederick R. 
Karl, in the introduction to his A Reader’s Guide to the Contemporary English Novel 
(1962), writes: ‘The contemporary novel is clearly no longer “modern”.’23 
Modernism’s rarefied airs and introspective attitudes seemed wholly unsuited to a 
brave new world of affluence, mass culture, technology and the Welfare State. Many 
new writers coming up in the fifties reacted against a discredited, prematurely 
institutionalised and belatedly periodised version of modernism which, for them 
meant Bloomsbury: genteel, arcane, elitist, obscurantist and politically questionable. 
The novelist Kingsley Amis was perhaps the most strident in his declamations of the 
avant-garde bogeyman: 
  
The idea about experiment being the life-blood of the English novel is one 
that dies hard. “Experiment”, in this context, boils down pretty regularly to 
“obtruded oddity”, whether in construction – multiple viewpoints and such – or 
in style; it is not felt that adventurousness in subject matter or attitude or tone 
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really counts. Shift from one scene to the next in mid-sentence, cut down on 
verbs or definite articles, and you are putting yourself right up in the forefront, 
at any rate in the eyes of those who were reared on Joyce and Virginia 
Woolf…24 
 
The new, “contemporary” style which (largely for the purposes of a press 
hungry for a literary revival that might fill the vacuum left by the war) coalesced 
under the banners of “the Movement” and later the “Angry Young Men” is seen, for 
example, in John Wain’s Hurry on Down (1953), Amis’ Lucky Jim (1954), John 
Braine’s Room at the Top (1957), in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (1958) by 
Alan Sillitoe, in Scenes from Provincial Life (1951) by William Cooper and in Jill 
(1946) by Philip Larkin. It was rational, empirical and funny, it prized an appeal to the 
“common reader” and a clear, unadorned and rollicking style over what was 
perceived as the rarefied introspection of what had gone before. Rather than 
attempting to mine the limits of experience, it set its sights upon the assuredly 
knowable world, mocking the old bases of tradition, pricking the pieties of the 
establishment and railing against the persistence of class privilege and social 
inequality. This was a new, upwardly mobile literature whose authors and avatars – 
Amis’ Jim Dixon, Wain’s Charles Lumley and Sillitoe’s Arthur Seaton, for example – 
were making their way (or making the existential choice not to) in the “age of 
affluence”. Their rallying call was, as John Wain described his policy upon his 
seasonable succession of Europhile man of letters, John Lehmann, as editor of the 
BBC’s Third Programme, ‘consolidation’.25 These writers’ self-conscious iconoclasm, 
their anti-modernism and anti-cosmopolitanism, their emphasis upon “verbal 
hygiene” and the continuity of a great English tradition evince a literature in the 
process of “digging in”. These characteristics of the writing of the time are also 
related to a partial re-emergence of the political concerns of the thirties, although 
without that decade’s emphasis upon Marx.  
This, comments Bradbury, was the ‘irreversible situation’ within the literary 
scene of the period: ‘to move against [modernism] is to move back’.26 Amis admits 
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that he and his cadre were ‘reactionaries rather than rebels. We were trying to get 
back, let’s say, to the pre-Joycean tradition’.27 And after the incredible cultural and 
historical transformations of the twentieth century thus far, such a manoeuvre, writes 
Bradbury, amounted to a ‘peculiarly nasty subterfuge’. The British, he continues, 
were 
 
writing novels as if there was no predicament at all. Their writers, the critics 
claimed, were refusing experiment, the strains and pains of form and 
perception; they were reinstating materialist and liberal realism, avoiding the 
meaning of Beckett, Joyce, Virginia Woolf and reaching to Wells, Bennett, 
even back to Henry Fielding. They restored an anciently liberal and humane 
universe; they celebrated their own provincialism.28  
 
Rubin Rabinovitz, in his 1967 study of this tendency, The Reaction Against 
Experiment in the British Novel, which, as Stonebridge and MacKay argue, ‘was to 
set the terms for readings of the immediate post-war novel for over a decade’,29 
sums up the realist temper of the period: 
 
The critical mood in England has produced a climate in which traditional 
novels can flourish and anything out of the ordinary is given the denigratory 
label ‘experiment’ and neglected … [T]he successful novelist in England 
becomes, too quickly, a part of the London literary establishment. … All too 
often he uses his position as a critic to endorse the type of fiction he himself is 
writing and to attack those whose approach is different.30 
 
Insisting that the ‘thesis that the English novel has, since the war, taken a 
separate and self-isolating path is itself becoming a mystifying falsity’31 (Bradbury) 
and that the ‘picture… of an incorrigibly insular England defending an obsolete 
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realism against the life-giving invasions of fabulation’ is an ‘oversimplification’32 
(Lodge), Bradbury and Lodge argue that this ‘folkloristic view’33 is one imposed upon 
British fiction from without by American critics like Karl and Rabinovitz, as well as 
James Gindin in his Postwar British Fiction: New Accents and Attitudes (1962). 
However, even whilst they tentatively attest to a ‘rising mood of experiment and 
textual enquiry’within the British novel during the period,34 these accounts still affirm 
traditional assumptions about the givenness of the relationship between the English 
literary mind-set and realistic writing. In his account, Lodge comments that ‘there is a 
good deal of evidence that the English literary mind is peculiarly committed to 
realism, and resistant to non-realistic literary modes to an extent that might be 
described as prejudice’.35 He famously imagines the novelist standing ‘at the 
crossroads’ between the central thoroughfare of realistic writing and the side alley of 
experiment: 
 
The situation of the novelist today may be compared to a man standing at a 
crossroads. The road on which he stands (I am thinking primarily of the 
English novelist) is the realistic novel, the compromise between fictional and 
empirical modes. In the ‘fifties there was a strong feeling that this was the 
main road, the central tradition, of the English novel, coming down through 
the Victorians and Edwardians, temporarily diverted by modernist 
experimentalism, but subsequently restored (by Orwell, Isherwood, Greene, 
Waugh, Powell, Angus Wilson, C.P. Snow, Amis, Sillitoe, Wain, etc., etc.) to 
its true course.36 
 
These accounts, then, tend to be dominated by a realist-experimentalist 
dichotomy, which sets up an opposition between a detached, obscure, aloof 
experimentalism, perceived as belatedly and exhaustedly modern and 
overshadowed by the legacies of Joyce and Beckett and a liberal and more humane, 
indigenous tradition of realist writing. Critical engagement with an emergent 
experimental tendency – typified in the novels of Johnson, Ann Quin, Christine 
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Brooke-Rose, Brigid Brophy, amongst others, but also present in their more 
“mainstream” counterparts such as Muriel Spark, Doris Lessing, Iris Murdoch, John 
Fowles and William Golding – tends to be ancillary to debates about the 
appropriateness of the realist mode to give form to social and cultural change and its 
ability to produce panoramic fictions that might heal the rifts caused by these 
transformations. Experiment has fared little better in subsequent accounts, allied 
with a period of literary history that expatriate Frederick Bowers, in his contribution to 
a special issue of Granta entitled “The End of the English Novel”, scorns for ‘its 
conformity, its traditional sameness, and its realistically rendered provincialism’, 
caricaturing it as ‘local, quaint and self-consciously xenophobic’,37 or perceived as a 
derivative and untimely rear-guard avant-garde.  
The more recent accounts of twentieth-century history that appeared as part 
of a rash of fin-de-siècle literary stock-taking around the turn of the millennium seem 
content to rehearse the old realist-experimentalist divide, to pitch the experimental 
novel against its realist counterpart and find the former lacking – in popular success, 
in a tenable politics, in aesthetic achievement – and dismiss it to the peripheries of 
literary history. Against the dominant realist mode – both then and now – the vague, 
slippery epithet “experimental” is generally deployed by critics to euphemise 
aestheticised dandyism, or a moral compass gone awry. Andrzej Gąsiorek’s Post-
War Fiction: Realism and After (1995) is a rare example of a recent account of post-
war British fiction which remain unbeholden to this “great divide” (Stonebridge and 
MacKay’s Fiction After Modernism [2007] and Randall Stevenson’s The Last of 
England? [2004] are others). In his preface, Gąsiorek declares his interest in those 
‘writers whose works deliberately fall somewhere between what Barthes calls the 
scriptible and the lisible, and which try to reconceptualise realism rather than reject it 
outright’.38 He suggests that the ‘distinctions between “realist” and “experimental” or 
between “traditional” and “innovative”’ are now ‘so irrelevant to the post-war period 
that they should be scrapped altogether.’39 
The persistence of these distinctions is perplexing, especially given the 
myriad ways in which literary postmodernism has sought to challenge and transform 
our very understanding of what constitutes realistic narrative. The fabulation, self-
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reflexivity, fantastic narratives, magic, and latterly, hysterical realism that emerged 
from the broad church of British postmodernism all, in different ways, sought to wed 
an ethical commitment to the real with an embrace of the new opportunities offered 
by formal and linguistic innovation: to offer a voice to those previously debarred from 
realist discourse, for example, to re-assimilate forgotten histories, to bring together 
the traditionally warring factions of critical theory and creative writing and to confront 
what Kermode calls the ‘horror of contingency’40 that realist discourse, by its very 
nature, seeks to order, smooth over, make meaningful. Brian Richardson, in his 
audacious re-evaluation of modern British literary history, “Remapping the Present”, 
argues that this admixture of realistic expression and fictional innovation, which 
constitutes an ‘ingenious [attempt] to conjoin the otherwise opposed poetics of 
realism and postmodernism’ as “postmodernism realism”’, may well turn out to be a 
‘substantial and distinctively British contribution to the development of fiction’.41 
Similarly, the novelist and critic A.S. Byatt, in a 1979 essay addressing the 
intersection between “realist” and “experimentalist” modes of writing, “People in 
Paper Houses”, astutely identifies a ‘curiously symbiotic relationship between old 
realism and new experiment’. For Byatt, unlike Lodge, British fiction’s realist legacies 
are not perceived as a heritage too weighty to cast off, but a richly generative point 
of departure for new and innovative writing. Drawing the two poles together, in her 
essay she explores the ways in which the realist tradition and the experimental 
impulse work together contrapuntally in productive tension within the novels of John 
Fowles, Wilson, Murdoch and Lessing. She advocates a mode of ‘self-conscious 
moral realism’, which constitutes 
 
an awareness of the difficulty of “realism” combined with a strong moral 
attachment to its values, a formal need to comment on their fictiveness 
combined with a strong sense of the value of a habitable imagined world, a 
sense that models, literature and “the tradition” are ambiguous and 
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problematic goods combined with a profound nostalgia for, rather than 
rejection of, the great works of the past. 42 
 
So, if, contrary to the critical accounts of the period of Amis, Rabinovitz and others, a 
significant feature of British post-war fiction could be said to be the ways in which 
realism and experimentation have rubbed along together very productively, then why 
is it that this time-worn polarity continues to be reiterated?  
The problem seems to lie with the ways in which the British mid-century novel 
has been negatively defined against postmodernism by subsequent literary critics. 
Efforts to hail a literary renaissance spearheaded by Martin Amis, Ian McEwan and 
Salman Rushdie in Britain in the eighties have tended to emphasise the post-
consensus novel’s radical break with the post-war period. The ‘end of the English 
novel’, editor Bill Buford’s introduction to Granta’s special issue assured, signalled 
not the death knell of the form, but the beginnings of a British novel: 
 
The fiction of today is… testimony to an invasion of outsiders, using a 
language larger than the culture. Today the imagination resides along the 
peripheries; it is spoken through a minority discourse, with the dominant 
tongue re-appropriated, re-commanded, and importantly reinvigorated.43  
 
Although the appropriateness of this new nomenclature for the emergent devolved 
and postcolonial identities of the British fiction of the time is debatable – and indeed 
this issue of categorisation remains largely unresolved – this particular iteration of 
the perennial debate illustrates the persistence of the peculiar relationship between 
literary tradition and national culture in Britain. Laura Marcus and Peter Nicholls write 
that the ‘troubled relation of internationalist perspectives to nationalist ones’ is 
‘another version’ of the ‘tension between change and continuity’.44 By the seventies 
and eighties the idea of a ‘Great Tradition’ had become associated with 
conservatism, empiricism, insularity, even philistinism and xenophobia. Literary 
historians’ attempts to periodise British postmodernism have tended to reassert this 
                                                          
42
 A.S. Byatt, “People in Paper Houses: Attitudes to ‘Realism’ and ‘Experiment’ in English Post-War Fiction,” 
in Passions of the Mind: Selected Writings (New York, NY: Knopf, 2012), 181. 
43
 Bill Buford, “The End of the English Novel,” Granta 3 (Spring 1980), 16. 
44
 Laura Marcus and Peter Nicholls, eds. “Introduction,” The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century English 
Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), i. 
59 
 
‘troubled relation’, heralding an innovative, newly cosmopolitan, theory-savvy British 
contemporary novel at the expense of acknowledging the continuity and influence of 
home-grown traditions of writing and of thought. 
Endeavouring to overturn the conventional perception of a British literary 
establishment where critical theory is perceived as a pernicious form of Gallic 
‘literary rabies’,45 critics have sought to emphasise British postmodernism’s 
importation and keen assimilation of the structuralist and post-structuralist agenda 
from continental Europe and America. The hybridity, textual self-referentiality and 
formal and linguistic innovation of the British contemporary novel has been credited 
to the theories of fiction developed by Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida and Julia 
Kristeva, amongst others. If literary genealogies locate novelistic progenitors for the 
British postmodern novel, they tend to come from the French nouveau roman – 
writers like Michel Butor, Nathalie Sarraute and particularly Alain Robbe Grillet – 
who were themselves as much engaged in novel theory as they were in practice. 
The ‘baton of innovation’, as Randall Stevenson puts it, ‘sometimes has to be carried 
by another team before the British outfit can continue its own rather erratic course 
down the tracks of literary history’.46 
What scant critical attention the British experimental novel of the sixties has 
received has tended to be reserved in the main for the writers Christine Brooke-
Rose and J.G. Ballard. As fictional explorations of the tenets of critical theory that 
are underpinned by the very theoretical architecture that presses the mode of their 
interpretation, Brooke-Rose’s “crictions” are a gift to theoretically-minded critics. The 
multinational, multilingual cosmopolitanism of her biography seems to have 
legitimated Brooke-Rose amongst a British critical establishment which, on the one 
hand, is still mired in self-conscious philistinism and knee-jerkedly hostile towards 
“experimental writing” and “French theory”, and, on the other, is all too keen to 
disavow what is perceived as the paucity and theoretical ignorance of British 
narrative fiction. Ballard, meanwhile, within British writing has become the exception 
that proves the rule. The British experimental writer and sixties provocateur died in 
2009 having acquired the status of a prophetic and (rather unlikely) much-loved 
national treasure in no small part due to his novels’ generic unplaceability, his long-
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standing affiliation with Science Fiction delivering his oeuvre from the strict protocols 
that govern the writing and the reading of “literary” fiction in Britain, and his late-
period move into the mainstream, apparently serving to legitimate it. 
 So, was the fiction of the sixties simply more of the same milk bar messiahs 
and upwardly mobile lucky Jims, rebelling against tradition and yet somehow doing 
so in very disappointingly and unambitiously traditional novels? Did the writers of the 
period really believe, as Amis famously commented in relation to the planned 
expansion of higher education in 1960, that ‘more would mean worse’? And how 
broadly were these views shared and manifested within fiction? Does our vision of 
mid-century writing as one in which the novel collapsed back into middle-of-the-road 
social realism provide a substantive picture of the fiction of the period? If such a 
picture of British writing is accurate, then why is it that the literature of this “right little 
tight little island” did not also get swept up in the myriad transformations of this most 
transformative of decades? And if the received narrative is wanting, then why does 
the literary history of the sixties continue to be written up in terms of its quietude?  
 In what follows, via the work of Quin, this study will attempt to present an 
alternative picture of the fiction of the sixties, which attests to the existence of 
outward-looking but indigenous traditions of experiment that have been neglected 
within existing accounts of literary history that tend to focus upon the so-called 
inward turn of modernism, or the turning inside-out of fictional conventions of 
postmodernism, or the insider-outsider, Empire Writes Back double perspectives of 
the post-colonial. The task of positioning anew a kind of inveterately self-conscious 
writing that was itself so caught up and implicated within the period’s debates about 
the novel’s role in culture cannot be a relatively simple matter of the careful and 
nuanced welding of text and context. Scene-setting is going to be lengthy. The 
introduction to this study will attempt to sustain the interrelated parallel stories of, on 
the one hand, those cultural, intellectual and historical forces that governed the 
reception and the perception of experimental writing and, on the other, those from 
whence the British experimental novel emerged. And by considering how the 
experimental novel was conceived of, and how it conceived of itself, I will attempt to 
re-think these novels’ complicated and under-theorised relationship to literature and 
culture and begin – I hope – to attest to their literary and cultural significance.  
 I begin by looking prior to the sixties, to trace the historiographic debates and 
negotiations of British literary identity in the period immediately following World War 
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II. This introduction will provide an extended commentary upon a tradition of thinking 
about the role of the novel in culture. Firstly, I will examine the ways in which in the 
era’s debates surrounding the “stagnant society” and the “two cultures” the novel 
was implicated as a key part in the etiological puzzle of “what’s wrong with Britain”. 
Noting how such a contrivance is itself indicative less of the novel’s part in the 
country’s “scumbled” national life and more of the continuing centrality of the novel 
to the ways in which Britain conceived of (and metaphysically re-visioned) itself 
during the period, this study will then move on to trace the persistence of Arnoldian 
thinking during the period, culminating in the nascent school of English Cultural 
Studies. I will examine the significance of the ways in which the declinist thesis that 
dominated conceptions of British nationhood during the twentieth century has been 
yoked to the fortunes of the novel, the effects of the predominance of 
preoccupations with historical and stylistic positioning, periodisation and 
categorisation within British literary criticism and the (continuing) implications for the 
reception of innovative fiction in Britain of a lingering Leavisism that situates art as a 
guide to the “good life”. This chapter will investigate how, in spite of portents of its 
imminent demise, the novel continued to be mobilised by an anxious culture to fulfil 
its traditional obligations as the liberal humanist form par excellence. In the final 
chapter of this study, on Quin’s Tripticks, I pick up the threads of the story of British 
Kulturkritik again to consider and reassess the ways in which a largely forgotten 
indigenous tendency of countercultural writing during the sixties drew upon a lineage 
from the visual arts to attempt to re-envision and articulate an alternative role for the 
novel in Britain.  
 Whilst thinkers from other disciplines enlisted the novel to help “warm 
through” their metaphysics, amongst literary intellectuals themselves, faith in the 
Leavis-Eliot orthodoxy had lapsed. I will examine the cris de conscience felt 
throughout the liberal literary intelligentsia in the aftermath of wartime and their 
profound uncertainties about the role the novel could now play within a culture 
whose deepest and most foundational truths – those that the novel was perceived to 
embody and to elevate – were felt to have been denuded. This sense that it was not 
just the world that had changed but also our very means of apprehending it was 
linked to a crisis of representation amongst a generation of novelists who sought to 
reconcile their writerly responsibility of finding new ways to articulate the new 
circumstances of selfhood, truth and experience within the parameters of a form that 
62 
 
was felt to belong to a previous, kinder age and within a political climate that was felt 
to threaten the very existence of the novelist and novelistic writing. My introduction 
will examine how, like Quin, the writers of the period sought ways out of their 
quandary by employing fictional narrative – the sceptical art par excellence of a 
sceptical age – as a self-metaphorising form to at once mimic ironically the ways in 
which we attempt to make sense of our lives through narrativisation and to radically 
extend the limits of narrative, in order to better capture human life in its fullness, and 
thereby, in turn, broaden the remit of human experience itself. Finally, I return to the 
novel of the fifties to reassess the work of Amis, Wain, Braine et al. and, in the light 
of this closer and more nuanced picture of the complicated contexts of mid-century 
fiction, to take another look at the “return to realism” which seems to have become 
the critical blind-spot of twentieth-century literary history. Reassessing its effects, 
and finding that undoubtedly it too registered the uncertainties of the period – that 
the novels of the fifties constitute less a return to, and more a perplexed and 
alienated transformation of, the traditional ways in which we understand ourselves – 
I question the notion that the epithet could be accurately applied to even the novels 
most inextricably associated with the “return to realism”. 
 
 
A ‘Stagnant Society’? 
 
Even as the sixties began to swing, a sense of kulturpessimismus was so pervasive 
amongst commentators it had, as David Reynolds comments, become cliché.47 The 
absence of Britain’s very own “economic miracle”, together with the belated and 
reluctant acknowledgement of its diminished imperial status after Suez and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, produced a sense of profound anxiety about the state of the 
nation. The Suez Crisis of 1956 was the moment when, as Eric Hobsbawm notes, 
the ‘international decline of Britain became so evident that not even the highly 
developed national faculty for voluntary blindness could conceal it’. But only 
amongst the most dyed-in-the-wool upper-class colonials was the handing back of 
India in 1947, after 200 years of colonial involvement, framed in terms of the impact 
of the loss of empire upon the national psyche. More widely, and across the political 
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spectrum, the “granting” (as it was pitched at the time) of independence to Britain’s 
former colonies was perceived as a final act of imperial benevolence; the proper and 
decent end to an empire-building project driven by the blood and sweat of Victorian 
moralism. The Commonwealth, for now, still remained, as Labour M.P. Maurice 
Edelman argued, ‘one of the great progressive manifestations in the history of 
mankind’.48 
Off the record, however, Britain had had little choice but to end its extremely 
costly involvement with India; the end of the Raj was ushered in on terms dictated by 
the Anglo-American loan which brought Britain back from the brink of bankruptcy. 
When, in 1956, President Eisenhower granted Britain a much-needed IMF loan on 
the condition that Britain must subsequently effect a ceasefire in Egypt and withdraw 
from the region, the recognition that the British lion’s roar was now merely a whimper 
could no longer be confined to the corridors of power. As Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden commented in a memorandum, the humiliation of Suez ‘has not so much 
changed our fortunes as revealed realities’.49 Britain was finally forced to recognise 
that it had ceded its place on the world stage to the United States and to the Soviet 
Union, the newly-minted superpowers who, each hovering over the big red button, 
were now engaged in a pact of mutually-assured destruction, a Cold War that would 
last almost half a century.  
This was the beginning of the Anglo-American “special relationship”. Harold 
Macmillan, unwilling to sacrifice Britain’s national sovereignty for membership of the 
nascent EEC alongside “the Six”, chose instead to ally Britain with the United States 
in a relationship of dependence that he likened at the time to that of the Greeks and 
the Romans. The Suez adventure had unveiled not only Britain’s fallen geopolitical 
status but also its economic weakness. The two were inextricably linked; Britain no 
longer boasted the industrial muscle that had underwritten its empire-building 
project. Divested of its colonial dependents, Britain was now itself dependent on the 
grace and favour of more powerful nations. In 1963, Harold Wilson made his election 
pledge to forge a new Britain ‘in the white heat of the technological revolution’, but 
there were widespread concerns that Britain was to be left behind by this third 
industrial revolution whilst nascent superpowers like America, Japan and Germany, 
with its economic miracle, strode ahead.  
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The end of rationing in 1954 had marked the beginnings of a consumer boom 
and what would come to be known as the Age of Affluence. As ‘affluence came 
hurrying on the heels of penury’,50 the ‘new England’ that J.B. Priestley had 
anticipated in his 1933 English Journey, that had been stalled by World War II and 
its aftershocks, was finally beginning to emerge. As the writer Wayland Young notes 
in a 1956 issue of Encounter: 
 
Since George Orwell published The Road to Wigan Pier in 1936, Wigan has 
changed from barefoot malnutrition to nylon and television, from hollow 
idleness to flush contentment. The landscape is the same all right, but as 
soon as the figures come on you are clean out of Orwell-land.51 
 
Full employment and rising wages brought about a ‘social revolution’ in which 
prosperity was not only confined to the upper echelons of the middle classes but 
was enjoyed throughout the class system. But whilst at home, Britons enjoyed the 
plentiful bounties of full employment, affordable consumer durables and the welfare 
state, amongst commentators there was widespread anxiety about Britain’s new 
positioning upon a radically altered world stage. Worries about British economic 
competitiveness abroad – encompassing concerns about the relative sluggishness 
of Britain’s post-war economic recovery, the influx of cheap American imports and 
the decline of the British manufacturing industry – were rife and, in fact, had been 
throughout an apparent age of plenty. As Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton 
point out, the fact that Harold Macmillan’s famous 1957 declaration that Britons had 
‘never had it so good’ had been appended by the remark that ‘…what is beginning to 
worry some of us is “Is it too good to be true?” or perhaps I should say “Is it too good 
to last?”’, is seldom remembered.52  
Declinism in the sixties was by no means politically partisan. Whilst narratives 
of decline were mobilised by a perplexed and anxious Right in the service of “one 
nation” conservatism and imperial nostalgia, they gained currency too on a 
fragmented and disillusioned Left. High hopes that the end of the war would bring to 
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fruition the social democratic project of political reform, centralised economic 
planning and social engineering – a project that had been tentatively begun in the 
revolutionary fervour of the thirties and delayed by the outbreak of war – had been 
dashed by the failure of successive Conservative and Labour governments to deliver 
on the promises of the Beveridge Report of 1942. Subsequently, the “spirit of '45” 
which Ken Loach celebrates in his recent, eponymous film was felt to be something 
of a wash out. The sense of national unity forged in the air raid shelters and ration 
queues had fostered hopes of a new start for Britain. Exhausted Britons, however, 
were by no means keen to extend the heroic efforts and drastic measures of 
wartime. The recovery of hearths and homes could only ever be too lethargic for a 
population eager to enjoy the hard-won pleasures of peace. Despite the claims 
about the egalitarianism of the social democratic post-war consensus, the promise of 
social mobility and equality of opportunity remained a distant dream for the many 
and a mixed blessing for the few, upwardly-mobile avatars of welfare capitalism, who 
found themselves displaced in a society that remained riven by class conflict. The 
playwright Dennis Potter described the guilt-ridden, anxious plight of the scholarship 
boy in an essay entitled “Base Ingratitude?” in the New Statesman in 1958. The 
working-class undergraduate, Potter writes, ‘cannot stomach the two languages that 
divide up the year, the torn loyalties and perpetual adjustments, the huge chasm 
between the classes’.53 
‘We are revolutionaries’, lamented J.B. Priestley in the same publication in 
1949, ‘who have not swept away anything’: 
 
We are Tories loudly denouncing taxes and regulations chiefly invented by 
Tory Ministers. We are Socialists busy creating peers and cheering pretty 
princesses. We are dreary self-righteous people with a passion for gin, 
tobacco, gambling and ballet. We are a nation of Sabbath-keepers who do 
not go to church. We toil to keep ourselves alive, with three tea-breaks, a five-
day week and Wednesday afternoons off for the match. We spend so much 
time arguing about food we have no time to cook it properly. We spend 
fourpence on our culture, and several million pounds a year advertising it. We 
get free spectacles and false teeth and, for lack of hospital beds, may die in a 
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ditch. We have probably the best children and dullest adults in Europe. We 
are a Socialist-Monarchy that is really the last monument of Liberalism.54  
 
Later in this thesis, I explore the ways in which Quin chronicles this tawdry and 
quietly desperate milieu with grim fascination in Berg and in Three. England, she 
writes, was a place ‘where [she] could no longer belong’.55 ‘So much time’, she 
laments in her unfinished novel, Ghostworm, ‘spent in a country where hearing it 
meant just another day of voices commenting Cold [sic] today yes but not as cold as 
yesterday.’56 She, like fellow English discontent Lawrence Durrell, wore heavily 
those ‘cultural swaddling clothes’57 which he calls ‘the English death’. In his novel 
The Black Book (1959), Durrell seeks to shine the light under the ‘phantasmagoria’ 
of Englishry and anatomise the ‘problems… of the anglo-saxon psyche’ [sic]: 
 
Toward evening, when I walk down the row of suburban houses, watching the 
blinds lowered to salute the day’s death, with no companion but that municipal 
donkey the postman, I find myself in a world of illusion whose furniture can 
only be ghosts. In the lounge the veterans sit like Stonehenge under the 
diffuse light of the lamps. Old women stuck like clumps of cactus in their 
chairs. The Times is spread out over the dead, like washing hung out on 
bushes to dry. Footsteps and voices alike trodden out in the dusty carpets; 
and the faint Aeolian sofas appealing to the statues. Night. The clock whirrs 
inside its greenhouse of glass, and the Japanese fans breathe a soft 
vegetable decay into the room. There is nothing to do, nothing to be done.58 
 
Similarly, Martha Quest, in Doris Lessing’s 1969 novel, The Four-Gated City, the fifth 
and final part of her “Children of Violence” cycle set in fifties Britain, arrives in a time-
lagged and ruined London that is positively Patrick Hamilton-esque in its meanness 
and decrepitude; damp-to-the-bones and efflorescent with mould, the Thames runs 
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with effluent and the sky is ‘low [and] weeping’59. Here the press are convinced that 
Britain is being driven to rack and ruin by the ‘grip of red-handed socialists’; Martha 
cannot ‘pick up a newspaper or listen to the radio without feeling as if she were in 
the middle of the Russian revolution, or something not far from it in cataclysmic 
thoroughness’.60 But in fact ‘nothing much had changed’ in this country;61 she finds a 
milieu dilapidated and seedy, ‘something not far off conditions described in books 
about the thirties’.62 The Britain of The Four Gated City is one hopped up on its own 
myth and staunchly refusing to confront a sobering reality. A country deluding itself 
with the perceived threat of socialism, preoccupied with the reds under the bed, and 
wilfully ignoring the low-down state of the nation: 
 
[T]his was a country absorbed in myth, doped and dozing and dreaming, 
because if there was one common fact or factor underlying everything else, it 
was that nothing was as it was described – as if a spirit of rhetoric (because 
of the war?) had infected everything, made it impossible for any fact to be 
seen straight.63  
 
The revelation of Stalin’s war crimes in a “secret” speech by the Leader of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Kruschev, in 1956, which brought 
allegations of a cover-up by the British Communist Party, and the Party’s official 
endorsement of Russian intervention in the Hungarian Uprising of that year, caused 
a crisis of conscience amongst the British Left. Thousands denounced Marxism and 
almost one-fifth were driven to revoke their membership of the Party. The socialist 
movement in Britain was left wracked and in tatters and wholly disillusioned with 
party politics.  
Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn, the figureheads of one faction of the British 
Left, which regrouped around the new New Left Review, shared this sense of crisis, 
but argued that existing accounts had focused on elaborating a diagnosis and had 
neglected to articulate the real and more complex causes of British decline. 
Furthermore, they proposed that this analytical blind spot and lack of historical 
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consciousness was endemic to British national culture and was, in turn, a crucial 
factor in the Left’s malaise. In a series of essays published in the New Left Review 
over the course of the sixties, they developed what became known as the Anderson-
Nairn thesis on British decline. According to them, the ‘idiosyncratic’ development of 
British society had produced an ‘elastic and all-embracing hegemonic order’ which, 
never challenged from below, had held a ‘tranquil and unchallenged sovereignty’ 
over a stultifying national culture.64 An incomplete bourgeois revolution had not only 
failed to displace the agrarian ruling elite, but had transformed them into a powerful 
capitalist class. The industrial revolution had served only to allow an aspirational 
bourgeoisie to assimilate into the old aristocracy to form a new ruling bloc which was 
never under any real threat from an embryonic proletariat for whom ‘Marxism came 
too late’.65 This alliance was consolidated by imperialism and, uniquely amongst its 
European neighbours, had not been rocked by defeat or occupation throughout the 
twentieth century’s two world wars.  
Britain’s economic difficulties, its struggles to confront a diminished post-
imperial future and concerns about the moribund condition of the Left inspired 
national soul-searching. The national discourse during the period was dominated by 
narratives of decline. Amongst a raft of best-selling declinist disquisitions during the 
period were Michael Shank’s Penguin special, The Stagnant Society (1961), 
Anthony Sampson’s Anatomy of Britain (1962), British Economic Policy Since the 
War (1958) by Andrew Shonfield, Anthony Hartley’s A State of England (1963), 
Nicholas Davenport’s The Split Society (1964). In the run up to the 1964 general 
election, Penguin published a series of books entitled What’s Wrong with Britain – 
including Eric Wigham’s What’s Wrong with the Unions? (1961) and What’s Wrong 
with British Industry? (1964) by Rev Malik. Commentators debated the “suicide of 
the nation” – often even whilst attempting to distance themselves from the “state of 
the nation” mania – in an eponymous issue of “Encounter” edited by Arthur Koestler 
in 1963.  
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The ‘Scumbled’ National Life 
 
Commentators suspected that Britain’s economic problem was a mere token of a 
deeper and more intractable malaise; a spiritual crisis whose origins lay in the most 
fundamental assumptions of British society. As Koestler writes in his introduction: 
 
We hold… that psychological factors and cultural attitudes are at the root of 
the economic evils – not the loss of Empire, not the huge sums we must 
spend on armaments, not the misfortune that the steam engine was invented 
by an Englishman. “We are at the moment dying by the mind,” wrote Ian 
Nairn, “it is the mind which must will the change.”66 
 
Britain’s inability to do just that, to adapt to its new context, was a diagnosis shared 
by many during the period. For Koestler, the British lion had squandered its wartime 
victories and, preferring the comforts of self-deception to acknowledging ignoble 
truths, was back, ostrich-like as ever, to business as usual: 
 
At times of emergency he rises magnificently to the occasion. In between 
emergencies he buries his head in the sand with the tranquil conviction that 
Reality is a nasty word invented by foreigners.67  
 
John Holloway, in a series of essays entitled “English Culture and the Feat of 
Transformation”, published in The Listener in 1967, agrees. Unlike the nations of 
mainland Europe, where the experience of occupation had been ‘great and 
transforming’, where the old certainties had collapsed and ‘reality [had] broken 
through’, wartime in Britain, Holloway argues, had been ‘a matter of sticking it out: 
Dunkirk, raids, rationing, refusing to let events prevent one from holding fast to the 
old ways.’68 The war, he argues, had simply vindicated the status quo. A long and 
unbroken history, uninterrupted by the revolutions, occupations and invasions that 
had transformed Britain’s European counterparts, had produced a traditionalist 
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culture that seemed to be content with quietly revelling in its own quiddity. Britain, 
according to Koestler, had not become a meritocracy but had remained a 
‘mediocracy’ of bumbling Sunday drivers, putterers and dilletantes, who were 
inveterately manqué, busying themselves with their parochial peccadillos, positively 
hostile to efficiency, rationalism and expertise and by no means capable of 
withstanding the ‘white heat’ of the scientific revolution anticipated in Harold Wilson’s 
era-defining speech in 1963.  
In an essay entitled “Get Out and Push!” published in Tom Maschler’s 
polemical state-of-the-nation collection, Declaration (1957), film-maker and co-
founder of the Free Cinema movement, Lindsay Anderson, describes Britain’s post-
war, post-imperial spiritual homecoming: 
 
Let’s face it; coming back to Britain is always something of an ordeal. It ought 
not be, but it is. And you don’t have to be a snob to feel it. It isn’t just the food, 
the sauce bottles on the café tables, and the chips with everything… After all, 
there are things that matter even more than these; and returning from the 
continent, today in 1957, we feel these strongly too. A certain civilised (as 
opposed to cultured), quality in everyday life: a certain humour; an 
atmosphere of tolerance, decency and relaxation. A solidity, even a warmth. 
We have come home. But the price we pay is high. 
 
For coming back to Britain is also, in many respects, like going back to the 
nursery. The outside world, the dangerous world, is shut away: its sounds are 
muffled… Nanny lights the fire, and sits herself down with a nice cup of tea 
and yesterday’s Daily Express; but she keeps half an eye on us too.69 
 
An addled, conservative elite that was mired in an imperial nostalgia for some 
prelapsarian past and hubristically convinced of its own continuity was perceived to 
have instituted what was commonly known at the time as a “cult of amateurism”. 
Sampson, in Anatomy of Britain, describes a nation dominated by an overweening, 
                                                          
69
 Lindsay Anderson, “Get out and give it a push!” in Declaration, ed. Tom Maschler (London: MacGibbon and 
Kee, 1957), 153. 
71 
 
out-dated and archaic establishment, which had become ‘dangerously out of touch 
with the public, insensitive to change, and wrapped up in their private rituals’:70 
 
The civil service, the palace, the honours system, have all projected an 
apparently unchanged and permanent world; while Britain becomes again a 
competitive trading nation, the weight of tradition and prestige remains in an 
imperial context. Of all the ideas which the Victorians fostered, surely the 
most dangerous was permanence – whether of Britain’s supremacy, of 
consols or of the “permanent way”. While the sense of the future and the 
radicalism of the Victorians evaporated, the idea of permanence remained. 
Railways, family firms, coal mines or regiments all acquired the safe, 
unchanging character of a country estate.71 
 
Despite the paranoia about encroaching totalitarian regimes that was pervasive 
during the era which W.H. Auden christened the “age of anxiety”, for these 
commentators what’s wrong with Britain had less to do with a sinister and all-
powerful centralised state control, and more to do with concerns about a nation 
where public pomp and pageantry concealed a hidden seat of power that was 
diffuse and elusive and perpetuated by bureaucratic conformism. British public life 
was governed by the ‘ubiquitous figure of Muddle’ and administered by an unofficial 
officialdom of mandarins and middle managers – ‘thousands of men muttering about 
their duty “to whom they serve”’.72 The threat came not from coolly technocratic 
efficiency, but from the muddled British credo that Sampson describes as an 
example of the credo, ‘it’s odd but it works’.73  
During the period, the public school, with its old school ties and old boys’ 
clubs that initiated successive generations into the ranks of the elect, became the 
emblematic institutional base of the establishment’s insidious and intractable power. 
In the 1968 film If…, named after the Rudyard Kipling poem which celebrates 
traditional British values, the public school functions as the mise-en-scène for a 
furious indictment of the famous stoicism, stiff upper lip and sense of moral 
superiority of the British establishment that are, for director, Lindsay Anderson, mere 
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cover for rampant chauvinism, snobbery, lassitude and barbarism. In the words of 
protagonist, Mick Travis, addressed to head Whip, Rowntree: 
 
The thing I hate about you, Rowntree, is the way you give Coca Cola to your 
Scum and your best teddy bear to Oxfam and expect us to lick your frigid 
fingers for the rest of your frigid life.74  
 
Based upon Anderson’s own experiences of his despised alma mater, Cheltenham 
College, the film is, in part, an almost proto-Foucauldian study of the ways in which 
social control is disseminated, replicated and internalised amongst the ‘docile 
bodies’ of the school pupils within this citadel of the elect. The headmaster of the 
school is remote and slippery, eager to pay lip service to the rapid societal changes 
of the present and espouses open-mindedness, fair punishment, progressivism, 
claiming to sympathise with the long hairs’ ‘blameless form of existentialism’.75 
However, underneath his laissez-faire “decency” operates a draconian regime where 
“college spirit” is instilled via fascistic spectacle, inscrutable rituals and war games. 
Enforced public conformity is matched by private perversity – the lascivious matron 
is brought close to orgasm by recorder music, a female teacher wanders the dorms 
naked whilst fondling the boys’ belongings. The college’s moral compass is provided 
by a slavering pederast chaplain and the energies of dissent are put down by ritual 
humiliation, cold showers, regular beatings, brisk cross-country runs, the mediated 
violence of the rugby pitch and, perhaps most evocatively, the march of the jack 
boot. The fervent emotional lives of these teenage boys are furtively channelled into 
homoerotic longing. Discipline is administered and punishment delivered upon the 
unquestioningly obedient “Scum” of the lower forms by a band of dandified and 
sadistic senior “Whips”  in the name of a credo of ‘self-reliance, service [and] self-
sacrifice’ best summed up by war hero General Denison’s Founder’s Day 
benediction:  
 
Today it is fashionable to belittle tradition…The old orders that made our 
nation a living force are for the most part scorned... But what have they got to 
put in their place? […] Freedom is the heritage of every Englishman… but we 
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won’t stay free unless we’re ready to fight. And you won’t be any good as 
fighters unless you know something about discipline, the habit of obedience, 
how to give orders and how to take them. Never mind the sneers of the 
cynics, let us just be true to honour, duty, national pride. We still need loyalty, 
we still need tradition, when we look around the world today what do we see? 
We see bloodshed confusion and decay… England, our England doesn’t 
change so easily… it makes me jolly proud that there is still a tradition here 
that has not changed and by God it isn’t going to change.76 
 
 
Literature: The ‘Low Church’ of English Culture 
 
In these declinist narratives of the period, literary intellectuals were frequently 
fingered as the key culprits behind Britain’s cultural deficiency. They were perceived 
to occupy a uniquely privileged position within an anachronistic cultural idiom of 
‘constitutional conservatism, gentlemanly capitalism, intellectual elitism and a 
misplaced superior self-understanding’.77 The literary intelligentsia were seen as a 
central pillar supporting what Holloway refers to as Britain’s nostalgic and regressive 
‘scumbled national life’.78 Margaret Drabble, in an article in praise of Angus Wilson’s 
clear-eyed and merciless depiction of the hypocrisies and foibles of the mid-century 
scene writes: ‘The possibility of writing a contemporary novel about a contemporary 
Britain seemed remote, perhaps not even desirable.’ 79 
In an essay in the underground newspaper, Bananas, Nairn characterises the 
English literary intelligentsia as a unique and formidable presence within British 
culture, whose work was concerned with the creation and propagation of a ‘myth-
world’ of ‘moralised romanticism’ which would ‘[bolster] the ailing body’ of British 
society: 
 
Metaphorically, one might say that there is no very visible High Church of 
culture in England, with correctly attired Bishops and Priests, and all the 
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formal rituals. Probably for this reason, there is no very striking anti-Church 
either, no determined and iconoclastic avant-garde. But there is a formidable 
and effective low church of English culture, administered more informally by 
multitudes of low priests. Their real power is as great as that of any State 
culture has ever been. Does the culture-landscape look empty here? Search 
more closely: there are few ‘intellectuals’, but cassocked huntsmen and 
fiddling priests are everywhere, zealously shaping a national mentality.80 
 
The British elite, argues Koestler, quoting Disraeli, are all literary men through and 
through: 
 
Old Struthonians are Amateurs and Gentlemen; they fight valiant rearguard-
actions in the merry civil war between Eggheads and Engineers; and they see 
to it that their sons are educated in the same spirit, by becoming thoroughly 
immersed in Homer’s universe, but not in the universe of Newton. Thus 
equipped, they may hope for a place in the sun and add their voices to the 
“plaintive treble of the Treasury Bench”.81 
 
The tensions between these two competing visions of Britain – on the one hand the 
‘Egghead’ patrician establishment who were held to have assumed guardianship of 
the “traditional” culture and inculcated their values via a traditionalist education 
system and, on the other, a burgeoning class of ‘Engineers’ who comprised a future-
facing technocracy with little time or inclination for Shakespeare – were ubiquitous 
during the period. But as Guy Ortolano points out in his recent book, the “Two 
cultures controversy” that was to colour so much of the discourse of the intellectual 
culture of the period was in fact a reiteration of an age-old clash of civilisations, the 
re-emergence of which was prompted by anxieties about a Britain in terminal 
decline.82  
Perhaps the most damning indictment of literary culture came from the 
Cambridge physicist and novelist, C.P. Snow, whose 1959 Rede Lecture, ‘The Two 
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Cultures and the Scientific Revolution’, formed the first broadside in the debates. 
Snow’s technocratic critique of literary culture pointedly (and confusingly) conflates 
the ‘literary intelligentsia’ and what he calls the ‘traditional culture’. He argues that 
British intellectual life had become dominated by a fundamentally reactionary literary 
intelligentsia which was mired in intellectual decadence. ‘Natural luddites’83 they had 
wrinkled their noses in aesthetic revulsion at the industrial age and absconded into 
navel-gazing obsessions with their ‘own unique tragedy’.84 This culture had been 
dominated ‘for a generation’, Snow argues, by a politically-malign literary sensibility, 
typified by apocalyptic modernists like Yeats, Pound and Wyndham Lewis, which 
had produced the ‘most imbecilic expressions of anti-social feeling’.85 Against the 
charge that ‘the influence of all they represent [brought] Auschwitz that much closer’, 
Snow finds himself unable to ‘defend the indefensible’.86 Scientific culture, on the 
other hand, is ‘tough and good and determined’;87 ‘there is a moral component right 
in the grain of science itself’,88 Snow argues, and ‘the future in its bones’.89 
His vision of a ‘traditional culture’ dominated by anti-democratic modernist 
intelligentsia is, however, somewhat off the mark. Far more prevalent within British 
intellectual culture was a tradition of dissenting middle class liberal radicalism – a 
creed not so very far off that of Snow himself – which tended to be nationalistically-
inflected with a strongly-held belief in British exceptionalism. This humanist tradition 
was a ‘surrogate religion’ which was, Bryan Appleyard argues, ‘founded upon a kind 
of visionary panic at the spectacle of the world being mechanized, centralized, 
secularized and drained of values.’90 A British tradition of liberal humanist thought – 
which attempted to temper an overarching ethical commitment to the human 
freedom and dignity of an essential and universal Man with a scepticism about mass 
politics, a theoretical modesty about sweeping abstractions and an individualist faith 
in the primacy of human relationships – had made frequent recourse to literature and 
literary history, and specifically to the novel, pressing them into service as 
communitarian models of dissent. For a lineage of thinkers that culminated in the 
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twentieth century with the Eliot-Leavis orthodoxy and the English Cultural Studies of 
Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart and E.P. Thompson, literature was the central 
component and privileged object of knowledge of an English tradition of Kulturkritik.  
 
 
Fiction and ‘Radical Earnestness’ 
 
Come of age in the nineteenth century as the literary expression of the secular, 
individualist spirit of modern capitalism, the novel had been a vehicle for social 
mimesis amongst the nascent middle classes, housed in the book, the Gutenberg 
era’s first mass-produced object. In its classic realist mode, novelistic fiction had 
both reflected and shaped a British creed, one which tempered an overarching 
ethical commitment to the human freedom and dignity of an essential and universal 
man with a suspicion of mass politics, a theoretical modesty about sweeping 
abstractions and an individualist faith in the primacy of human relationships. Its 
genre-defining characteristic of dissonance held the novel’s allegiances to both the 
fictional and the empirical in a delicate synthesis. Characteristically dialogical and 
sceptical, literary realism had been a kind of ideal space for the novelistic modelling 
of liberal humanism’s central proposition of man as the supreme author of meaning 
and action. It was uniquely capable of acknowledging ‘the plenitude, diversity and 
individuality of human beings in society, together with the belief that such 
characteristics are good as ends in themselves.’91  
These British intellectuals tended to do their thinking, and their dissenting, 
both in and through the novel. ‘Time and time again the English intellectual tries to 
explain his ideas or interpret those of others by resituating them in his literature’, 
writes Fred Inglis.92 For its ability to apply ideas to experience, fictional narrative 
became the ‘necessarily domestic idiom’93 of a ‘demotic liberalism’94 predisposed to 
prefer practice to theory. Fictional narrative was capable of holding in suspension 
the ‘triple tensions’ of English thought: ‘between dissent and practicality, between 
individuals and institutions, between experience and hope’.95 Its world-creating 
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capacity lent itself to a characteristically Fabian sensibility which held that the 
‘rational belief in and striving towards a better life and world is only possible if that 
life and world are not only imaginable but feasible.’96 Fiction was a cornerstone of 
what Peter Ackroyd has called the ‘strange alchemy of humanism, in which aesthetic 
standards can be transformed into spiritual and social needs’.97 
Against the familiar cliché that in Britain the public intellectual is a non-native 
or at the very least extinct, breed, historians like Stefan Collini in a series of books 
including Public Moralists (1991), English Pasts (1999) and Absent Minds (2006), 
and Inglis in his Radical Earnestness (1982), have sought to map this British 
tradition of thought, and have identified the ways in which it makes extensive use of 
literature and literary criticism as its object of study and its parlance. Moreover, they 
suggest that it is this literary, as opposed to theoretical, cast of mind which might 
well account for our failure to acknowledge this indigenous tradition of progressive 
thought, or the persistence with which it is misunderstood as merely the domain of 
the crude empiricist or sentimental patriot.   
What Collini designates as the ‘Whig interpretation of English literature’ 
emerged,98 he argues, concomitantly with the Victorian era’s ‘moment of 
Englishness’.99 At the time, a patriotic mood of national self-confidence that was 
galvanised by Britain’s imperial success enmeshed with a pressing need for national 
self-definition, an Englishness ripe for export that would both bind the polity and 
society of a vastly expanded “Britain” and would power (and legitimate) the imperial 
project together with anxieties about the rapid social transformations effected by 
industrial capitalism.100 These historical circumstances provided the impetus, Collini 
argues, for the production of a national, patriotic consensus that was to be achieved 
via the invocation of a tradition of English literature as the distinctive embodiment 
and expression of English national identity.101 This admixture of nationalism and 
moralism sought to transform the base metals of the local and the temporary into the 
precious, the universal and the timeless, via affirmations of the distinct moral 
properties of English literature. By projecting these values forwards and backwards 
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into a state of pseudo-permanence, nineteenth-century commentators sought to 
“recover” the nation’s timeless and essential soul via its literary history. After the 
collapse of Victorian consensus and the rise of mass culture, the literary canon 
became the terrain upon which the conflicts of cultural criticism were played out: 
‘literary criticism in its broadest sense has been acknowledged as the chief idiom for 
cultural criticism in mid-twentieth-century Britain’.102 
This creed had weathered successive crises of identity since its Victorian 
heyday. Liberalism’s cheerful optimism about the inevitability of progress, couched in 
its belief in a democracy composed of rational individuals and responsible intellectual 
elites, was to be systematically challenged by the forces of history from the Victorian 
era onwards. Its discourse of self-reliance, seeded from classical liberalism’s faith in 
free markets and civil liberties, clashed with the reforming spirit of the era, typified in 
the emergence of the Labour movement and the formation of the Fabian Society. 
World War I and the Great Depression eventually forced liberals to acknowledge the 
need for state-level intervention to regulate markets and ameliorate social ills and 
effected the move towards a Keynesian social democracy. George Dangerfield, in 
his eponymous 1935 book, famously declared the ‘strange death of liberal England’. 
That said, although in party political terms liberalism was to face a century in the 
wilderness, a broader liberal humanist sensibility persisted. It confronted the 
challenge of modernity’s mass society and mechanisation with a kind of detached 
contempt. Accounts of modernism which emphasise the movement’s challenge to 
liberal humanism have tended to obscure the ways in which modernism was itself 
shaped by and implicated in this tradition of thought. Far more prevalent – if more 
modest – however, was a form of artistic rebellion seeded in the spiritual crisis 
amongst genteel Bloomsburyites (Virginia Woolf and E.H. Forster, in particular) who 
remained broadly committed to the tenets of liberal humanism whilst self-consciously 
elegising its passing. 
From the twenties and thirties onwards, a tradition of thought that had 
originated as a status-quo-challenging defence of the new social order of modern 
capitalism had begun to appeal to the novel instead for its abilities to manifest in 
fiction an ‘imagined community’ of shared, stable values as a bulwark against a 
                                                          
102
 Stefan Collini, English Pasts: Essays in History and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65. 
79 
 
hostile and atomised present of mass culture, mass media and Americanisation. As 
Francis Mulhern argues, this tradition of thought 
 
narrowed, in stages, to the lament for an irrecoverable past, as its actual 
social bases weakened, its claims mounted towards the absolute… by the 
middle of the twentieth century it had been reduced to the desperate self-
assertion of a specialized minority… as the only sure trustees of an 
unattainable general spiritual welfare.103 
 
In F.R. Leavis, who entered the fray in 1962 with his own Richmond Lecture entitled 
“Two Cultures? The Significance of C.P. Snow”, Snow could scarcely have found a 
more fitting adversary. Leavis savaged the literary merits of Snow-the-novelist’s own 
realistic fictions then went on to reiterate the project he had pursued for three 
decades: that of establishing “University English” as the ‘humane centre’ of the 
disciplines and, more broadly, as the universal ego of culture. Under Leavis’ 
tutelage, the discipline of University English sought to claim responsibility for a 
literary culture that was freighted with an extraordinary significance. Its protectorate 
was to be nothing less than what Leavis called the ‘living culture’, a communal 
culture that had been lost to the industrial revolution and of which literature was the 
highest expression: ‘In their keeping… is the language, the changing idiom, upon 
which fine living depends, and which distinction of spirit is thwarted and incoherent. 
By “culture” I mean the use of such a language.’104   
Leavis’ metaphysic, which came to shape the pedagogic tradition of English 
Studies, elevated the “Great Tradition” from a nationalist project to a universalist 
(and yet nationalistically inflected) one, looking to literary history to supply a 
communal system of values and beliefs that might could redeem a fallen civilisation. 
Leavis believed that in the literary canon the last surviving vestiges of this common 
culture could be found, recovered and preserved by a ‘minority culture’: ‘Upon this 
minority depends our power of profiting by the finest human experience of the past; 
they keep alive the subtlest and most perishable parts of the tradition.’105 Modernism 
– that is, a particular (i.e. non-Bloomsbury) version of it - was central to Leavis’ vision 
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of culture. In his championing of T.S. Eliot and then of D.H. Lawrence, he was a key 
figure in the institutionalisation of modernism in Britain. In what was, for Leavis, as 
the inheritor of T.S. Eliot’s myth of a fallen modernity, an irretrievably postlapsarian 
and barbaric ‘mass civilisation’, modernism was pegged as the antidote to what he 
perceived as the ‘quack enlightenment, stock opinion and formulaic gratifications’106 
of the mass media. Modernist poetics, Leavis claimed, had a unique capability of 
accessing the spiritual essence of civilisation.  
Literature, and, indeed – as Alan Sinfield has argued107 – Leavis would also 
be central to the ‘left-culturalist’ project of English Cultural Studies, although the 
ways in which the pioneers of English Cultural Studies, Williams, Hoggart and 
Thompson engaged with both of these diverged dramatically. Emerging from the 
ashes of the British Communist Party after 1956, the Birmingham School sought, on 
the one hand, to dethrone an Eliot-Leavis critical hegemony and, on the other, and in 
response to their disillusionment with Communist Marxism, to reinvent what Sinfield 
calls ‘socialism with a British face’.108 This nativised socialism moved away from the 
economic base/superstructure paradigm and towards an emphasis on culture. British 
left-culturalism held that class is fundamentally a cultural, rather than simply 
economic, construct and sought to emphasis the role of human agency in the 
creation of human reality. It insists, like E.P. Thompson, that ‘[t]hese cultural 
questions are questions about life’.109 
Although pitching itself resolutely against the Leavisite orthodoxy’s elitist 
vision of a rarefied culture desperately attempting to assert itself against a fallen 
civilisation, the influence of Leavis, and, indeed, of Matthew Arnold, on the 
Birmingham School, was explicit and far-ranging. Whilst broadening the scope of 
their version of culture beyond the realms of the strictly literary, like their 
predecessors, literature and literary study retained a uniquely privileged place within 
their political vision. Hoggart (whose preferred title for his most famous work was not 
The Uses but The Abuses of Literacy which would have sat quite comfortably with 
Leavis) shared his progenitor’s elegiac vision of an organic community, but situated 
his own golden age amongst the “authentic” culture of the pre-war working classes 
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as opposed to Leavis’ more distant – although, in a sense, no more mythical – 
agrarian ideal. He, like Leavis, remained committed to the superiority of literature as 
a mode of cultural expression, even whilst attempting to broaden the gamut of what 
that might constitute, beginning to set out the parameters of a sociology of literature. 
For Raymond Williams, the realist novel was a space in which to manifest the 
ideals of social democracy. In his essay, ‘Realism and the Contemporary Novel’, 
Williams, after György Lukács, calls for the reclamation of a ‘progressive and 
revolutionary’ realism,110 against the burgher epic with which the category is more 
commonly associated. He describes how the separating out of the realist novel into 
its personal and social functions has reflected a crisis in the relationship between the 
individual and society. Elaborating upon his 1958 dictum of “culture is ordinary” – 
and anticipating the constructivist theories of Berger and Luckman which became 
prominent five years later with the publication of their The Social Construction of 
Reality – Williams argues that if the idea that ‘[r]eality is continually established by 
common effort’ is now a given, then ‘art is one of the highest forms of this 
process’.111 The proper function of the novel, he argues, is the attempt to reintegrate 
the individual and society in communicable form, ascribed to its unique capacity of 
‘creative discovery’.112 
 
 
Closing Time in the Gardens 
 
Amongst literary intellectuals, however, this faith in literature as, as Williams writes, a 
‘court of human appeal’,113 had lapsed. In his “Comment” prefacing the December 
1947 issue of Horizon, editor Cyril Connolly laments a ‘Twilight of the Arts’ that was 
indexed to the ‘twilight of a civilisation’.114 His year-end review of an annus horribilis 
declared that, with few exceptions, ‘the catalogue of that branch of our literature 
which can be described as “experimental” is complete.’115 He sees portents of a ‘new 
Dark Age’ lasting ‘several hundred years’.  In the immediate aftermath of World War 
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II, Connolly describes a culture afflicted by a profound crisis of confidence. The 
‘leveled, diminished world’ World War II had left, as Hugh Kenner describes, was 
one of ‘shared poverty, blunt scissors, blunt minds, numb hopes’.116 
The effect, argued Connolly, was a literary scene ossified by the ‘spiritual 
problem of the artist in a world without hope’.117 Three years later, in the final issue 
of Horizon, Connolly famously called ‘closing time in the gardens of the West’. From 
now on, he declared, the ‘artist will be judged only by the resonance of his solitude or 
the quality of his despair.’118 His complaint is indicative of a mood of profound 
kulturpessimismus that afflicted successive generations of Anglo-American literary 
commentators during this mid-century period. Accounts of the British post-war period 
are dominated therefore by twinned narratives of decline, which index a perceived 
declension in Britain’s literary vitality to the contraction of its geopolitical clout. 
Britain’s continuing retreat from imperial power, the threat of Americanisation with 
the resurgence of mass culture during the fifties, the carving up of “old Europe” as 
part of the post-war settlement and the new superpowers pact of mutually assured 
destruction were amongst the factors contributing to a profound crisis of confidence 
that came to be reflected in a post-war literature characterised as self-consciously 
unambitious and parochial in outlook.  
The literary Left were in a state of collapse. As a twinned aesthetics and 
ideology of compromise, the fortunes of liberal humanism and the novel were so 
tightly intertwined they were widely held to be coterminous. Convinced, even 
complacent, about their creed’s continuity and permanence, believing it to be so 
ingrained in Western civilisation as to be self-evident, British liberal humanists had 
abided modernity’s mass society and mechanisation with a kind of detached 
contempt. When the incipient threat of totalitarianism and the squalor of the thirties 
began to press the delicate logic of their creed, such a stance, for some, amounted 
to so much ineffectual handwringing. For Evelyn Waugh, liberal humanism during 
this period appeared to have ‘two peevish spirits whispering into either ear.’119 As he 
writes, in a review of Cyril Connolly’s era-defining Enemies of Promise (1938):  
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 [Connolly] is divided in his mind. On the one hand he sees English life as a 
secure, hierarchic organization, with, at the top, a glittering world where the 
artist should by right preen himself. An artist should have ease and 
appreciation; he should travel and dine well and be continuously in and out 
of love. On the other hand, he sees English life as rotten and tottering; the 
physical and moral dangers so imminent and appalling that the artist can 
only hope for a complete change for his life to be possible; a change which 
Mr. Connolly inclines to think may be for the worse.120 
 
During World War II and its aftermath, however, liberal humanism had found its 
vanishing point. For a literary intelligentsia reeling from the atrocities perpetrated 
during war time, the onset of the Cold War, with its incipient threat of totalitarianism 
from three sides – fascism, communism and McCarthyism – together with fears 
about the erosion of the middle class literary intelligentsia’s traditional milieu and 
metier by the Welfare State, and the explosion of mass culture were thought to pose 
a mortal threat to the literary intellectual’s material, economic and political conditions 
and, more fundamentally, to their freedom.  
The Anglo-American sense of vindication at victory for moral virtue in what 
became known as the “Good War” was tempered by the profound and uneasy 
questions that were raised by the unravelling of its aftermath. As the scope and 
nature of the atrocities perpetrated by both Axis and Allied forces emerged – the 
coolly rational modernity of genocide in the concentrations camps; the totality of 
atomic devastation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the extent of collaborationism in 
Europe and beyond; the indiscriminate brutality inflicted upon prisoner, partisan, 
resister and civilian alike – Britain and America were confronted with the 
uncomfortable realisation that the categories of “good” and “evil” were no longer, and 
had never been, as simple as “us” versus “the Hun”. Moreover, the Holocaust had 
rendered these historic binaries of moral virtue obsolete and had initiated a new 
moral category that Issac Rosenfeld calls a ‘terror beyond evil’.121 As Rex Warner 
writes in 1946: 
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There is no longer to be any truck with the dogmatic and generalised belief 
in a God to whom all human souls are of equal value… no more use for the 
liberal “scientific” notions that the interests of mankind are inseparable… no 
longer any talk of gentleness, of international good will and the like… Mere 
iterations of European ideals of universal love and justice will cut no more ice 
after this war…122 
 
Amongst perplexed and anxious Anglo-American liberals, it became apparent that 
the events of World War II would not only redraw geopolitical topographies and 
upset the balance of global hegemony, but would raise more profound and uneasy 
questions about nationhood and nationalism and, even more fundamentally, would 
call to account the very notion of being human.  
‘No poetry after Auschwitz’, goes the famous dictum attributed to Theodor 
Adorno, which in fact, it is important to note, has been paraphrased from a longer 
and more complex remark made within the concluding passages of his 1949 essay, 
“Cultural Criticism and Society”, in which he actually states that to persist in the 
cultural production of a culture that produced Auschwitz is to participate by denial in 
the perpetuation and reification of that barbaric culture.123 It is perhaps even more 
pertinent to pose the question of if, as George Steiner puts it, ‘[the] house of classic 
humanism, the dream of reason which animated western society, have largely 
broken down’,124 then what would become of its house organ, the novel?  
 
Following on the epic and on verse-drama, the novel has been the third 
principal genre of western literature. It expressed and, in part, shaped the 
habits of feeling and language of the western bourgeoisie from Richardson to 
Thomas Mann. In it, the dreams and nightmares of the mercantile ethic, of 
middle-class privacy, and of the monetary-sexual conflicts and delights of 
industrial society have their monument. With the decline of these ideals and 
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habits into a phase of crisis and partial rout, the genre is losing much of its 
vital bearing.125 
 
Bradbury argues that the mood during the period was ‘one of a broad, cohesive 
liberalism and anti-totalitarianism’, where ‘[e]xtreme attitudes, whether of the Left or 
the Right were now in distrust’126. That said, however, the liberalism that was the 
traditional creed of the literary intellectual was now imbued with a fear and self-doubt 
that was more liable to admit T.S. Eliot’s charge, posed earlier in his The Idea of 
Christian Society (1936), that disparaged the essentially negative version of liberty 
available in liberal societies and suggested that, in setting up freedom as its 
axiomatic value, liberalism had created an ethical vacuum into which the forces of 
Fascism had flowed. The British liberal Left admonished itself for its hubris in 
allowing fascism to slip through and for supporting Soviet Communism after 1956.  
Amongst but not limited to an older generation of pre-war intellectual 
mandarins, traditionalists for whom the Eliot-Leavis orthodoxy still held true, the 
Welfare State’s new commitment to culture with the establishment of the Committee 
for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) – which in 1945 became the 
Arts Council, chaired by the architect of welfare capitalism, John Maynard Keynes – 
was felt to be no less of a threat. This older generation of writers feared that the 
freedoms and the securities of their traditional rentier class milieu were being rapidly 
eroded. That state intervention in the arts would dismantle the fragile world of 
patronised dissent, and render the discourse of the middle-class dissident samizdat, 
replacing it with that which was state-funded and government committee-approved.  
Their quasi-mythical idea of culture, passed down direct from Arnold and Southey 
via Leavis and Eliot, was being usurped by something rather more prosaic; a culture 
that was administered to the masses “for their own good” – like a daily spoonful of 
castor oil – alongside their NHS spectacles and break-time milk. Their vision of 
culture as a sacred and timeless repository of values and beliefs inherited by an 
organically-elected meritocracy was being replaced by that of a culture that was 
centrally planned and subsidised by a new class of government bureaucrats. The 
belief amongst this would-be priesthood, expressed by T.S. Eliot in his Notes 
Toward the Definition of Culture in 1948 that ‘culture was the one thing that we 
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cannot deliberately aim at’127 was being usurped by the endorsement amongst a 
new clergy of government mandarins of a more consciously worked-out pluralisation 
of culture. 
Amongst the younger generation of left-leaning literary intellectuals, too, the 
welfare state was not unproblematically embraced. Iris Murdoch, in her 1961 essay, 
‘Against Dryness’, writes that the Welfare State represents the triumph of a “bad” 
liberalism, one based in a theory of man as a ‘brave naked will surrounded by an 
easily comprehended empirical world’.128 Commenting upon the politics of welfare 
capitalism, Murdoch praises the welfare state’s socialist accomplishments, but 
argues that they, in the end, amount to ‘a set of thoroughly desirable but limited 
ends’.129 Based on a ‘debilitated form of Mill’s equation: happiness equals freedom 
equals personality’,130 for Murdoch the Welfare State represents the triumph of “bad” 
liberalism and has resulted in the ‘impoverishment of thinking and language’ and the 
decay of a ‘moral and political vocabulary’131 that was typical of an age in which 
sincerity had usurped truth.  
The quandary of the writer and of the novel after the end of liberal humanism 
preoccupied many of the self-conscious fictions of the period, but perhaps nowhere 
are the hypocrisies and handwringing of middle-class literary intellectuals more 
mercilessly depicted than by the poison of Angus Wilson’s pen in his debut novel, 
Hemlock and After (1952) which questions liberalism’s adequacy (and integrity) as 
the moral compass of a “new Britain” and the capacity of the Welfare State to 
support its cultural life. In it, man of letters, Bernard Sands, finds himself caught 
between a need for authority and a knee-jerk distaste for power. Having obtained a 
government grant to set up a writer’s centre, Vardon Hall, with the British 
intellectual’s characteristic antipathy to institutional power, he congratulates himself 
upon his triumph over the ‘world of Kafka’s “They”’.132 ‘[V]ery gratifying to an 
anarchist humanist’, Sands comments, ‘to have the State eating out of [my] hand’.133 
But in the novel Sands is systematically challenged by the bureaucratic 
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machinations of government, which, in turn, expose the flaws in his liberal humanist 
vision.  
 
 
Writing ‘Inside the Whale’ 
 
The literary intelligentsia’s disillusionment with the collapse of its ideals was matched 
not only by anxieties about the curtailment of its freedoms, but also by a rather more 
fundamental crisis of selfhood. This threat, posed from, variously, encroaching 
totalitarian regimes, mass media, advertising and technology and the state 
interventions of welfare capitalism, was felt particularly keenly amongst a literary 
intelligentsia whose thinking about the role of the writer tended to rest upon a 
characteristically romantic modernist conception of the artist as a unique and 
privileged seer. As George Orwell, in his classic wartime essay in unlikely praise of 
Henry Miller, “Inside the Whale”, argues: 
 
What is quite obviously happening, war or no war, is the break-up of laissez-
faire capitalism and of the liberal-Christian culture… Almost certainly we are 
moving into an age of totalitarian dictatorships – an age in which freedom of 
thought will be at first a deadly sin and later on a meaningless abstraction. 
The autonomous individual is going to be stamped out of existence. But this 
means that literature, in the form in which we know it, must suffer at least a 
temporary death. The literature of liberalism is coming to an end and the 
literature of totalitarianism has not yet appeared and is barely imaginable. As 
for the writer, he is sitting on a melting iceberg; he is merely an anachronism, 
a hangover from the bourgeois age, as surely doomed as the 
hippopotamus… from now onwards the all-important fact for the creative 
writer is going to be that this is not a writer’s world. That does not mean that 
he cannot help to bring the new society into being, but he can take no part in 
the process as a writer. For as a writer he is a liberal, and what is happening 
is the destruction of liberalism.134 
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The very idea of the privacy and the integrity of a discrete and autonomous 
self was already under increasing pressure. From the twenties onwards, novels like 
Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1924), H.G. Well’s Men Like Gods (1923) and Brave New 
World (1932) by Aldous Huxley had given expression to cultural anxieties about 
technological change, mass production and massification, the new industrial ethos of 
mechanisation and efficiency and the new scientism and its culture of expertise. 
World War II and its aftermath had revealed the latent capacity of the self to be 
amassed into ranks, coerced into the perversions of Fascist and Stalinist thinking 
and then manipulated into mass genocide on an unthinkable scale. Behaviourism, a 
branch of experimental psychology that had emerged between the wars, for its 
attempts to discover and codify techniques for controlling human behaviour, was 
perceived to have spawned a monster.  
In the period following World War II, the writer’s fears about the threat to the 
individual consciousness posed by social engineering, conditioning and 
miseducation can be seen in mid-century fictions of the dystopic imagination, 
allegorical novels notably preoccupied by mass psychosis, surveillance, “groupthink” 
and the covert manipulations of shadowy organisations. Most famously, there was 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) but also Rex Warner’s The 
Aerodrome: A Love Story (1941), Darkness at Noon (1940) by Arthur Koestler and 
Nigel Dennis’ Cards of Identity (1955), a largely forgotten satirical tour de force that 
explores the crisis of identity amongst confused and directionless post-war subjects 
and which, with its depiction of the manipulations and machinations of the “Identity 
Club”, a tyrannical elite who rule by the imposition of identities upon their unwitting 
patients, is a kind of anti-psychiatry novel avant la letter. 
 With the onset of the Cold War, the perceived threats of operant conditioning, 
manipulation and propaganda were augmented by the new menace that was felt 
from the secret forms of political coercion that became known as “brain washing” and 
“mind control”. As David Seed chronicles in his study of the paranoid fictions of the 
era, appalled by reports that American POWs in Korea were being “turned”, the 
United States embarked upon a “battle for the mind”, condemning the “mind control” 
taking place on the other side of the iron curtain whilst themselves embarking upon a 
massive project of psychological experimentation using behaviouristic techniques 
and psychotropic drugs which was sponsored and implemented by the CIA and other 
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state organisations, the most infamous of which was the MK-ULTRA project.135 By 
the late fifties, similar strategies of social control and manipulation were strongly 
suspected to have been extended into civilian everyday life by both corporations and 
state institutions, which were perceived to be attempting to tame and exploit the 
chaos of mass society via the application of new sociological and scientific 
techniques to organise, label and manipulate the masses in a schema of mass 
psychology.  
This issue was addressed in 1960 by a special issue of the Times Literary 
Supplement published under the header “Limits of Control”, later collected as The 
Writer’s Dilemma. Editor Stephen Spender drew together a coterie of writers 
including Lawrence Durrell, Alan Sillitoe and Nathalie Sarraute to reflect upon the 
question: ‘what are the limits beyond his own control that threaten the modern 
writer?’136 ‘We start off in agreement that there is an unprecedented crisis,’ he writes 
in his introduction, ‘[f]reedom is threatened. Consciousness may be entirely 
conditioned. Individualism is undermined’.137 Whilst Spender and his contributors 
broadly reaffirm their liberal faith in the ‘creative genius’ of the writer’s voice and their 
Arnoldian faith in writing’s social action upon the culture, elsewhere Lessing, in her 
important essay, ‘The Small Personal Voice’ (1957), published in Declaration, 
attempts to renegotiate the role of the “committed” writer and of the novel in culture. 
Confronting head-on the dilemma Gayle Greene sums up as that of ‘how to use the 
novel to say something new when the discourses from which the novelist creates are 
inscribed within the ideologies she repudiates’138 – a quandary self-consciously 
played out again and again in her fictions – Lessing argues for the differently 
conceived, but nonetheless vital, role of the writerly imagination. The novelist’s 
‘small, personal voice’, she argues, must recreate ‘warmth and humanity and love of 
people’139 in a way that constitutes neither propagandising, or unquestioning political 
“commitment”, but bears the writer’s responsibility as an ‘instrument of change for 
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good or bad’140 and as an ‘architect of the soul’.141 Lessing’s essay attempts to 
explore the ways in which novelists might move beyond the impasse presented by 
realistic writing, that of a mode discredited, whose capacity to accurately and 
ethically reflect the realities of contemporary life was in doubt, but which was 
persistently elevated as the literary antidote to the anxieties of the era by an 
establishment still nostalgic for the now impossible ideals of liberal humanism.  
In her 1962 novel, The Golden Notebook, Lessing draws together the gamut 
of dilemmas facing writers during the period. How can novels work to achieve the 
authentic integration of “the personal” and “the social” insisted upon by Williams 
without subordinating either and thereby enacting the return to, on the one hand, the 
introspective preoccupations of modernism or the ideological perils of social(ist) 
realism? What relevance can art now have when confronted by the inexorable 
machinations of the culture industry? What mode should one adopt with both the 
private truths of literary modernism and the political commitment of “critical realism” 
now perceived as forms of aesthetic collusion with the politics of fascism and 
Stalinism respectively? Can there now be such a thing as a politically innocent form 
and given all of this, what can the role of the writer now be? The protagonist of 
Lessing’s novel is Anna Wulf, a chronically blocked writer who is troubled by her own 
inability to put pen to paper. At her writing desk she is, figuratively, flanked by a 
Chinese peasant, an Algerian soldier, Castro’s guerrilla fighters – those whom 
Frederic Jameson would call the newly-emergent ‘subjects of history’ – all of whom 
ask: “Why aren’t you doing something about us, instead of wasting your time 
scribbling?”142 During the sixties, writers felt themselves under an untenable 
pressure to justify their practice. This erstwhile writer feels continually ‘as if she had 
committed a crime’143. To call oneself an artist, in these circumstances, is an 
unforgiveable form of hubris. 
Anna’s dilemma is at first a formal one. The problem is, as Lessing writes in 
the opening lines of the novel, that ‘as far [Anna] can see, everything’s cracking 
up’.144 And fiction, according to Lessing, has become an exercise in papering up the 
cracks. In its social realist mode, the novel is a form of reportage, desperately 
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grasping at a lost “wholeness” by documenting those sections of society ‘not yet 
admitted to the general literate consciousness’145. Its politically-committed socialist 
realist counterpart is no better. Art, according to Lessing, takes to political 
commitment under duress, as a quid pro quo against an all-powerful culture industry. 
What good is socialist realism anyway, asks Anna, when the “reality” of so-called 
‘actually existing socialism’ consists of ‘economics, or machine guns mowing down 
people who object to the new order’?146 
These problems of form quickly become problems of language. ‘Increasingly’, 
writes Anna, ‘words lose their meaning suddenly... the gap between what they are 
supposed to mean and what in fact they say seems unbridgeable’.147 In passages 
that directly allude to Sartre’s Nausea – right down to the jazz music and the 
doorknob – Anna’s own existential revelation triggers an apprehension of the 
inadequacy of language. ‘A row of asterisks... might be better’, she writes, ‘[o]r a 
symbol of some kind, a circle, perhaps, or a square. Anything at all, but not 
words.’148 It would seem, initially, that in The Golden Notebook, Lessing offers us a 
way out of this aesthetic and political knot. Towards the end of her party days, 
lapsed card carrying Communist Anna insists that ‘humanism stands for the whole 
person, the whole individual, striving to become as conscious and responsible about 
everything in the universe’.149 And it appears, at first, that Lessing is reaffirming this 
liberal humanist role for fiction. Indeed, Anna’s own aim is to write such a novel: her 
hope is that the golden notebook might be ‘powered with an intellectual or moral 
passion strong enough to create order, to create a new way of looking at life’.150 
Early reviews attempted to reassemble this novel of formal fragmentation and 
linguistic breakdown, peopled with divided selves, as a more-or-less realistic 
narrative. But doing so, as Lorna Sage has argued, is a kind of mathematical formal 
impossibility.151 In fact, the attempt to recuperate this novel which, like Quin’s own 
later one, Three, is so explicitly about the impossibility of coherence, linearity and 
totality, and that formally acts out the disintegration of the realist conventions (of both 
art and life) that had once held true, is a very telling form of critical mimesis. Try as 
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they might, Anna’s notebooks will not add up to a single, unified story. But for the 
ways in which Lessing’s novel sustains these dilemmas and, moreover, ingrains 
them within the epistemological project of fiction-writing itself, what it does do is point 
towards a new, non-redemptive, but no less vital, way of telling.  
The dark visions of the forties and early fifties were cautionary tales about 
totalitarian abuses of power that warned against the dangers of groupthink and the 
unethical application of scientific rationalism. However, although peopled by 
characters who are losing their grip on reality, the metaphysical insecurity of these 
novels has been abstracted and thematised at the level of plot as pathologies of 
mass psychosis and pandemic insanity. Here, the world-creating capacity of fiction is 
used to imagine altered but still ordered and substantive story-worlds – the 
degenerate village and its fascistically ordered counterpart, the Aerodrome, in 
Warner’s novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Airstrip One and Cards of Identity’s country 
estate, Hyde Mortimer, for example – that are depicted realistically by the 
rationalising locus of their third-person narrators. In these fictions, with their pre-
occupation with socio-psychotic disorders, there is the sense, as Bradbury writes, 
that ‘modern history was less the crisis of real forces than a mass psychosis’.152 
Irrationality – be it the allure of fascism, the submission to power wielded for its own 
sake, or the difficulties in sustaining an identity – is depicted as a collective 
pathology that is socially conditioned but does not disturb the laws of a familiar world 
capable of being rationally and empirically apprehended. As John MacMurray writes, 
in the introduction to his 1937 book, Freedom in the Modern World, during the period 
it was felt that it was not the world that had “gone mad”, but us: 
 
When in such a situation as we are in produces problems of a magnitude that 
is scaring us out of our wits, then there is insanity about. These difficulties 
have their source in us. There is nowhere else for their source to be. If we 
confess, as I think we must, that we are living in a world that has gone mad, 
we have to remember that madness is a malady of the human mind. The 
world outside us cannot be mad: only the world inside us is capable of sanity 
and insanity. Plainly, there is something serious the matter with us. We have 
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lost our hold on reality, and the world will continue to reflect the Bedlam inside 
us until we recover our sanity.153 
 
Whilst the dystopian fictions of this earlier period maintained the normative 
oppositions between reason and unreason, rationality and irrationality, illness and 
health, sanity and madness, by the late fifties and sixties, the very efficacy of these 
distinctions was being called into question. Fear about the social implications of the 
“medicalisation of the mind” meshed with the radical scepticism of the intellectual 
climate of the period, first intuited within fictional writing, and then conceptualised 
within literary criticism, sociology, philosophy and cultural theory. It was now felt that 
it was not us who had gone mad but the world.  
During the period, humanist recoil at the atrocities of World War II, together 
with the unimaginable discoveries of science that seemed to challenge the rational 
basis of scientific thought and the existence of an “ultimate reality”, engendered a 
profound sense of “reality crisis” amongst intellectuals. Two leading philosophers of 
science were during the sixties to have remarkable impacts upon the ways in which 
we conceive of scientific knowledge. Thomas Kuhn’s hugely influential 1962 book, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, challenged the prevailing positivist view of 
scientific progress and assumptions about the perfectibility of the scientific method, 
arguing that change is unsteady and uneven, characterised by alternating “normal” 
and “revolutionary” phases. Karl Popper’s falsification principle shook the epistemic 
status of the discipline, reorienting the aims of science away from Truth and towards 
increasing verisimilitude. Elsewhere, theoretical physicist, Werner Heisenberg had 
formulated his uncertainty principle in the late twenties, but by the sixties it had 
superseded the classical intuitions of physics with the description of a probable and 
random universe and toppled the certainty that there is any reality independent of the 
act of observation. During the early sixties, American mathematician Edward Lorenz 
pioneered chaos theory, which describes the ways in which small events can cause 
large-scale and unexpected consequences. In the middle part of the decade, the 
theory of plate tectonics overthrew earth science’s principles about the composition 
of the earth’s interior, which had been accepted since the “golden age” of nineteenth 
century geology. Scientific progress itself looked to be the Enlightenment project’s 
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undoing. The sixties also signalled a waning of the Enlightenment’s “myth of 
progress” and a new apprehension of its consequences, especially in the 
environmental sphere. Rachel Carson’s landmark book, Silent Spring (1962), which 
explored the impact of pesticides, is often credited with beginning the contemporary 
environmentalist movement and marked the beginning of the end of an 
unproblematic belief in the human capacity to harness and control nature without 
repercussions.   
The calling into question of the foundationalist approaches of the past to 
human knowledge, the laying bare of myths of truth and the embrace of the idea that 
existence could be understood in terms of a number of provisional and contingent 
narratives during the mid-century gave rise to a fictionalist moment that is evident, 
for example, in the philosophies of existentialism, the later “fictional turn” amongst 
French theorists such as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva 
amongst others, and the theories of social constructivism that emerged within the 
discipline of sociology.154 Victor Sage in 1973 notes the ‘fashionable extension’ of 
the term “fiction” to denote the ways in which we make sense of the ‘formless flux’ of 
the world via the imaginative creation of mental activity.155 This new, radically 
sceptical mood was to animate postmodernist claims that “all truths are fictions”. 
And, if truths were now fictions, if fictionality was now to be understood not as 
pertaining to the products of our imagination but as a vast umbrella under which our 
new way of experiencing the world could shelter, then what, exactly, was fiction? 
And what would be its function? This extended quote from Sukenick’s “Death of the 
Novel” captures the mood of perplexed ennui amongst writers during the period:  
 
The contemporary writer – the writer who is acutely in touch with the life of 
which he is part – is forced to start from scratch: Reality doesn’t exist, time 
doesn’t exist, personality doesn’t exist. God was the omniscient author, but he 
died; now no one knows the plot, and since our reality lacks the sanction of a 
creator, there’s no guarantee as to the authenticity of the received version. 
Time is reduced to presence, the content of a series of discontinuous 
moments. Time is no longer purposive, and so there is no destiny, only 
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chance. Reality is, simply, our experience, and objectivity is, of course, an 
illusion. Personality, after passing through a phase of awkward self-
consciousness, has become, quite minimally, a mere locus for our 
experience. In view of these annihilations, it should be no surprise that 
literature, also, does not exist – how could it? There is only reading and 
writing, which are things we do, like eating and making love, to pass the time, 
ways of maintaining a considered boredom in the face of the abyss.156  
 
Literary theorists, most notably Frank Kermode in The Sense of an Ending, 
his landmark study of the relationship between the traditions of eschatological 
thought and novelistic plot-making, which appeared in 1968, made recourse to a 
lineage of fictionalist thought, including Kant and Nietzsche, together with Hans 
Vaihinger (whose own The Philosophy of As If [1911] is an important precedent for 
the literary fictionalism of the sixties) and the American poet Wallace Stevens 
(whose conceptualisation of the ‘supreme fiction’ is another)  to renegotiate the role 
of the novel and to distinguish it as one fiction amongst many. Now, when the human 
experience of and confidence in a commonplace reality or, more properly, realities, 
has been forcefully queried and fiction and experience are conceived of as related 
rather than opposed casts of mind, Kermode’s account insists upon literary fiction’s 
privileged status amongst different orders of fictionality. Navigating the Sartrean 
impasse of fictionality that motivates his novel Nausea, summed up by Frank 
Lentricchia as one in which ‘no sooner is [the] neoidealist, fictive act of 
consciousness privileged as an act of freedom from the determining forces of reality, 
than it is quickly deprivileged by an existentialist investment which sees fictive 
arrangements of being as impoverished in the face of being itself’,157 Kermode 
argues that the novel is capable of reconciling the self-contradictory paradox of 
fictionality through fictional self-consciousness and is thereby a unique and powerful 
tool of human sense-making. Novelistic irony’s characteristic double consciousness, 
Kermode argues, presents us with those necessary fictions that we know to be false 
but that we momentarily accept. And in this way, novels have the ability to 
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simultaneously offer and ethically deny the consolations of form, of concordance, of 
beginnings, middles and endings.  
The writers of the period, however, were less concerned with realising 
Kermode’s ethical vision of fiction as heuristic device, than with militating against the 
order of fiction to find ways to more authentically reflect the chaos, disorder and 
discordance of reality. Despite – or, perhaps, as Byatt argues, because of – our 
‘more cautious and empirical climate’158 British novelists had long been engaged in 
exploring fictionality. Alongside writers like Spark, Lessing, Murdoch, Fowles and 
Golding, British experimental novelists were equally preoccupied with interrogating 
fictional narrative, from B.S. Johnson’s ultraist attempts to dispute the fictionality of 
fiction to Brigid Brophy’s baroque novels of Austenian designedness. Christine 
Brooke-Rose’s rangy and brilliant study of this tendency, A Rhetoric of the Unreal 
(1968), whose significance as an account of the development of post-war fiction has 
yet to be fully acknowledged, conceptualises this new, self-metaphorising role of the 
novel as a modern re-emergence of forms of the fantastic: 
 
[T]he sense that empirical reality is not as secure as it used to be is now 
pervasive at all levels of society. Certainly what used to be called empirical 
reality, or the world, seems to have become more and more unreal, and what 
has long been regarded as unreal is more and more turned to or studied as 
the only “true” or “another and equally valid” reality… This apparent and for 
the moment still partial (and perhaps transient) inversion of the real/unreal is 
perfectly logical: if the ‘real’ has come to seem unreal, it is natural to turn to 
the ‘unreal’ as real.159 
 
And in this way, the writers of the time employ the unique self-metaphorising 
capabilities of the novel to explore the metaphoric, rather than the mimetic potentials 
of the form. Their works do not test hypotheses – a criticism frequently levelled at the 
nouveau romancier attempt to produce fictions to meet and match its manifestos – 
but use travestying strategies to test the limits of literary fiction. By deconstructing 
fictional convention, these writers of the sixties sought at once reveal the life-
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strategies we employ to order and to categorise the flux of experience and to more 
authentically capture the presence of that experience.  
Their strategies were wildly divergent. In this study, I will focus specifically 
upon the ways in which Quin and others drew sustenance from the debates and 
controversies surrounding the “science of the soul” that provided the theoretical 
underpinning of the counterculture, and which coalesced under the banners of anti-
psychiatry, Freudo-Marxism and others. This tendency within intellectual thought 
itself arose from the same sense of radical scepticism that motivated Kermode’s 
apologia for fiction. I will examine the ways in which within the writing of the period, 
an abiding novelistic preoccupation with phenomenological exploration enmeshed 
with the period’s claims about the relativism of all truths and, moreover, with the 
valorisation of alternative modes of experience. I will also explore the ways in which 
by allying themselves with these theories, the writers of the period sought to 
renegotiate the novel’s traditional role as a communal model of dissent. 
 
 
The Sleep of Unreason  
 
Disillusioned with Marxism after Stalin, Prague and Budapest, and in response to the 
spread of totalitarianism in Europe, in the sixties the New Left sought a new mode of 
thinking that emphasised the human aspect of capitalist alienation, returning to the 
individual and their freedoms in reaction against the political and social abstractions 
of traditional Marxism which were now indelibly associated with Stalinist genocide, 
Soviet bureaucracy and party corruption. During the period, the ethical return to the 
individual meshed with the reassessment of the long-held values and assumptions of 
the Enlightenment tradition undertaken in response to the atrocities of World War II 
and disenchantment with Communism as the ‘God that failed’. Left-wing intellectuals 
sought to uncover the structures of unreason that lay behind both the unthinkable 
events of recent history and the apparently rational façade of technocratic capitalism.  
One line of socially conservative thought during the sixties sought to reaffirm 
existing assumptions about the – in Goya’s words – monsters brought forth in the 
sleep of reason, pleading for moral responsibility and arguing that permissive 
attitudes towards what Pamela Hansford Johnson calls ‘moral corruption’ – 
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particularly within literature – had birthed an ‘affectless and affluent… Ugly 
Society’160 in which murderousness and brutality were rife. The emergence of anti-
permissive attitudes is seen especially in the reaction to the Moors murders of the 
mid-sixties, which were perceived as a terrible testament to the ‘swelling violence in 
the air’,161 by figures like C.P. Snow, whose novel The Sleep of Reason (1968) 
reflects upon the perils of the instincts left unfettered by reason and the social chaos 
he was convinced would ensue and Hansford Johnson, whose 1967 book, On 
Iniquity, is a meditation upon the trials of Brady and Hindley. The ‘increasingly 
permissive society’, Hansford Johnson suggests, is like a ‘compost-heap of 
rottenness out of which such ugly weeds could flourish and grow lush’.162 
However, amongst a generation of thinkers, including Freudo-Marxists like 
Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown and Erich Fromm, R.D. Laing and David Cooper 
of the anti-psychiatry movement and cultural theorists like Michel Foucault, Gilles 
Deleuze and Feliz Guattari, Adorno and Horkheimer’s Frankfurt School critical theory 
and Guy Debord’s Situationism, it was felt, on the contrary, that it was the unnatural 
repression of the instincts that had produced the violence, sadism and genocide of 
totalitarianism and that the failure of rationalism was the product of the capitalist 
distortion and transfiguration of the drives into a destructive force. 
Within the intellectual climate of the sixties, unreason, irrationality and 
“madness” emerged as the significant and pressing cultural questions of the era. 
Accounts like Foucault’s Madness and Civilisation (1960) and Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) theorised madness as the latent 
other of civilisation’s reason, and held the repression of irrationality to account for 
those events that had so confounded left-wing thought. Marcuse’s Eros and 
Civilisation (1955) and Brown’s Life Against Death (1959) develop a psychoanalytic 
interpretation of history which draws upon an identification between history of 
civilisation and the return of the repressed, from which antinomian and Dionysian 
anarchy and its rejection of the claims upon the individual made by society and the 
state offers the only escape. The Scottish figurehead of the anti-psychiatry 
movement, R.D. Laing’s famous dictum declares that insanity is the only sane 
response to an insane world: ‘In the context of our present pervasive madness that 
                                                          
160
 Ibid., 136. 
161
 Pamela Hansford Johnson, On Iniquity: Some Personal Reflections Arising Out of the Moors Murder Trial 
(London: Scribners, 1967), 59. 
162
 Ibid., 11. 
99 
 
we call normality, sanity, freedom, all our frames of reference are ambiguous and 
equivocal’, he argues in his Preface to The Divided Self.163 Published in 1960, this 
landmark book had sought to revolutionise the way we perceive mental illness by 
making madness comprehensible. By the mid-sixties, Laing’s indictment of 
mainstream psychiatry had been extended to society at large. Amongst the 
intellectuals of the counterculture, sanity was felt to entail merely the presentation of 
a false self that had been “adjusted” – by psychiatry, by the family and by political 
institutions – to an alienated social reality. Psychopathology was increasingly 
perceived as a cultural symptom, an expression of the effects of the psychosis of 
contemporary society upon individual subjectivity. 
 
 
Going Quietly Mad 
 
In the sixties, fiction became a sympathetic medium for lines of enquiry which sought 
to dispute and to overturn normative distinctions between reason and madness, 
rationality and irrationality, and sickness and health, not merely for its declared 
interest in human experience, but also for its phenomenological capacity to render 
subjective experience meaningful and to embody it within imaginary worlds. There 
had long been a perceived kinship between madness and creativity. As Corrine 
Saunders and Jane Macnaughton write in the introduction to their study on madness 
and creativity in literature and culture: ‘Madness is one of the great topoi of literature 
from the classical period onwards.’164 Throughout history, both popular and 
intellectual culture alike have found the symbolic annihilation of the artist irresistible. 
However, this affinity, and the authorial construct of the “mad writer” with their 
special, sacrificial knowledge, flourished during the sixties amongst literary 
intellectuals seeking an antidote to the instrumental reason, conformity and social 
control that were perceived as the toxic dividends of the Enlightenment’s fall. 
Edmund Wilson’s seminal study of artistic creation, ‘Philocetes: The Wound and the 
Bow’, which appeared in 1941, turns to the Philocetes myth to posit a link between 
psychic trauma (the wound) and the healing power of insight (the bow). Drawing 
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sustenance from the period’s return to Freud, during the sixties, Wilson’s contention 
that trauma, abuse, deficit, misfortune and conflict can provide the impetus and the 
motivation for creative achievement enmeshed with what Al Alvarez calls the 
period’s ‘myth of the artist’, which he defines as the ‘general belief – by the public as 
well as the artists themselves – that the work and the life are not only inextricable but 
also virtually indistinguishable’.165 The notion that, through the flight of the 
consciousness into sensual or mystical states of “madness”, one could escape the 
narrow parameters of Western rationalistic thought and, thus liberated from false 
attitudes and values, encounter one’s “real” or “authentic” inner self was revived by 
the figurehead of the anti-psychiatry movement, R.D. Laing, in the early sixties. The 
influence of Laingian thought upon imaginative literature during the period is seen in 
the ritualization of the process of writing as a liberatory response to the constraints of 
being normal, variously for example, in the writing of Doris Lessing, in the feminist 
and proto-feminist novels of Margaret Atwood, Marge Piercy, and Margaret Drabble, 
(rather differently) in Norman Mailer, in the work of Ken Kesey, of course, in 
Penelope Mortimer’s eighth novel, The Pumpkin Eater (1962), Paul Ableman’s I 
Hear Voices (1958), in the American confessional poets and (perhaps unexpectedly) 
in Evelyn Waugh’s The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold (1957). It resonated not only within 
literary fiction, but also in the popular fiction of the time. The period’s appetite for 
what Plath in her diaries calls ‘mental hospital stuff’166 is seen perhaps most notably 
in Joanne Greenberg’s bestselling novel I Never Promised You a Rose Garden 
(1964), which chronicles a teenage girl’s experience of institutionalisation, but also in 
Jennifer Dawson’s autobiographical novel, The Ha-Ha (1961) and Irvin Yalom and 
Ginny Golderg’s Every Day Gets A Little Closer (1974), a trans-personal narrative 
duet of patient and therapist, amongst others.  
The classic plotline of the mental breakdown novel of the mid-century tells the 
story of an affluent, university-educated female protagonist attempting to reconcile 
the contradictory aspirations and obligations of her position. Her ambitions are, at 
once, unfulfilled within the home and ever-thwarted within the hostile workplace. 
Thoroughly primed for a life of achievement, and yet repeatedly shunted into the 
domestic sidings by pressures to conform to the period’s persistent gender norms, 
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she attempts to navigate that characteristic feminine predicament of the period (and, 
of course, beyond): the struggle to reconcile her obligations to hearth and home with 
the desire for professional fulfilment when either choice, under the circumstances, 
looks equally unappealing. 
In Sylvia Plath’s roman à clef, The Bell Jar (1963), the landmark exemplar of 
the genre, we meet Esther Greenwood, a ‘wicked’ – in the sense of wickedly 
ambitious – college student. The novel chronicles her attempts to navigate 
womanhood and sex and her struggle to come of age in spite of the formidable 
impediments that are visited upon her as a woman in the 1950s. The rite of passage 
between adolescence and adulthood is tempestuous, Esther is, at once, thoroughly 
– biblically – repulsed by, and giddily attracted to, her life’s potentials. Her parable of 
the fig tree – with its biblical echoes of the tree of life or of knowledge – represents 
the contradictory pulls upon the woman writer, with its image of a life’s possibility 
divided and branching off into mutually exclusive options: 
 
I saw my life branching out before me like the green fig tree in the story. 
From the tip of every branch, like a fat purple fig, a wonderful future 
beckoned and winked. One fig was a husband and a happy home and 
children, and another fig was a famous poet… I saw myself sitting in the 
crotch of this fig tree, starving to death, just because I couldn’t make up my 
mind which of the figs I would choose. I wanted each and every one of 
them.167 
 
As Marilyn Yalom points out, there is a tragic irony in Plath’s vision of Esther gazing 
up at this life-giving tree, lodged in its fecund ‘crotch’ and yet ‘starving to death’, 
paralysed by its plethora of Either/Or options, wanting, desperately, Both/And.168  
Esther, Plath writes, wants ‘to shoot off in all directions’ rather than play the role 
allotted to her, as the passive, stable centre, the ‘place the arrows shoot from’.169 
Thus confronted with an impossible predicament, these protagonists, to paraphrase 
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Doris Lessing in The Golden Notebook, another classic of genre, ‘go quietly mad’.170 
Quin’s predicament, however, was rather more perilous. As a working-class, 
non-university educated woman of the sixties, neither the winking fig of affluent 
suburban housewifedom, nor that of bluestocking spinsterhood, beckoned. For 
women like Quin, there would be no such dilemma. For what did beckon was rather 
less enticing: a working-class existence of frustrated aspirations and claustrophobic 
inertia which did not so much branch out as trammel one into the kind of life where 
both to marry and bear children were givens and to take on unfulfilling work was a 
financial necessity. This is the prospect that provides the basis for the gothic horrors 
of Quin’s debut novel, Berg, with its vision of a desperately wan and diminished 
world: a couple coddled together in bedsitting rooms poignantly jauntified by the 
placing of a single pink in a vase on a plastic table cloth. Writing across gender – a 
significant feature of Quin’s oeuvre – Berg’s male protagonist repeatedly attempts to 
abscond but is haplessly drawn back within a domestic milieu that on the one hand, 
with its cosy promise of easy affection, tempts and, on the other, threatens to slowly, 
heterostatically annihilate him. He envisions a life panned out before him in which he 
would 
 
potter about between the velvet-covered couch, and the table with its knick 
knacks, his best pin-striped suit hung beside the wardrobe, his cracked 
leather boots beside her blue fluffy mule, and watch her wash his shirts and 
iron them…Stranded here, morning, afternoons of making tea, playing rummy, 
attempting to meet the moral obligations Judith presumably expected.171  
 
A similar world is glimpsed in Quin’s unpublished poem, ‘There’s a Party’, which 
depicts a ‘corrupting domestic bliss’ menaced by a basement-dwelling and an 
overbearing landlord.  The poem’s persona, like Hermes, has ‘[w]ings on [her] feet’, 
but unlike the god of transitions and of boundaries, hers are clipped. ‘Jiving in the 
dark, sweat and smoke’ she becomes conscious of a ‘dull ache spreading’. She 
wants to be ‘save[d]… from this’, to ‘[e]lope’ to some Hellenic, Durrellian idyll with 
‘mysterious Justines’ and ‘Arab horses stamping by a lake’.172 She would get there 
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later, spending the summer of 1964 island-hopping in Greece, but what she found, 
as she depicts later in Passages, was not quite so idyllic.  
Equally, although Quin’s oeuvre similarly militates against normalcy at all 
costs, it would be inaccurate to conceive of her novels as the products of some 
Norman-Mailer-style Laingian creative frenzy, the source of her inspiration as 
spontaneous revelation, or her writing practice as the unmediated discharge of the 
fruits of some supranatural vision. Within Quin’s novels madness is never 
romantically valorised, or courted as some exotic muse. While she frequently 
peoples them with Laingian fellow travellers, as in Passages, she does so in order to 
indict their vain and hubristic attempts to summon the Dionysus within. Their ecstatic 
release never arrives. To be insane is always to suffer; toying dilettantishly with 
these dark and formidable forces can be deadly and by “going over the edge” her 
characters sacrifice themselves to more authentic truths that are at length revealed 
to be trivial and insubstantial myths.  
 
 
‘When I Was Crazy That Was All I Was’ 
 
Foucault, in the conclusion to his Madness and Civilisation, writes that ‘madness is 
contemporary with the work of art’ but, paradoxically, that ‘where there is a work of 
art, there is no madness’.173 Drawing upon the work of Freud, he argues that art is 
twin-born with madness, that both are imbricated within that dark centre of primal 
oneness that is without reason. Prior to his work in the 1920s, in which he admits that 
it confounded even his “universal science” of psychoanalysis, creativity was the test 
case with which Freud sought to prove his theories about the universality of human 
consciousness. In essays such as ‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’ (1907), 
Freud argues that the creative impulse is the quintessential subliminal activity, which, 
like neurosis, redirects repressed desires into the realm of the aesthetic. Elaborating 
this thesis, Foucault argues that in order to emerge into the rational world, the 
madness that is art must undergo a process of translation. And, therefore, creativity 
might well be forged, as Arthur Koestler argued during the period in his The Act of 
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Creation (1964), in the suspension of rational thought,174 but to become art, it cannot 
remain there. The artist must draw upon the symbols, images and rhythms of the 
familiar world which are, at once, capable of rationally communicating and yet 
crucially also preserving the irrationality of the self. Whereupon creativity latently 
transmits the self’s primal energies, resonating, in turn, with the irrationality that lurks 
within us all. This secret call-and-response of self with self, I argue in Chapter Three 
of this study, is dramatised in Quin’s novel Three. 
Whilst art, thus transformed, journeys out into the world, madness remains 
trapped within the solipsistic bounds of the self. And therefore, Foucault argues, the 
subject-position of madness is not to be understood as one of radical empowerment, 
of a differently calibrated but nonetheless equally sovereign mode of experience. The 
mad person valorised by Laing as the master of an alternative fiction which is as 
relativistically valid as any other is, for Foucault, powerless, unproductive, caught up 
in their own illusion and therefore unable to speak or think or live: 
 
The difference is clear when confronted by the shrewd deceiver, the 
meditating mind behaves, not like a madman panic-stricken in the face of 
universal error, but like an equally shrewd adversary always on the alert, 
constantly reasonable, and never ceasing to be the master of his fiction.175 
 
‘When you are insane, you are busy being insane – all the time’, writes Plath.176 In 
her seminal survey of the field, Writing and Madness, Shoshana Felman writes that 
the ‘madman… is engulfed by his own fiction’, that madness can be distinguished as 
‘the non-mastery of its own fiction’: 
 
As opposed to the subject of logos, the subject of pathos is a subject whose 
position with respect to fiction (even when he is the author) is not one of 
mastery, or control, of sovereign affirmation of meaning, but of vestige, of loss 
of meaning.177  
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This loss of control, of mastery and of dominion is characteristic of another strain of 
the “mad” novels of the long sixties. Lessing’s Briefing for a Descent into Hell (1971) 
and Ableman’s I Hear Voices (1958) depict the Homeric voyage of the mind 
embarked upon by men who are plunged into madness. In both novels, madness is a 
contrivance for the fabulation of delusory story-worlds which co-exist alongside and 
are impinged upon by the real world of the hospital ward in which they are confined. 
In Briefing for a Descent into Hell professor of classics Charles Watkins has been 
admitted to hospital in a state of shock; the novel chronicles his journeys of the mind 
across a hallucinatory seascape from his bed. Similarly, I Hear Voices tells the story 
of Arthur, confined to his asylum ward from whence he travels through an imaginary 
city of the psyche.  
But crucially, in Quin, madness “proper” is always madness remembered. The 
writing of her peculiar poetic fictions is for her, as poetry was famously for 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, the ‘spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings 
recollected in tranquility’. Her novels reflect the complex negotiations between two 
antithetical modes of experience, the rational and irrational, or, that which de 
Beauvoir designates as reason and the instincts, and Nietzsche, as the Apollonian 
and Dionysian impulses. Quin’s fictions reflect the struggles of a divided self to 
preserve the “presence” of a radically different mode of experience within the 
parameters of a communal language that militates against the sustaining of 
difference. As Felman comments: ‘To speak about madness is to speak about the 
difference between languages: to import into one language the strangeness of 
another; to unsettle the decisions language has prescribed to us so that, somewhere 
between languages, will emerge the freedom to speak.’178 Her novels attempt to 
discover and to test the efficacy of that space between languages as a space of 
freedom and of expression. Frequently, especially within the middle period novels, 
Three and Passages, Quin makes use of multiperspectival dialogism to thematise 
this work of sense-making at the limits of experience. And for her nuanced sensitivity 
to the complexities of the “literature of madness” and, moreover, to the “madness of 
literature”, and its implications for the expression not only of “peak experience” but 
also, more broadly, the ways in which we all attempt to make sense of our lives, 
Quin’s oeuvre differs from so much of the writing of and from madness of the sixties. 
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It harks back to, and elaborates upon, a lineage of female writers who endowed their 
work with the same burden: Mary Butts, Jean Rhys, Anna Kavan, Janet Frame, 
Christa Wolf, Elizabeth Smart, Katherine Mansfield and others. Like these writers, 
Quin’s project is to make the inner life connect with physical manifestation, to enact in 
fiction the attempt to draw reason and unreason together in order to capture, 
preserve and communicate the contents of experience.  
Patricia Waugh’s recent work has argued that, for its ability to render the 
expressive distortion of reality and the filtering of the external world through 
subjectivity as an imaginary and yet still somehow substantive universe, fiction and 
phenomenology had a long-standing affiliation.179 For the conventional relationship 
between the world and the book had never been as simple as all that. Despite time-
worn claims that it was only with postmodernism that fiction finally admitted that the 
story-world and the social world were not magically yoked together and that it was 
only through postmodern “experiment” that the novel rescinded its privileged claim 
on the real, since the nineteenth century novels have, in fact, sought to demonstrate 
the construction and reconstruction of the real via narrative focalisation through the 
subject. The novel has always been a sceptical mode, its narrators always, in a 
sense, unreliable. The world-creating capacity of fiction had intuited and then 
explored this sense of ontological insecurity – alongside Kant, Nietzsche and 
Vaihinger – long before it had been conceptualised anew during the “reality crisis” of 
the mid-century period.  
Because of its ability to convey prereflective and preobjective mental states 
and set them forth within substantive worlds, Brooke-Rose argues in her A Rhetoric 
of the Unreal that fiction is characteristically imbued with the epistemic function of the 
fantastic. Fantastic, that is, in the Todorovian sense: fictional narrative always 
demands not only a suspension of disbelief but also of belief. Since The Turn of the 
Screw appeared in 1898 (and even before) fiction has posed and even pressed but 
refused to satisfactorily answer the question: Is it the world that is mad or am I? 
Fiction is able to suspend indefinitely that Cartesian coup of reason that established 
the sovereignty of a thinking subject in a knowable world who could not be mad. If 
modernism took flight from a hostile world into abstraction and introspection, it surely 
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also, most explicitly in the late modernism of Henry Green, Elizabeth Bowen, 
Elizabeth Taylor and Ivy Compton Burnett but also in their predecessors like Woolf, 
Proust and even Joyce, sought to (as Woolf herself put it in her 1919 essay “Modern 
Fiction”) ‘catch the innumerable atoms… as they fall’,180 interrogating, reconstituting 
and imaginatively transforming the unspeakable elements of human experience 
through phenomenologies of perception that effaced the frontier between inner and 
outer and the visible and the invisible. And, once our shared assumptions about what 
the real might consititute had been categorically called into question by both the 
events of history and the bodies of thought that were attempting to conceptualise 
them, the ‘restoration of words to things’ would by no means be as easy as all that. 
 
 
I’m Not Alright, Jack: A “return to realism”? 
 
Look closely at many of these novels of the so-called return to realism, and it is not 
difficult to detect a profound metaphysical insecurity beneath their rather more 
apparent social concerns. Often despite their author’s protestations to the contrary, 
many of these novels contain tacit and tentatively self-conscious admissions of the 
inadequacy of conventional realism. Even those who in their critical writings are most 
stoically wed to the old liberal metaphysics – to the notion that fiction could and, 
moreover, should provide a paradigm for a knowable and ordered world – tended to 
betray themselves in their novels. Theirs is a kind of concrete existentialism, one that 
tended to figure empirically its metaphysical preoccupations. These novels reflect on 
the existential choice between the bondage of the working class life and the paucity 
of the promise of the strictly-bounded possibilities of middle class life. The British 
novelists of this so-called “return to realism” were in fact equally preoccupied by 
existential concerns, although their fictions added realist flesh of plot, character and 
setting to the bones of the abstracted, parabolic or quasi-allegorical existentialist 
fictions of Sartre and Camus that had emerged in France during the earlier mid-
century period. In their British counterparts, metaphysical preoccupations tend to be 
metaphorised in plot. Altered states of being-in-the-world and the disintegration of 
selfhood, for example, are signalled by apocalyptic drunkenness. Post-pub punch-
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ups represent the conflict between dominant institutional power and the existential 
hero. A Camusian lucidity is sought and found in illicit sex.  
We see (significantly predominantly male) protagonists in the process of 
making and unmaking the life strategies with which they confront a reality that has 
become an unknown quantity. For the roving consciousness of Saturday Night and 
Sunday Morning’s Arthur Seaton, for example, ‘only a calendar gave any real 
indication of passing time’. ‘Once a rebel always a rebel’,181 Arthur grasps the 
freedom of the condemned man with his ‘broad-fisted exuberant cunning’ which 
amounts to ‘fourteen quid a week to squander as best he could at the weekend’ as 
he ‘[serves] a life’s penance at the lathe’.182 Or take Jim Dixon, the fortuitous hero of 
Kingsley Amis’ Lucky Jim, a grammar school boy having trouble committing to his 
role as a young lecturer in the rarefied world of academe, characterised with relish 
by Amis’ poisoned pen. The strain of Jim’s imposture, his duplicity and doublespeak, 
is beginning to show, his private rebellions against the cant and pretention of his new 
milieu escalate as the repressed violence of his inner life erupts into public display: 
grotesque mimicry, Tourettish outbursts and dumb-struck bouts of aphasia. It is not 
until the end of the novel, having arbitrarily and despite his very best attempts at self-
sabotage played the system and won – the £500-a-year job in London, the girl, the 
humiliating defeat of his rival, Bertrand – that thought and action are finally 
reconciled and he is able to openly articulate his resistance: 
 
The bloody old towser-faced boot-faced totem-pole on a crap reservation, 
Dixon thought. “You bloody old towser-faced boot-faced totem-pole on a crap 
reservation,” he said.183 
 
Even a novel as smugly committed – in the political sense too – to the 
quotidian as William Cooper’s Scenes from Provincial Life is fraught with anxiety 
about its own inability to reconcile reality with its fictional model. Written in 1950, but 
set in ’39, and with the threat of totalitarianism hanging heavily over its protagonists, 
the novel endorses a kind of unreconstructed, reflex liberalism which for Cooper 
under the circumstances amounts to a kind of radicalism: ‘[we] could be called 
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radicals… we were made for a period thirty years earlier when we could happily have 
voted liberal…the essence was that we thought that life for us would be 
unsupportable in a totalitarian state… we had in common a strong element of the 
rootless and unconforming.’ 184 Elsewhere, however, the narrator remarks that under 
the circumstances, such a stance amounts to a ‘slackness in Weltanschauung’:185 
 
Sometimes I tried to link the disintegration of our private lives with the 
disintegration of affairs in the world. I saw us all being carried along into some 
nameless chaos. Yet it rang false. In spite of what the headlines told me every 
morning, in spite of what I reasoned must happen in the world, I was really 
preoccupied most deeply with what was going on between me and Myrtle and 
between Tom and Steve. People can concentrate on their private lives, I 
thought, in the middle of anything. 186 
 
The narrator’s own frequent interjections give the lie to the notion that narrative can 
still support this worldview. Scenes from Provincial Life reflects self-consciously upon 
the problems with realistic writing: on the impossibility of recreating the vast social 
scope of nineteenth-century realism after community as an integral and knowable 
entity has collapsed, on the difficulties of writing a political novel and of translating 
the banalities of human experience into the significant events of plot. 
Take, for example, John Braine’s Room at the Top, which records the social 
ascent of Joe Lampton, a recently-demobbed RAF pilot and former POW orphaned 
by World War II, turned lower-middle-class boy done good, who leaves behind his 
hometown, ‘Deadly Dufton’, and his working class roots to take up a job at the 
Municipal Treasury in the town of Warley. Narrated by a decade-older Joe, Braine’s 
novel is a meditation upon the self-deceptions of this newly-minted company man. 
As if seeking empirical confirmation of his new, middle-class milieu, Joe junior 
exhibits an almost Balzacian fetish for home furnishings, exhaustively cataloguing 
parquet floors, Windsor chairs, art prints, divans and book cases. If, in Sartre’s 
Nausea, Roquentin’s apprehension of the shocking materiality of a door knob is the 
beginning of a series of revelatory confrontations with objects which expose human 
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existence in all its contingency, then Joe’s own encounter with the accoutrements of 
middle-class life has quite the opposite effect. For Joe on the up-and-up the world 
feels meaningful for the very first time. Whilst ‘deadly Dufton’ and its ‘zombie’ 
inhabitants are described with an almost Mortmere-ish horror, Warley’s is a different 
kind of unreality. There everything is suddenly just so: 
 
It was as if some barrier had been removed: everything seemed intensely 
real, as if I were watching myself taking part in a documentary film… 
everything was immensely significant, yet neither more nor less than itself… I 
felt that I were using my senses for the first time.187 
 
The narrative is fraught with a profound sense of dislocation. Joe has ‘come a long 
way since 1941,’ he remarks, ‘[t]oo far perhaps’.188 He assures his lover, Alice, that 
the traumas of the death of his parents and of his time in the RAF have been 
‘forgotten’: 
 
‘Sometimes something happens to bring them out. They poke out their heads 
and growl and then you shove them back in the cage. Why are you asking? 
Afraid I’m neurotic?189 
 
His self-presence, however, has been sacrificed in the process. Joe’s interiority and 
exteriority fail to match up; he inhabits the “Joe Lampton” persona of a silver-tongued 
rogue, his inner life separated into ‘watertight compartments’. Alice is his ‘guarantee 
of reality’: 
 
[A]s long as Alice was there I wouldn’t die, it was like having my father and 
mother alive again, it was the end of being afraid and alone.190 
 
Following her death by suicide, in which he is arguably complicit, Joe, now referring 
to himself in the third person, embarks upon a dissociative fugue across the new 
suburban estates of Dufton:  
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I tried to make my mind as blank as possible… But Alice had been killed, and 
what I saw was the components of a huge machine that now only functioned 
out of bravado: it had been designed and manufactured for one purpose, to 
kill Alice. That purpose was accomplished; it should have been allowed to run 
down and then stop, the driver asleep at the wheel, the passengers sitting 
docilely with their mouths wide open, waiting for the bus to fly away.191  
 
     Alice, too, is afflicted by a similar metaphysical instability: 
 
‘Oh God, everything’s going so fast. There’s no way to stop the 
merrygoround. You never feel safe. When I was young I used to feel safe. 
Even if Father and Mother quarrelled they were kind to me. The house was 
solid too. That bloody concrete barracks I live in now – it’s so clean and 
streamlined that I wouldn’t be at all surprised if it took flight.’192 
 
But, financially and socially dependent upon a loveless marriage, and keenly feeling 
her increasing age, Alice, unlike Joe, has no claim upon any notion of a kind of 
existential freedom. Hypocritically reprimanded by Joe for her infidelity and for 
posing nude and summarily cast off in favour of Susan, the younger and more 
beautiful daughter of a local business magnate, and as such a ‘Grade One’ prospect 
more appropriate for Joe’s social ambitions, Alice commits suicide. In Lucky Jim the 
protagonist rejoices in his lucky escape from the ‘neurotic’ lecturer Margaret, to 
whom, due to ‘pity and sentimentality’, he was unwillingly attached after her own 
unsuccessful suicide attempt. Margaret is not even permitted the authenticity of 
existential angst. Towards the end of the novel, her would-be suitors, Jim and 
Catchpole, confer and conclude that her overdose was merely a hysterical 
performance for attention’s sake. Margaret’s problem, Jim reflects, is her ‘bad luck… 
probably derived… from the anterior bad luck of being sexually unattractive’193.  
Significantly, then, in each of these novels our anti-hero has, by the end, to a 
greater or lesser extent been reconciled with his diminished world. Joe Lampton’s is 
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a pained and knowing acceptance of his own bad faith complicity, Arthur Seaton’s a 
defiant acceptance of freedom-in-bondage, grimly resigned to ‘fighting every day 
until [he] die[s]’, whilst Jim Dixon makes a lucky escape from the upper-middle-class 
intelligentsia to another, more “authentic” social mobility endorsed by Amis. It is, in 
the end, the female supporting characters who are martyred by social and moral 
dislocation. For the male protagonists’ lovers and mistresses, “liberation” leads 
merely to the re-imposition of repressive and restrictive structures. See, for example, 
Arthur’s lover, Brenda’s backstreet abortion in a zinc bath. Or, alternatively, these 
women figure merely as the fetish-objects of social mobility, at once the cipheric 
spoils of the protagonist’s Faustian bargains and ancillaries of the system, 
entrapping, domesticating and taming these men. Joe and his childhood friend 
Charles in Room at the Top, for example, conclude that ‘the more money a man 
[has] the better looking [is] his wife’, and create a grading scheme, the ‘Lampton-
Lufford Report on Love’, which correlates women’s attractiveness with the incomes 
of their husbands.  
The characters that people these mid-century novels of the so-called return to 
realism, then, are by no means merely the upwardly-mobile avatars of the age of 
affluence, I’m-all-right-Jacks, victors eagerly claiming the spoils of the post-war 
settlement inhabiting story-worlds that amount to stable, if hard-won, fictional 
paradigms of certainty and structure – despite their author’s protestations to the 
contrary. And even when their story-worlds finally click into place, the women for 
whom the new world will still not come into focus attest to the ways in which realistic 
writing could no longer meet and match its object.  
Critical accounts both of and from the period have tended to suffer from a 
fundamental insensitivity to the articulation in fictional form of the cultural 
transformations of the period. Heads turned by the new stories and new voices that 
were the fruits of social change, critics tend to mistake “honesty” for realism, and 
realism for the artless disgorging of experience onto paper. Attuned only to the 
manifest, these accounts have tended to directly map the social world onto the novel 
form, neglecting what Alan Swingewood calls the ‘concrete and complex mediations 
between the novel, its form, its creators and society’.194 But this was by no means 
merely a “New Wave” on the level of content. Both in contemporary accounts, and 
                                                          
194
 Alan Swingewood, The Novel and Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1975), 30. 
113 
 
subsequent critical surveys, too little attention has been focused upon the ways in 
which the profound transformations of the period were absorbed into the fabric of the 
narrative discourse itself. The positivist assumptions of accounts of the period have 
been borne out in unlikely places. Subsequent critical surveys have tended to accept 
their predecessors’ accounts of the fifties novel at face value – as the homogenous, 
unproblematically-realised fictional project of the worst of Kingsley Amis’s diatribes in 
the Spectator – by an academy all too eager to dispossess a literary history which it 
has persistently underestimated. The realist-experimentalist dichotomy that has 
dominated literary-historical accounts of this mid-century period has tended to mask 
the continuity of shared preoccupations and modes of expression amongst the 
writers of the fifties and sixties. As I move, in the next chapters of this thesis, to more 
closely examine Quin’s oeuvre, I will examine the ways in which these more 
nuanced but no less significant characteristics of fifties writing are developed by Quin 
and others in the following decade.  
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If You Don’t Mind We’ll Leave My Mother Out of All of This: 
Liberating Oedipus in Berg 
 
 
Ann Quin’s 1964 debut novel, Berg, is the story of dissolute hair restorer salesman 
and self-confessed mummy’s boy, Alistair Berg, aka Greb, who, as the opening 
legend states, ‘came to a seaside town intending to kill his father’.1 He has installed 
himself as a lodger in a tawdry guesthouse in an out-of-season resort where, like 
Hamlet, he lays in wait, plotting and scheming his parricidal revenge, separated by a 
flimsy partition wall from his intended murderee, his absentee father, Nathy, a has-
been (perhaps never-was) music hall performer and old soak touring his vaudevillian 
ventriloquist act around seaside towns and his father’s young, glamorous mistress, 
Judith Goldstein, who are lodging in the room next door. Berg is Nietzschean man, 
his will-to-power aspires to assert his mastery over heredity and determinism. By 
killing his father, he seeks to destroy the given order of things and recreate the world 
in his own image: 
 
Of course it’s ridiculous to think the whole thing is simply a vehicle for 
revenge, or even resentment – hardly can it be called personal, not now, 
indeed I have never felt so objective. If inherent in the age, well and good, 
though historically speaking the idea perhaps is a little decadent. (39) 
 
His quest is existential. He yearns to ‘defy fate’ and the ‘tragic sense of destiny that 
is inherent in every man’ (27). To become ‘responsible for every action’ (27), to 
‘[d]efeat the desire and act’ (40), to ‘dispose of the mind’ and ‘bring reality into 
something vital, felt, seen, even smelt’ (23). Berg’s aim is to gather up the ‘tangle of 
broken wires’ of life and create an order: ‘sort out, graft together, encircle the mind, 
the body, thus bound, motionless become, and in becoming: know’ (131).  
But, like the Prince of Denmark, Berg cannot complete his act of vengeance. 
The novel follows his ham-fisted attempts to ingratiate himself into this ersatz 
burlesque of a family romance: unwittingly becoming his father’s drinking buddy 
confidante, finding his own bewildered attempts to seduce Judith outclassed by her 
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own barefaced vamping. Following a drunken fracas at a fireworks party at Nathy 
and Judith’s, Berg is convinced that he has strangled his father and has rolled up the 
“corpse” in a rug:  ‘At last I can rest in peace amen. Accomplished.’ (75) But, from 
there, and with a terrifying inevitability, Berg finds himself embroiled in a dizzying 
succession of Oedipal variations, each one darker and more farcical than the last. 
 
 
Liberating Oedipus? 
 
In Oedipus the sixties found a figure for the times. The tragic son of Thebes was to 
become poster boy of the tumultuous upsurge of creativity and rebellion that swept 
across Europe and America during the period. He appears as a metaphor for the 
sixties’ inter-generational battle time and time again in the philosophy, literature, 
theatre, film and even music of the period. Writers, artist, filmmakers and musicians 
turned to this tragedy of knowledge, vision and blindness, drawing out the 
resonances of its themes of fate, free will and state control, employing it to not only 
elucidate but to lend a psycho-historical sense of mythic weight and historical 
inevitability to the period’s denigrations of authority of the “Name of the Father”. 
Peter Brooke revived Seneca’s Oedipus in an adaptation by Ted Hughes at the Old 
Vic in 1968 – Steven Berkoff found this nine-hour production, with its six-foot gold 
phallus and jazz band rendering of “Yes, We Have No Bananas” ‘too eclectic for 
words’.2 Stravinsky’s 1927 opera, Oedipus Rex, with a libretto by Jean Cocteau, was 
revived in 1960 at Sadler’s Wells by Colin Graham. Film adaptations appeared, first 
Oedipus Rex from the Italian director, Pier Paulo Pasolini in 1967, and then Phillip 
Saville’s Oedipus the King in 1968. 
The Oedipus story of self-deception and self-detection was recovered and 
reinvented to describe the limits upon the individual that are imposed by social reality 
and internalised, etched upon the self by ideology. It was employed to describe the 
ways in which the anarchic productivity of unconscious desire is sublimated and 
regulated.  For the way in which Oedipus’ desire to know the truth at all costs is put 
down by the introjection of culture; the myth reflected the limits imposed upon human 
knowledge. His tragic plight was perceived to express the impediments to the sixties’ 
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much-vaunted “cultural revolution” as the inheritance of authoritarian structures 
reinforced by societal taboos.  
The ancient myth of Oedipus, who unwittingly murders his father and marries 
his mother, had been revived by Freud at the turn of the century in his The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1899) as the “Oedipus complex”, to describe the universal 
phylogenetic phenomenon of guilty infantile desires and familial rivalry. For its 
designation of the exemplary trauma par excellence of psychosexual development, 
and its account of the ways in which repression is installed as the means by which 
we manage prohibited desires via the internalisation of paternal authority as the 
superego, the Oedipus complex became the theoretic cornerstone of 
psychoanalysis, establishing subjectivity as the site of perpetual conflict between 
desire and the law. Freud’s Oedipus complex has been revised, problematized and 
later disputed by successive generations of psychoanalytic thinkers since the thirties.  
Carl Jung developed Freud’s own tentative conceptualisation of the Electra 
complex to provide a feminine archetypical counterpart for Freud’s account of the 
male psychosexual developmental drama. Object-relations theorists such as D.W. 
Winnicott, Otto Rank and Melanie Klein reject the priority of the Paternal and reorient 
their theories of mind towards the mother-child relationship, prepending the onset of 
Oedipus with their hypothesisations of the pre-Oedipal. Prior to a volte face in his 
thinking about the Oedipal complex in the late sixties, during the fifties Jacques 
Lacan sought to rehabilitate Freud’s theory via the structural anthropology of Claude 
Levi-Strauss and the structural linguistics of Saussure. Lacan elaborates Freud’s 
own speculations about the linguistic structuration of the unconscious, arguing 
famously that the ‘textual unconscious’ is structured like a language.3 He states the 
centrality of the Oedipus complex as the means by which, at once, the child’s 
subjectivity emerges and they come into language by mapping the Oedipal structure 
onto the process of language acquisition. Concerned not with the development of the 
individual subject, but with placing the subject in the social field and thereby de-
emphasising the bourgeois nuclear family structuration of Freud’s family romance, 
Lacan assigns socio-cultural roles to the players within the Oedipal drama. 
According to the triadic structure of the Lacanian registers of subjectivity, the 
Oedipus complex represents the triangular schema through which the father, familial 
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envoy of the wider “symbolic” order of the social world, intervenes in the dyadic 
symbiosis of mutual desire between mother and child located in the “imaginary”, a 
condition of free-flowing identifications where the boundaries between the two, as 
subject and object, are blurred. The resolution of the Oedipus complex instigates the 
subject’s troubled entrance into the symbolic order and the imposition of language, 
difference, reason and the law. The condition of the subject’s emergence is one of 
loss and lack, of disunity and disharmony, in which the subject mourns the lost object 
of mother-child identification, displacing their incestuous fantasies onto other “partial 
objects”. It signals the beginning of the subject’s fruitless, desirous pursuit of this 
originary meaning along the chain of signifiers. Thus,’ Jane Silverman Van Buren 
notes, ‘cultural man is sentenced to an endless metonymic search for satisfaction 
that will always be incomplete.’4  
In the sixties, the blighted figure of Oedipus, felt to have been wrongfully 
imprisoned in language by the law for his symbolic crime, had become something of 
a cause célèbre. Oedipus was to be saved, recovered from psychoanalysis – whose 
bedrock, the process by which the individual is rightly and properly socialised, bore 
his name – and liberated by Eros. The Oedipus complex was increasingly thought 
not, as Freud had claimed, to be a phylogenetic product of the unconscious, but the 
symptom of an authoritarian social order’s colonisation of the mind: the tyranny 
within which the individual is forcibly adjusted to a “sick society” which was 
propagated by the institution of the family, and given sanction by psychoanalysis. 
Following Lacan, young Marxists “returned to Freud”, radicalising his insights into the 
unconscious to pursue desire into more subversive directions. Both Marcuse and 
Brown advocated ‘polymorphous perversity’, the liberation of desire which was 
subject to the ‘repressive desublimation’ of scientific rationality. Highlighting the 
existential aloneness of Oedipus’ plight, that which Brown christened the “Oedipal 
project” came to denote man’s doomed existential quest to become, in Spinoza’s 
terms, causa sui (“one’s own cause”); a drive to emancipation, a project of becoming 
god, but finally a fantasy of self-authorship which results, tragically, in the 
reaffirmation of ambivalence and dependence.5 Equally, the expressed aim of Gilles 
Deleuze and Feliz Guattari’s notoriously iconoclastic, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
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Schizophrenia, which appeared in the post-1968 aftermath of événements in France 
was to ‘shake off the Oedipal yoke’ and ‘deoedipalize the unconscious’. 
Oedipalization was the process produced by capitalism, propagated by the family as 
capitalism’s delegated agent and consolidated by psychiatry, by which the subject 
learns to desire its own repression wherein revolutionary desire is distorted and 
reimagined as tabooed incest and then repressed.  
Oedipus appeared also in less immediately recognisable form as the mythic 
underpinning of so much of the art of the period. See, for example, Norman Bates’ 
grotesque mother-love in Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), Benjamin Braddock’s designs 
upon Mrs Robinson in The Graduate (1967), based upon Charles Webb’s 1963 
novel, Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman or Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of 
Virginia Woolf (1962). More relevant here, though, is the way in which the Oedipus 
story reappears in radically distorted forms in the anti-detective novels of the period 
emerging from Europe and America, like Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 
(1966), Alain Robbe Grillet’s The Erasers (1953) and Michel Butor’s Passing Time 
(1957). Oedipus was, in a sense, the very first detective; both the Oedipus myth and 
classical detective fiction take as their logic the revelation of mysteries and the 
reestablishment of the order of things, their subject matter the exposure of lies and 
the tearing off of masks. Both forms are teleologically-organised paradigmatic 
examples of the “causal plot” (as Aristotle argues of the Oedipus myth in his Poetics 
and Todorov of detective fiction in his The Typology of Detective Fiction). They share 
assumptions about the nature of reality and of fiction. And, in this sense, the Oedipus 
story is paradigmatic of all narratives.  
Roland Barthes, in The Pleasure of the Text, asks: ‘Doesn’t every narrative 
lead back to Oedipus? Isn’t storytelling always a way of searching for one’s origin, 
speaking one’s conflicts with the Law, entering into the dialectic of tenderness and 
hatred?’6 For him, every narrative is the ‘staging of the (absent, hidden, 
hypostatized) father’ constructed in text to satisfy in fiction the desire that we cannot 
in life: the desire ‘to know, to learn the origin and end’.7 Barthes suggests that 
narrative’s Oedipal drive represents the triumph of civilisation over the primal 
instincts, and results in the subject’s search in narrative for fictional metaphorisations 
of the origin and end which have been forever debarred by the incest taboo. ‘If there 
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is no longer any father, why tell stories?’ Barthes ponders.8 However, refracted 
through the radical scepticism of the age, by the mid-century the Oedipal ur-narrative 
of causality and order was drawn upon to reflect the epistemological doubt, 
indeterminacy, relativity and the acknowledgement of the limits of reason, that 
characterised the era. The anti-detective novel now sought to employ these 
structures as a framework through which to examine the process of knowledge itself. 
As Deborah A. Moddelmog comments, in the detective novels of Pynchon and 
Robbe Grillet, the mystery that is length revealed by the unfurling of the fiction is a 
‘metaphysical quagmire’ that forecloses the very possibility of meaning.9  
 
 
Quin’s Ill-made Men 
 
Alastair Berg is the first in the cast of oedipal anti-heroes that populate Quinworld. 
Throughout her oeuvre, Quin turns to the Oedipus story as a mythic master code 
with which to articulate the human existential plight and her profound ontological 
distrust of the normative. Berg, together with Leonard of Three and the unnamed 
male protagonists of Passages and Tripticks, are all similarly ill-made men lurching 
haplessly towards a kind of (re-)birth. All are wearied and diminished subjects, 
troubled by a weakened sense of what Sartre calls ipseity – a sense of selfhood, that 
is, of fundamental self-givenness, that the world exists for me and is my world and 
that I exist for myself.10 And in search of this sense of identity they, like Oedipus, 
attempt to exercise their conscious will by imposing upon a bewildering and radically 
contingent world the ordering, sense-making capacities of the mind. To solve the 
riddle of the world, they seek to translate the power of the mind into social power, to 
conquer, that is, the Cartesian division between thought and action. But, ironically, 
their efforts to reveal the mystery of the world always remove them from their own 
discovery and confront them with different, and far more troubling, truths. Forced to 
use the tool of language, which points beyond itself but forever entangles us within 
this world, deforming everything to which we apply it, these Oedipal protagonists’ 
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attempts to reconstruct and reformulate experience ceaselessly come up against the 
impasse of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which describes the ways in which 
observation distorts reality. They are repeatedly forced to recognise the ways in 
which comprehension itself is always vulnerable to the world and therefore the falsity 
of the idea of the autonomous, self-actualising mind. And in response they become 
tyrants of subjectivity, ensconced in a hermeneutic frenzy of interpretation, 
rumination and self-questioning. They are, to a man, as Quin herself so memorably 
puts it, ‘anal-retentive researchers’11 (often, as in Three and Passages, they are 
professionally engaged in the life of the mind as translators and writers). Or, as Louis 
Sass defines this sense of distorted and disordered self-consciousness, they are 
afflicted by ‘hyperreflexivity’.12 Their attempt to draw closer to the world paradoxically 
results in being driven further and further away and drawn deeper and more 
irrecoverably within their own interiority. There they remain, trapped between thought 
and action, between, that is, an interior vision which can never be actualised and is, 
in any case, not their own, and an external world that is indeterminate, 
unpindownable and ever elusive and impossible to comprehend.  
 ‘A man called Berg who changed his name to Greb came to the seaside 
intending to kill his father’. The memorable epigraph that begins the novel is 
unequivocal about Berg’s parricidal intent. But his mens rea is never matched by an 
actus reus. Recounted in synopsis, Quin’s novel becomes the very blackest, black 
as noir, of bedroom farces. A slapstick, sexual tragicomedy in which the hapless 
Berg, a would-be Oedipus, succeeds only in murdering a succession of symbolic 
surrogates of the father and mostly cannot even manage that. In fact the death toll 
by the end of the novel amounts to the slaughter of Judith’s feline familiar, her cat, 
Seby, and his father’s beloved budgie who dies of natural causes. Berg’s quarry, the 
“corpse” of his father by which his progress is constantly hamstrung, is, at length, 
revealed to be his father’s much simonised ventriloquist’s dummy. His attempts to 
return to his mother, Edith, victorious with his father’s “body” in tow are continually 
thwarted by Judith. He is repeatedly folded back into the stultifying absurdity of 
domestic life from which he longs to establish distance but whose safety, ‘the 
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comfort of her arms at night…know[ledge] [that] at last he belonged to one person’ 
(125), he finds insidiously seductive. Job not done and still casting around for a 
resolution to his Oedipal plight, Berg visits the coroner and identifies a drowned 
destitute, one of the tramps that form, as Giles Gordon has commented,13 the Greek 
chorus of this novel so heavily soaked in myth, as his father. Berg attempts to usurp 
the-Name-of-the-Father by literally killing his own father, but only succeeds in “killing” 
his father’s proxies which, in the end, seals his own fate. The novel’s myriad Oedipal 
variations persist well beyond the close of the novel. It closes in classic chiller style 
with the reappearance of Nathan, subtly changed but with his resurrected 
taxidermied budgie, strangely familiar, who installs himself in the room next door. 
 
 
Alienation-on-Sea 
 
In an out-of-season seaside resort – a resolutely non-place which with its Oriental 
folly and pier we might infer to be Brighton, if that were not to miss the point entirely 
– Berg could scarcely have chosen a better setting for a parricide, that most 
fundamental of transgressions. Lodged where the land meets the sea, the seaside is 
a quintessentially liminal space, a place, as Rob Shields describes in his study of 
Brighton in Places on the Margin, of  “in between-ness”, of ‘discontinuity in the social 
fabric, in social space, and in history’.14 Stallybrass and White in their The Politics 
and Poetics of Transgression define the British Isles’ coastal periphery as the final 
resting place of the carnival, describing how, marginalised by the forces of 
modernity, it ran towards the sea.15 The British seaside was the place for the 
legitimated transgressions of carnival, where the usual rules and codes of behaviour 
are temporarily suspended, even inverted. A place where the Regency pleasure-
seeker, the Victorian bather and the thirties charabanc daytripper alike could enjoy 
the frisson of sanctioned and regulated liminality set in the safely mediated sublime 
of cliff, sea and vast horizon.  
By the sixties, however, into a “frontstage” - in sociologist Erving Goffman’s 
terms – of performed rituals of transgression and staged pleasures, a “backstage” of 
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aimlessless, small-time gangsterism, brute power and exploitation had begun to 
extrude. As Britons that could abandon the pleasures of the seaside for the wine and 
sunshine of the continent, following the advent of cheap tourist flights in 1952, they 
left behind a sense of anomie, decrepitude, seediness and stagnation. Even as in a 
post-war, post-Suez Britain struggling to reconcile itself with its loss of prestige, the 
seaside was hymned for its traditionally English brand of good, off-colour fun and 
became enshrined in the nostalgic myths of a collective childhood spent digging up 
sandworms in a kiss me quick hat as, with so much else, the veil had been lifted, 
innocence lost, and the seaside carnival began to seem less like temporary and 
socially productive liberation from the boundaries – both spatial and social – of 
respectable urban society – and  more like the intimation of a seedy underbelly of 
ambivalent and irrational forces laying latent but at the very heart of everyday life. It 
is no accident that both Roquentin and Meursault found themselves on beaches, that 
their ‘nausea’ should manifest where, as T.S. Eliot wrote of Margate Sands in The 
Wasteland, ‘I can connect / Nothing with nothing’16. Or that the English occultist and 
mystic Aleister Crowley, dubbed “The Wickedest Man in the World”, should live out 
his final years cooking up heroin in Room 13 of a guesthouse in Bohemia, 
Hastings.17  
During the late fifties and sixties a succession of writers – as well as 
musicians, most notably The Beatles – sought to recover music hall, vaudeville and 
other traditional forms of a more “authentic” and indigenous popular culture in 
response to anxieties about national identity (and especially the perceived threat of 
Americanisation) which enmeshed with a renewed sense of working class 
consciousness. Colin MacInnes, in his 1961 essay, ‘Young England Half English’ 
claims that ‘until some forty years ago, the English song about English life resounded 
boisterously in the music halls. Since then, new American musical idioms… have 
swamped our own ditties’.18 Richard Hoggart might have accused George Orwell of 
viewing the English working classes ‘through the cosy fug of an Edwardian music 
hall’,19 but he too was liable to romanticise the beanfeast, the charabanc trip and 
even the mid-week fish and chip supper as ‘free acts’ of what he calls ‘cheerful 
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existentialism’.20 His auto-ethnographic memoir, The Uses of Literacy, elegises an 
English working class which sought and found its meaning in ‘that little bit extra’: the 
‘sprawling, highly ornamental, rococo extravagance’ of popular culture.21 The 
playwright, John Osborne, articulated a similar declinist thesis in his 1957 play, The 
Entertainer, which is set during the Suez crisis. In the play, which mingles vaudeville 
set piece mises en scène with domestic life, Britain is metaphorised as a tatty, 
decaying music hall, presided over by failed comic turned dissolute philanderer, 
Archie Rice. ‘The music hall is dying and with it, a significant part of England’, writes 
Osborne in his introduction, ‘[s]ome of the heart of England has gone; something that 
once belonged to everyone, for this was truly a folk art.’22 Welfare capitalism might 
have meant that ‘[n]obody wants, and nobody goes without, all are provided for’, but 
what was left, as Jean comments, was the meagre paucity of an existence where 
you ‘go on and on till they carry you out in a box’.23 
However, Quin clearly had no truck with the period’s rose-tinted, nostalgic 
attempts to ennoble and memorialise the gilt edges of a kinder and gentler age. Berg 
resonates powerfully with a tendency in drama that became known, after Martin 
Esslin’s coinage, as the Theatre of the Absurd,24 typified in the works of playwrights 
like Joe Orton, Harold Pinter, Samuel Beckett and Eugene Ionesco. This movement 
in theatre sought to appropriate and re-contextualise the motifs of traditional popular 
culture for far more ambivalent ends. The novel’s commingling of farce and menace 
is certainly Ortonesque, its bedraggled milieu and down-at-heel rooming house 
setting could be straight out of Pinter plays such as The Room (1957) and The 
Birthday Party (1957). The new anachronisms of popular culture that emerge in the 
works of these writers are shop-soiled, time-worn and pitiful, and used to define the 
estranged and alienated conditions of human existence. These playwrights were 
influenced by the existentialism of Camus and his assessment, set out in his essay 
“The Myth of Sisyphus” (1942), of the human situation as “absurd”, afflicted by a 
sense of alienation and anomie at the purposelessness of existence in a universe 
without meaning or value.25 For those affiliated with the Theatre of the Absurd, the 
theatrical forms of music hall, pantomime, vaudeville, variety, the revue and the light 
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opera (which were themselves derived from older popular forms like the commedia 
dell’ arte, and they, in turn, seeded from primitive forms like mummery) were 
employed to convey the artificiality and estrangement of the conditions of modern 
life. The unity and integrity of the well-rounded character was replaced by debilitated 
and depthless stock types, for example. Dialogue becomes a relentless call-and-
response of inconsequential clichés, innuendos and non sequiturs. 
The forces of carnival that had, as Bahktin so influentially argues in Rabelais 
and His World, signalled the productive, even radical possibilities of the albeit 
temporary transgression from reason – or at least the socially useful delusion of it – 
were now being deployed to depict the irrationality at the very heart of human 
existence: the reductive nature of human experience and the displacement of the 
subject. The Age of Reason had now lapsed and had brought about nothing but its 
opposite; Adorno and Horkheimer, Juergen Habermas and Max Weber had all 
recognised the rotten heart of Enlightenment modernity. Scientific rationality had 
participated in genocide, the enslavement of human by technology and large-scale 
environmental destruction. The comedy of farce had become the tragedy of the 
absurd. 
 
 
Voiceless Bodies and Bodiless Voices  
 
Berg’s ventriloquial plot might well allude to the curious case of Archie Andrews, a 
ventriloquist’s dummy that disappeared from a London train bound for Leeds in 
October 1951. At the time one of the most prominent stars of British radio, millions 
followed the Archie Andrews “kidnap” scandal in the press. After an anonymous tip-
off, Archie was found three days later by his vent, Peter Brough, trussed up in a 
suitcase in the left luggage office at King’s Cross, a similar scene to that in which 
Berg repeatedly attempts to dispose of his father’s “corpse” in the novel. ‘Paternity is 
often an issue’ in ventriloquism, writes Steven Connor in Dumbstruck, his cultural 
history of the art of ‘seeming to speak where one is not’: 
 
 [O]ften the ventriloquist attempts to supply the place of the figure’s real 
father, who is said to be elsewhere. The ventriloquist fathers himself, in a not-
quite-bloodless vocal birth, in which the child never in fact leaves the 
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ventriloquist’s body (indeed, the ventriloquist is partly inside the body of its 
figure).26 
 
In the figure of the ventriloquist and his dummy, Quin (not quite) embodies the 
Oedipal process. By killing the dummy, the hapless Berg seeks to corporealise the 
bodiless voice of the parental ghost, to actualise Lacan’s Paternal metaphor, through 
which the subject is doomed to pursue endless substitutions for the originary loss, 
and then extinguish it. But the Oedipal psychodrama, of course, only ever has one 
ending: ‘It is Death’, as Kristeva writes in her reading of Samuel Beckett’s “First 
Love”, ‘it always was’:27 
  
It is the meaning of the narrative of the son… As long as a son pursues 
meaning in a story or through narratives… he narrates in the name of death.  
 
In his later reflections upon culture, especially his Totem and Taboo (1913), Freud 
sought to extend his account of Oedipus as a psychic phenomenon to explain the 
origins of social life. The psychic process by which the subject is enculturated, Freud 
argues, is the schematic inheritance of the parricidal origins of civilisation. He 
theorises that the Oedipus complex has empirical origins, seeking to establish the 
oedipal story of prohibition and punishment as prehistoric fact which, as Zizek put it, 
‘really had to happen’.28 Our internal, eternal conflict between desire and the law, 
Freud speculates, is the memory-trace of a primordial scene in which the primal 
father is murdered by his sons and then reincarnated as a totem animal by whose 
ritual sacrifice the sons attempt to appease the absent father, who in death has 
become even more powerful than in life: 
 
As far as the father that Oedipus knew is concerned, he only becomes the 
father, as Freud’s myth indicates, once he is dead. It is thus here, as I’ve said 
a hundred times, that one finds the paternal function.29  
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The ritual murder of the dummy, the totemistic father-surrogate, then, results not in 
Berg’s emancipation but his enslavement in the machinations of oedipal process and 
the inevitable succession to his place within the paternal lineage. The oedipal 
narrative has a terrifying inevitability; we find Berg, after Nathy’s “death”, installed in 
his father’s chair in their seaside bedsit, firmly ensconced within the ‘annihilation of 
domesticity’ (147): 
 
Yes, let’s have a proper meal, with a proper woman sitting opposite, with a 
proper plastic table cloth, a proper pink, with proper yellow cups and saucers, 
and a proper clock ticking over with the proper time. (161) 
 
In her essay, Kristeva sketches a grisly tableau of Beckett’s mourning sons, all 
waiting for Godot, the figure of the father with his deathly power. In Beckett, of 
course, he never arrives, but in Berg he does. In yet another shift of the Oedipal 
structure the father re-emerges as an ominous figure behind the partition that shakes 
like an ‘animal thumping its tail’ (168).  
Intending to kill the father’s bodiless voice, then, Berg’s protagonist succeeds 
only in birthing his own voiceless body: the dummy, his silent, speechless familiar. 
Developing a technique she later employed in her short story, ‘Motherlogue’,30 a one-
sided dialogue between the narrator and her mother in which the narrator’s 
responses seem to have been redacted, Berg is almost mute, talked at, never 
verbalised. Even here, voicing his one line, Berg stumbles, there is a slip of the 
tongue (“never” instead of “ever”) and, in any case, Judith infers what she would 
rather hear: ‘Of course I knew where was something between us right from the start, 
that wicked look you used to give me on the stairs’ (89). 
Berg’s story is told in that characteristically Quinian mode wherein the verb “to 
be”, conferring the impression that a story is, at least, taking place and is happening 
within some substantive universe, is consistently elided. A kind of fictional E-Prime, 
where thought and action are (almost) always hypothetical, depicted in a slippery as 
if register, which describes without ever conferring existence. Memory and 
perception and inner and outer voices are enmeshed and occur along the same 
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irreal plane where the lines of sight are off. There is a sense, in Berg, of a past and 
present that lay cheek-by-jowl, of a memory world and a perceptual world that show 
forth almost simultaneously and are connected metonymically. Within this logic of 
sensation, time becomes a merely flimsy accretion that is easily scraped away. The 
phenomena of the present appear distant and etiolated, but segue sometimes 
imperceptibly into the memory-tone of a vital and highly-charged world. Narrative 
voice slips from a claustrophobically internalised third-person to address the second-
person of this divided self and constitutes a memory-world that is fragmentary and 
yet abundant, cornucopic, sublime, even in its sensorial intensity: 
 
Remember the swings, the shoots, and roundabout horses; dizzy and 
dazzled, sticky fingers on a stray cat, a dead thrush, a rabbit stunned; 
cornflowers  sprayed against stained glass; poppies in cornfields, the first, 
second, or was it the third kiss given, not on the lips, in the hay; rats scuttling, 
and the kisses later chalk-marked on park benches: I’ve got the most. Days of 
sun and smells of home-made cakes, toffee, fallen apples… Hills meeting sky, 
and those who charmed paths with snails, or put catherine wheels in hedges; 
rockets misfired from other planets; the whole galaxy: a giant’s chair, oneself 
a splinter in the leg. (8) 
 
The phenomenological world that young Berg draws around himself is a ‘freedom 
that found its own reality’ (153). It is a kind of narcissistic sanctuary that offers 
protection from the vertiginous apprehension of a ‘world that no longer revolves 
around you.’ There ‘channels of light… flickered on the boy who was left the other 
side of the hedge’ (11). A ‘sticky, sickly child’ with ‘[r]ound scarred knees’ – ‘just a 
common cissy’ (100) – is afforded the possibilities of transcendence: 
 
But once on your own when you lorded it with beast and flower, striding the 
hills, welcomed by a natural order, a slow sensuality that circled the sun, rose 
the wind through the grass forests, then nothing mattered, because everything 
comprehended your significance. (11) 
 
Berg’s perceptual world, however, is etiolated and antinomian, peopled with marginal 
characters and marginal lives lived in cramped and mildewed rooms on the déclassé 
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fringes of society. Of dusty chintz and velveteen, bare bulbs swinging, phlegmy 
coughs in the night, cat hair, moth balls, artificial fruit, milk-skin and tide-marked 
cuffs, the ‘familiar furniture and objects scattered about the room, yet no longer 
belonging’ (112). See the description of Berg’s room with its  
 
rumpled bed, the chest of drawers, that refused to close; the half open 
wardrobe doors, the chipped enamel pot with its faded blue flowers; the wall 
paper making everything else collide; this morning’s dirty dishes, half a brown 
loaf – a monk’s cowl – perched on the pale yellow plastic table cloth; pin-
striped trousers over the rose-chintz chair; pants, string vests; the case full of 
bottles, wigs, pamplets: BUY BERG’S BEST HAIR TONIC DEFEAT 
DELILAH’S DAMAGE: IN TWO MONTHS YOU WILL BE A NEW MAN. (3) 
 
People are self-fashioning grotesques, mere personae busied with role-
playing paltry renditions of character; ‘cosy mice in their cages of respectability’ (81).  
This world is revealed from the point of view of the peeping tom, the voyeur; human 
perspective is found kneeling at keyholes, or with an ear pressed against the 
partition which serves as the screen against which he projects his pseudo-
incestuous fantasies. This sense of estrangement between Berg and the outer world 
is made flesh, portrayed as a cartoon appendage that protrudes from the self, an 
antenna that gropes towards the outer world. With echoes of Stephen’s umbilical 
cord in Ulysses, in Berg perceiving happens through a ‘microscopic eye’ which looks 
upon the world through a gap in the curtain ‘as if from a umbilical cord’ (5), his gaze 
is returned ‘as through a telescope’ (6). Music is heard as if strung like a thread of 
‘hard-polished beads’ (7), Berg ‘pull[s] his eye through a keyhole’ (7). Conversation 
is a relentless call-and-response of inconsequential clichés, innuendos and non-
sequiturs: “Good morning, nice day. Good afternoon, cold today.” (2).  
Berg is a ‘Pirandello hero’, a character very much in search of an author, as 
frigid and solitary as the iceberg his name implies and engaged in an elaborate 
Jungian masquerade. As an enervated and acne-ridden youth with shoes that 
pinched, who was ‘terrified of so much sophistication, everyone that much more 
adult, more knowledgeable in the rules of the social game’ (44), Berg ‘learned how to 
make contact by spraying a fashionable, acceptable brand of sanctity onto others’ 
(45), fashioning a persona with which to reconcile himself with the outside world. 
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Arranging his face into appropriate shapes in the mirror, donning a limp bow tie, he is 
‘trying hard not to expose the internal rustle, or lay bare the final draft’, to ‘abide by 
the rules and regulations of [his] chosen part’ (6).  
Memory sequences apparently disclose a plethora of psychoanalytic 
etiologies to account for Berg’s damaged subject. Can one pin down his distress via 
a Freudo-Lacanian interpretation of a malfunctioning Oedipal complex, for example? 
He is a ‘monumental bird weighed down by elemental forces’ (27): the “good mother” 
turned bad, too intimate, too devoted, queasily over-familiar, the absentee dad, 
bringer of reason gone AWOL, the Name-of-the-Father never imposed, never 
introjected leaving the young Berg left with vast reservoirs of untranslated infant 
omnipotence, ‘longing to be castrated’ (4) to be divested of his primary narcissism. 
Or, is this an instance of Jungian enantiodromia, an unsuccessful process of 
individuation and the return of a repressed individuality from beneath an empty 
persona? There are obscure intimations of sexual abuse at the hands of drunk Uncle 
Billy, a ‘faint recollection of a grizzled face peering over’ (4 )and of the ‘dormitory 
pleasures’ inflicted upon Berg as a ‘pretty boy at the age of nine’ (10), of Berg’s 
aberrant sexual development, of his attempted suicide at ten, of sexual deviance and 
guilt. He is a would-be pick-up artist, cruising the dancehalls of this seaside town for 
a ‘piece of fluff’ (4) and yet he is repulsed by the ignominy of sex, impotent and yet a 
shamefaced onanist: 
 
Like playing with a doll, rising out of the bath, a pink jujube, a lighthouse, 
outside the rocks rose in body, later forming into maggots that invaded the 
long nights, crawled out of seal walls, and tumbled between the creased in the 
sheets. (4) 
 
Equally, Quin appears to endorse the theory of the schizophrenogenic mother that 
rose to prominence in psychoanalysis between the fifties and seventies under the 
aegis of Melanie Klein. Berg’s mother, Edith, is depicted as a boundaryless despot, 
‘devoted unconditionally to her only son’ (3), the ‘good’ mother turned bad; too 
intimate, too devoted, queasily over-familiar.  
Contrary to the cultural return to the mother that was being enacted elsewhere 
during the period – the reclamation and recuperation, that is, of the feminine as a 
position of empowered marginality – in Berg the traditional associations of the 
130 
 
feminine (with irrationality, madness, excess and the grotesque) are reaffirmed. In 
Berg the feminine is always deeply ambivalent. Judith is overripe and 
superabundant, smelling of ‘wet fur and confectionery’ (70) her flesh ‘blotched and 
mottled’ (123), her smile ‘a crack in icing sugar’ (92) the mascara ‘congealed blood 
under her eyes’ (93). She leers at him lasciviously, snarls, bites and licks him. She 
seems to extrude pneumatically. Her sexuality is portrayed as seductive and 
menacing. She is a siren, a venus flytrap, a vampire, who seduces with her ‘round 
soft belly, the quick relief of her opening thighs, the smell between, like hyacinths’ 
but once captured will ‘[e]at you whole, drain everything out of you within a week’. 
(125) She is invariably found set into highly-charged scenes that embody these 
claggy and sweetish associations and that seem to pulse and vibrate with a kind of 
atavistic sexual menace. She is a ‘secret hot-house pleasure’ (69) amongst 
monstrous dancing pot plants whose sticky, grasping tendrils threaten to overwhelm 
Berg (in an echo of Nathalie Sarraute’s botanic metaphorisations, tropisms). Or they 
seem to become doused in a Sartean slime, the spilled hair tonic ‘that spread its 
mucus-like way right round them, between them, over them.’ (85) 
For Betty Friedan, in her The Feminine Mystique (1963), women are the 
passive victims of the ‘comfortable concentration camp’ of middle-class domesticity. 
‘Dehumanized’ and ‘adjusted’ as housewives, they, like the victims of the holocaust, 
walk to a ‘slow death of mind and spirit’.31 In Berg, however, as in the novels of Amis, 
Cooper, Wain, et al., women are portrayed as the willing ancillaries of the system, 
the foot soldiers that entrap and ensnare their male charges in clotted and cloying 
worlds of domestic annihilation. In naming Judith Goldstein, Quin draws similarly 
upon a problematic identification between women and the figure of the Jewish 
concentration camp victim – one which she would return to in her novel Passages – 
but in Berg, women are consenting conspirators with the mystique. As role-players 
par excellence, women are the agents of a metaphysical absurdity. They are 
Hemingwayian “bitch goddesses” who feign an ‘air of complete innocence’ that 
conceals their ‘anarchy of destruction’ (88). Judith clings ‘like a snail to its shell’ (94) 
to her social mask. The ‘curlers, the daily, nightly rituals’ (92) conceal an authentic 
self that is ‘a centre of real hardness’ (90):  
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Isn’t she the very prototype of the woman one dreams of being caught up by, 
at rest in her omnipotent, knowing her to be ruthless, but never accepting the 
fact, half the fascination in wondering how far she will go – the wiles, the lies, 
all vanity accepted but never quite confronted. The so-called mystery of the 
woman, so involved in the many-sided portraits of herself, eternally eluding 
one’s grasp, knowing she would lose all if she ever showed her real identity, 
her real worth. (145) 
 
Berg, like Daniel Paul Schreber before him, fancies himself in drag. Making up 
as a women, a masque worn on top of a mask, he ponders the thrilling sexual 
possibilities: ‘if only the navy were in… the adventures he could have had in such a 
disguise’ (117). Berg’s, however, is no feminisation phantasy of benignly embodied 
subjectivity, of jouissance; his transvestitism is in no way, as Louis Sass has 
interpreted of Schreber’s own, an ‘antidote to the intellect’ or a ‘palliative for the self-
torturing mind’32. It is portrayed, on the contrary, as thoroughly Freudian, a vengeful 
longing for the father who, in a comic set piece unwittingly mistakes Berg for Judith: 
‘Lead him on, lead him right there, produce it in his face, in his ear, in his eye, let him 
have it so he’ll remember it to the day he dies. (119).  
In the end, the sea is Berg’s only respite. Failing to fulfil his doomed fantasy of 
self-authorship Berg abandons his attempts to climb out of his inner cosmology and 
submits to the void, attempting to whittle down reality into its elemental constituent 
parts. It is only adrift, floating between life and death that Berg, like fellow shipwreck, 
Pincher Martin, can finally play Prometheus, reaching a zero condition of 
homeostasis described as 
 
a moment caught between two moods, that space within, separated from life, 
as well as death, when the sun is faced without blinking, when eternity lies 
here inside; no division whatsoever, simply a series of circular motivations? 
(23) 
 
Adrift in a watery purgatory between life and death Berg feels himself ‘falling in 
endless space’ (151). Where ‘all suddenly would be soundless’ and time is reduced 
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to the ‘moment fixed between one wave and the next’, one can enjoy the ‘glorious 
sensation of weightless, moon-controlled’, can ‘forget, be forgotten’ and ‘becom[e] 
part of the sky’ (153). One cannot, however, suspend this zero condition infinitely. 
Berg is in the balance, suspended precariously between opposing forces that, on the 
one hand, draw him under the waves towards engulfment and submission and, on 
the other, call him to return to shore. The sea’s watery purgatory is merely a 
palliative. This, after all, is a mere fantasy of human limits, hanging precariously 
between the impossible transgression of those limits – engulfment, drowning – and 
return. Like Prometheus, Berg is left in the impossible quandary of the self-divided 
man who knows too much.  
It is the tramp, not Berg, who is blinded, like Prospero, the ‘pearls that were 
his eyes’ plucked out by gulls, not punctured with a pin. Berg is, in the end, only 
figuratively pricked by the pin that seals his fate and signals the further interminable, 
inexorable rotation of the Oedipal triangle. The pin, that is, which clasps Judith’s 
butterfly brooch, on which his eyes alight in the coda of the novel, remembering, 
perhaps, the ‘rusty pin’ on Edith’s ‘saved-up birthday brooch’ that ‘always caught 
something in your throat’ (7) and which stands for the inescapable tawdriness and 
disappointment of the world in which Berg is finally and irrecoverably trapped.  
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Invisible Injuries and the Algebras of Liberation:  
Three, the Nouveau Roman and British Late Modernism 
 
 
In Doris Lessing’s The Golden Notebook (1962), the number of liberation is four: four 
notebooks, four gates and four directions. Frederick R. Karl has commented that in 
the figure of four, Lessing finds a form that blocks all other exits except to utopia.1 
For Quin, however, in literature – as in life – it is always three. The figure of the 
triangle occurs time and time again in Quin’s fictions: in Berg’s endlessly reiterated 
Oedipal variations, for example, in the trinity of a woman, her lover and her missing 
brother in Passages’ re-inscription of the Antigone myth and in Tripticks’ 
protagonist’s trio of ‘X-wives’, his affair with his mother-in-law and his not-so-cosy 
threesome with his second and third spouses. Within her own romantic relationships, 
Quin pursued sexual and social threesomes with varying degrees of success. 
Indeed, Three is dedicated to ‘Bob and Bobbie’: the American poet Robert Creeley 
and his wife, Bobbie, with whom Quin lodged in Placitas, New Mexico during her 
D.H. Lawrence Fellowship in 1964. In a profile of her in the Arts Guardian prior to the 
publication of her final novel, Tripticks, in 1972, Quin’s love life is reported with no 
little titillation: ‘Miss Quin had a relationship which involved going to bed with a 
boyfriend and a girlfriend at the same time’, the interviewer breathlessly reports.2 For 
the journalist perhaps this unorthodox lifestyle was just another notch on the bedpost 
of the “sexual revolution”. Conservative commentators like C.P. Snow, Pamela 
Hansford Johnson and later Margaret Thatcher perceived the new sexual 
permissiveness as signalling moral collapse, the mindlessly and irresponsibly 
hedonistic pursuit of instant gratification. But for Quin, “free love” is the privileged 
and paradigmatic instance of the communing of self with self, and therefore always 
practiced in pursuit of knowledge, the exploration of human connectedness and the 
attempt to forge new paths for the circulation of desire.  
Her second novel, Three, published in 1966, two years after her debut, is, as 
its title implies, a study in fiction of life a ménage a trois. Three’s titular trio are Ruth 
and Leonard, an unhappily married, middle-aged couple; she a housewife, he a 
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translator, the absent third is S., their young female lodger, who has – it seems – 
taken her own life by drowning. All three are both narrators and readers; their story is 
told and, simultaneously, read via a salad of multi-perspectival accounts and 
fragmentary documents, nested narratives set cheek-by-jowl, voice unattributed and 
frequently remaining undifferentiated within the body of text. The frame narrative, 
passages of brittle, enervated third-person free direct speech which depict Ruth and 
Leonard’s narrative present, are inlaid with sections from Leonard’s diary, whose 
telegraphed sentences and coded X’s the couple refer to in failed attempts to fix the 
events of the previous summer: ‘Yes I’m sure yes but when was that? Check your 
diary.’3 Leavened into this are fragments of S.’s own diary and transcriptions of her 
audio journal, expressionist renditions that blur perception and memory, which Ruth 
and Leonard each consult semi-clandestinely and with no little lurid fascination. 
There are the cine films that the couple provide a commentary upon, and the secret 
reel that Leonard watches alone. Transcriptions of Leonard’s taped audio diary, 
which is listened to by Ruth, and Ruth’s diary, read by Leonard, appear towards the 
end of the novel and finally offer tantalising glimpses into the couple’s inner lives. 
Three’s multi-perspectival witnessing structure and the self-reflexive thematisation of 
writing and of reading foregrounds hermeneutic issues surrounding articulation, 
interpretation and their availability, their limits and, at last, their indeterminacy. We 
“read” the protagonists “reading” one another and by placing these accounts side-by-
side, the novel at once tentatively, glimpsingly, and always only partially, reveals 
both the “truth” of the characters’ existence and the measures the protagonists take 
to keep that “truth” at bay. Moreover, the metarepresentative aspect of Three, its 
depiction of the ways in which Ruth and Leonard attempt to read and to represent 
one another’s mind, reflects more broadly upon what fiction is.  
In the novel, Quin dramatises what the French nouveau romancier, Nathalie 
Sarraute – that other chronicler par excellence of human intersubjective relationships 
– called, adopting the expression from Katherine Mansfield, a fellow writer singularly 
attuned to their complex and ambivalent mechanics, ‘the terrible desire to establish 
contact’.4 Quin, like Sarraute, employs a bifocular, anti-behaviourist mode that turns 
surface realism against itself, endowing every gesture, every word and every thing 
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with the secret chaos of what lies beneath. But, unlike Sarraute, Quin also 
speculates in fiction upon the possibilities, by replacing human coupling with 
“tripling”, for more “authentic” relations between self and other and a much-yearned-
for rapprochement between the interior life and the external world. That is, the 
potential for a form of human connectedness which Hélène Cixous, a writer and 
theorist who shares Quin’s preoccupation with finding alternative ways for humans to 
relate to one another, defines as one in which the self ‘would not use the word love 
to cover up its opposite’.5 But, as the novel chronicles, the possibility of attaining that 
state of mutual recognition is dependent upon the other and demands a leap into the 
other’s abyss without any guarantee of reciprocation. These are the stakes of Three: 
the risk that the pursuit of connectedness may well lead to its opposite.  
 
 
Three’s Company 
 
For Quin, as for existential phenomenologists like R.D. Laing, human life is forged in 
the correlative existence of living beings and others who comprise their surrounding 
world. Quin recognises the inherently dialogic nature of the self and of culture, the 
way in which our reality is continually established intersubjectively, via the inter- and 
intra-psychic relationships between two experiencing subjects. People, Quin writes in 
Three, like the creatures upon Noah’s Ark, arrive ‘[t]wo by two’ (56) and the quotidian 
is sustained by the action and reaction of their equal and opposite forces. But, like 
Cixous, Quin also recognises these couplings as the social analogue of what she, 
after Derrida, defines as ‘logocentrism’,6 that the pairing of man and woman 
recapitulates the ways in which binaristic structures of thought are reproduced 
endlessly as the units of culture: self/other, inner/outer, male/female, mother/father, 
child/adult, pleasure/pain, good/evil, love/hate. And for Quin, as for Cixous (and, of 
course, for Derrida), this oppositional system is governed by a mechanics of 
presence and absence that requires a passive partner in each coupling, a part that 
“woman” as irretrievably “other” – at once necessary to the system but forever 
excluded from it – is inevitably called upon to play. For Quin, the discordant third is 
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the disruptive element that breaks the bonds of these oppositional couplings that 
form the base molecules of reality.  
Quin’s rule of thirds speculates in fiction upon a route out of the master-slave 
dialectic in which human relations, in a time and a culture when authentic 
connectedness is no longer possible, are condemned to be a tragic ‘struggle to the 
death’ of lordship and bondage. One where, as conceptualised by Hegel in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), the desire for recognition tragically precludes the 
very possibility of forging a connection with others. Human relationships for Quin are 
pursued for their potential of satisfying the self’s craving for recognition by others. 
The sharing of a cigarette is singularly – transcendentally – freighted for ‘[t]he 
contact it promises’ (110). This promise is one of the happy and harmonious co-
presence of subjectivities and the consensual sharing of meaning, and is therefore 
the means by which the subject might gain access to a world beyond the 
imprisonment of the self, by which it might recover a sense of certainty about the 
world’s existence beyond the interminably frustrating limits of one’s own subjectivity, 
and, in this way, finally escape solipsism and conclusively establish a stable sense of 
being-in-the-world.  
But in Three such a craving is always futile and always endlessly frustrated, 
for the quest for identity necessarily entails its dissolution. Human relations are a 
constant subterranean battle of provocation and humiliation, as lashed-together 
consciousnesses antagonise one another in their struggle to differentiate themselves 
and jostle for dominance. The relationship between self and other is depicted as the 
way in which humans, unwittingly or otherwise, collude with one another to create 
the toxic, chimerical worlds they inhabit. Apparently innocent exchanges are a mere 
veneer for acts of cruelty and brutality. Human relations (fail to) contain their 
potential for psychic violence. In Three, the power embedded within the other’s 
perception of the self is a deeply ambivalent one. Laing, in The Divided Self, 
describes the being of schizophrenia as a condition of profound ontological 
insecurity, which is characterised by the subject’s apprehension of immanent threat – 
that of ‘engulfment’, ‘implosion’ and ‘petrification’ – to the continuity, autonomy and 
integrity of the unified and discrete self.7 And in Three, as in Sarraute’s novels, we 
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gain an experiential sense of the lived world that results when everyday life is 
pervaded by these anxieties.  
The real’s stable – or rather, for Quin, frustratingly heterostatic – dualism is 
depicted in Three as a mere performance of ‘defiant, unapproachable unity’ (57) that 
always bears the anxious trace of the interloping third that threatens to imbalance 
the real’s delicate and hard-won equilibrium: ‘Everybody [is] immediately concerned 
in being, doing what is expected of them. As if [they were] given the choice of two 
packs of cards to set the pace, but were misled by an invisible third.’ (57) Reality is a 
performance, or a game, its players merely the embodied envoys of their’ “true” and 
“authentic” selves. The ‘invisible third’ by splitting desire two ways, thereby breaking 
the frame of dualism’s pageant of brittle, insubstantial unity, or by throwing the game, 
for Quin presents the possibility not just of accessing a truly embodied subjectivity, 
but of transgressing those bodily limits. In her radically non-Oedipal fictions, the third 
is made to stand for the apex in continuing triangular human relations where 
transgressive desires remain unforeclosed.  
The third, according to the geometries of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, is 
generally associated with the Name-of-the-Father, the bringer of authority, of reason 
and of language. It is the paternal intervention that forecloses the free flow of 
communicative intercourse between mother and child. It is, for Lacan and for Zizek, 
for example, the ‘big Other’, the authoritarian superego of the symbolic economy that 
imperils the freedom of the subject. For Quin, however, the third is the mistress of 
the Real, lascivious and capricious, her expansive and free-flowing desiring 
appetites never fully sated. It is she who overturns the subject-object relations with 
which we mediate our relationship with the world, a spanner in the works of a desire 
assumed to be unilateral and unidirectional. 
But, as René Girard warns, the love triangle is by no means a stable and 
unproblematic framework for the circulation of desire. His hugely influential Desire, 
Deceit and the Novel (1966) transformed literature’s formal algebra, replacing the 
coefficient two with three. Later, in The Scapegoat (1989), Girard elaborates his 
mimetic theory of desire, explaining that we yearn for the desired object only 
because some third-party mediator has desired it before us. This rivalry, Girard 
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writes, is the ‘source of all disorder… the true secret of conflict and violence’.8 To 
keep the peace, he argues, this murderous rage must be channelled onto a 
scapegoat, an innocent victim whose death brings about temporary calm but whose 
persecution and murder ultimately gives the lie to the illusion of human order. In 
Quin’s novels, desire’s apogee is always in danger of becoming its scapegoat. The 
third of Three, S., is the bringer of a heady and intoxicating chaos who must, 
necessarily, be “sacrificed”, for the restoration of an order which can now only ever 
be illusory.  
Unlike her contemporaries, in particular Lessing, B.S. Johnson and Alan 
Burns, Quin claimed not to be “political”, that class ‘never bothered [her]’, that she 
was ‘sick to death’ of it being the primary focus of the social realist novel of the fifties. 
She felt it had ‘been overdone’.9 But her books, with their sensitivity to what the 
psychologist and social theorist Erich Fromm, in his 1941 book Escape from 
Freedom, designates as the pathologisation of the normative,10 and their attunement 
to what V.S. Pritchett, writing of Henry Green’s Doting called the ‘injury done to 
certain English minds by the main, conventional emphases of English life’11 are, 
without doubt, implicitly political. In what follows, I will explore the ways in which 
Quin’s Three seeks to discover and to capture what lies below what was for her the 
flimsy veneer of civilisation – to think the unthinkable and to say the unsayable – by 
self-consciously enacting, testing the limits of and speculating upon what lies beyond 
the metarepresentational function of fiction. More broadly, I want to continue the task 
of re-stitching and re-situating Quin’s work back into its contexts within the writing 
and thought of the period, by exploring the novel’s resonances with a deep and 
abiding mistrust of the quotidian that is evident in a lineage of Anglo-French late-
modern, after-modern, not-quite-post-modern writers, such as Elizabeth Bowen, 
Henry Green, William Sansom, Nathalie Sarraute, Alain Robbe-Grillet and others.  
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Still Life With Three 
 
We meet Ruth and Leonard in the aftermath of S.’s disappearance, each of them 
taking great pains to establish for themselves and for each other their lack of 
culpability. Their disquiet is euphemised into stock obituary phrases: ‘No one can be 
blamed Ruth we must understand that least of all ourselves… We’re not to blame 
remember that no one is responsible for another’s action – any tea left by the way?’ 
(1-2). The novel chronicles their quest, upon discovering S.’s diary, to expose the 
mystery of her death by reconstructing the summer prior to her drowning: ‘Let’s face 
it neither of us understood her there was a need in her for security yet at the same 
time she rebelled background convent family everything contributed…’ (117)  
Both Ruth and Leonard have assumed the well-worn roles of domestic life: 
she peevish and nit-picking, addled with phobias and neurotic ailments – migraines, 
hay fever – and popping pills against her jangled nerves, emotionally hyperborean, 
except with the coddled cat; he a long-suffering nail-baiter, sexually frustrated but 
afflicted by erectile dysfunction and sedating himself with television, his emotional life 
channelled into amateur botany, his intellectual life into books. The neurotic, highly-
charged prose of the main narrative told in the third person permits Ruth and 
Leonard no interiority – indeed, they joke hubristically about their lack of ‘hidden 
depths’ – but it jangles with the paratactic force of an invisible injury it cannot contain 
which fractures the surface realism of their comfortable, familiar, middle-class milieu, 
summed up by S. as ‘[d]ays of headaches, library, dinner and lunch engagements’ 
(65).  
S. is Three’s MacGuffin. The narrative reveals that this couple of would-be 
gumshoe detectives, whatever they tell themselves and one another, are in pursuit 
not of the truth of S.’s death – there is, after all, a suicide note and the verdict of a 
police investigation – but of their own ambivalent erotic fascination with what she 
represents: the mythic third, the apex of triangular relations, the eternal interloper 
who embodies the possibilities of an alternative mode of existence outside of the 
constraints of the nuclear family unit, her suicide a wish-fulfilment fantasy of 
engulfment and self-annihilation. ‘What did she want of us, need from him, myself? 
We shall probably never know’ (125), Ruth asks, lacking the self-knowledge to invert 
the terms of her question in order to pose the one that is equally begged by the text. 
And for S. too a ‘simple recognition is all that’s needed’ (139). Pursued by her own 
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demons she longs to ‘become something in their lives, anything’ (60). She is a honey 
trap, a hand grenade thrown into Ruth and Leonard’s gated world who is ‘[p]ursued 
by the compulsion to jeopardise such a bourgeois stronghold’ (61): 
 
To see their cotton wool faces, zipper mouths expand, shrivel, contract. To 
throw their salt-cellar out of the window, drill through their soundproofed walls. 
(63) 
 
She initiates an ontological game of risk, urging Ruth and Leonard further and further 
towards the edge of the abyss: 
 
A recognisable nausea provokes the desire to become something in their 
lives, anything. Everything. But whose move is the next? (60) 
 
Games, as Freud knew, are never innocuous, are always the acting out in miniature, 
and within the safe confines of the bounded act, with its binding rules and low 
stakes, of the rituals that regulate our social existence. But in Quin’s games the 
stakes of play are considerably higher. The trio of Ruth, Leonard and S. mediate the 
strung-out boredom of domesticity with dangerous games at the edge of oblivion that 
toy with brutal and violent forces: 
 
Shall we play pontoon? Chinese Rummy? Consequences? Where are the 
masks? Let’s pretend we’re the only inhabitants left after an atomic war. Or 
prisoners all in one cell. (105) 
 
In what is perhaps a rather unexpected literary echo, just as in Jane Austen’s 
Mansfield Park a stranger, Mr Yates, masterminds a parlour production of Lover’s 
Vows which pollutes the bounded unity of the house with moral anarchism, so too in 
Three S. devises a masked mime play which destabilises an already fragile social 
order. For Quin, like Austen, “theatricals” represent a license for social boundary-
breaking. Masques invite her characters to cast off their masks; they constitute a 
mise-en-abyme of the performativity of social order which enables the release of the 
transgressive energies that lay beneath the thin veneer of civil society.  
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Significantly, the stage for this trio’s masked plays is provided by the 
misappropriated empty swimming pool of Ruth and Leonard’s holiday home, a motif 
familiar from the work of J.G. Ballard, a ruin of the future in the arrived in the present 
much employed by him for its metaphoric evocation of bourgeois malaise. And, 
equally significantly, the swimming pool is surrounded by ‘[r]ow upon row’ of mock-
Grecian statues which ‘[s]alute the house’ (25), forming a makeshift legion that 
defends the citadel of Ruth and Leonard’s ‘bourgeois stronghold’. ‘An attempt’, writes 
Quin, ‘to add / amend / defend.’ (25) It is from here that the ghosts of the outside 
finally emerge. During one mime play, whitewashed figures concealed amongst the 
clusters of statues “come to life” and incite a riot, vandalising the gardens, assaulting 
the players and throwing the social order of the house into disarray: ‘They looked like 
clowns giving vent to years of repressed feelings, as they punched, and kicked L’ 
(137). 
For Leonard, the possibility of transgression is intoxicating, whilst for Ruth it is 
vertiginous and devastating; S. is an interloper who threatens the very foundations of 
her closely-guarded world. Against which Ruth takes great pains to fix the veneer of 
the quotidian – diaries kept, engagements attended, routine duly and properly 
completed – but it all remains distressingly frail and insubstantial. Her sanctuary of 
bourgeois normativity is besieged by menaces, both real and imaginary: from the 
prying eyes of their curtain-twitching neighbours, the ‘bloody trespassers’ who 
‘trample on everything’ (43), the ‘vulgar crowd from the holiday camp’ who ‘muck 
about in the river’ (9): 
 
Such peasants here too… like beasts and how they stare too Leon have you 
noticed when we drive past that woman and her awful kids honestly given half 
the chance I think they’d quite happily see us dead? They’re all right if you talk 
to them. But what on earth can one say they wouldn’t understand just go on 
staring and once we’re through the gateway I can hear them laugh. (9) 
 
For Leonard, however, the ghosts of the outside fascinate. He courts the horrors of 
contingency from the safe distance of newspaper headlines, eagerly devouring 
reports of a man’s suicide (1), news of a distant volcano eruption (48), a domestic 
murder-suicide (78), a body found on a remote mountain top (131). 
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At every turn, then, the brittle tranquillity of the domestic life they have 
fashioned, and the traditional bourgeois humanist ethics for which is it a self-
consciously constructed synecdoche, is troubled by threats from without. ‘At least’, 
Ruth assures herself in her diary, ‘everything around us has substance and gives 
security. A home we have built up together.’ (124) But whilst Ruth’s night terrors are 
centred upon the bourgeois bogeymen that threaten to invade from the outside, the 
real threat, Quin reveals, lies much closer to home.  
 
 
The Terribly Normal Fiction of the Mid-century 
 
As they do in Passages, in Three, the primal forces of recent history cast a long and 
menacing shadow. In her diary, without comment, S. records the newspaper court 
transcriptions of a Nazi war crimes trial. For the camp adjutant in the dock, genocide 
‘was not [his] concern’ (60). As in Quin’s later novel, there are intimations about 
Leonard’s own involvement in the atrocities of recent history. Like the male 
protagonist of Passages, Leonard has a secret, shady past. He too, it seems, was a 
Communist defector, at sixteen a ‘little soldier playing with real lives to create a 
bigger and better world where all things and everyone would be equal.’ (120) He 
conspired, it is implied, like the camp adjutant, with violence and torture which, in 
denial or perhaps repression, says he ‘[n]ever witnessed’ (123). 
Quin’s Three was published only three years after Hannah Arendt’s 
authoritative report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Eichmann in Jerusalem, and her 
ontological distrust of what the pre-eminent political thinker called the ‘terribly and 
terrifyingly normal’12 very much resonates with what Arendt famously conceptualised 
as the ‘banality of evil’. Arendt conceives of evil after the collapse of traditional 
humanist ethics as no longer denoting deviance from societal norms, but people’s 
tendency to collude loyally and unquestioningly with the fictions of power to 
implement, accommodate and fulfil the laws based on those norms. Leonard himself, 
coming rather late to self-awareness in his own audio diary, describes how the 
‘illusion was shattered’ and begins to apprehend how his youthful idealism had led to 
his complicity in atrocity: ‘the pattern is set’ and ‘[s]oon one believes that is oneself’; 
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when the ‘image topples… no one notices… and one goes on automatically 
complying being doing. For that is the easiest way.’ (122) By allusively situating her 
domestic psychodramas against this submerged, half-glimpsed context, Quin forges 
an implicit link between the wartime atrocities implemented by those “just following 
orders” and observed by those who by obeying the letter of the law relinquish their 
own responsibility and the insidious violence of domestic life. Perpetrated by a cast 
of emotionally repressed, blindly obedient and insubstantial characters, cruelty and 
inhuman brutality has become the law of “normal” and “respectable” society. 
Beneath that ever-thinner veneer of respectability, there lurks a cesspool of malign 
and primeval forces that threatens to erupt at the very heart of the home, like the 
blood clot on her upper lip that Ruth attempts to cover with powder and lipstick (100).  
There is, in each of us, as Elizabeth Bowen has Portia, the protagonist of The 
Death of the Heart (1938), remark, in perhaps the most oft-quoted passage of her 
fiction, ‘battened down inside of himself, a sort of lunatic giant – impossible socially, 
but full-scale – and it’s the knocking and batterings we sometimes hear in each other 
that keeps our intercourse from utter banality.’13 Quin’s Three is singularly attuned to 
those distant, primeval rumblings that emanate involuntarily from some elusive and 
enigmatic primordial realm within the infinite mystery of the self, and the ways in 
which they impact upon our lives. So too is the fiction of the mid-century from both 
sides of the Channel – in Britain that of Ivy Compton Burnett, Henry Green, Iris 
Murdoch, Muriel Spark, William Sansom, Rayner Heppenstall and Bowen herself, 
and in France the nouveaux romans of Nathalie Sarraute, Alain Robbe Grillet and 
Marguerite Duras, amongst others. 
If modernism’s subject was the inner life, it was undoubtedly also, and in 
equal measure by this late period, about the struggle to reconcile the inner life with 
what lay outside. ‘Turning’, as Lorna Sage comments astutely of Henry Green, the 
‘deadly conventionality’ of life ‘into a kind of brilliant metafiction’14, in these Anglo-
French novels of the mid-century, modernism’s styles of estrangement descend from 
the aesthetic world of abstraction and are brought to bear on the real – but not, 
however, as we know it – lending a chilly and etiolated voice to the unspeakable 
experiences of the traumatised twentieth-century subject. 
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 They are singularly centreless novels, Cartesian parodies – as is often 
commented of Beckett – set in claustrophobically over-familiar and therefore 
uncannily false vraisemblables, which are peopled by characters who are scarcely 
people at all; indefinable, bloodless beings that in 1985 Christopher Lasch would 
categorise as ‘minimal selves’.15 With their acute, often obsessional or voyeuristic, 
perspectives upon human behaviour, and their construction of minimal selves that 
are elusive and mysterious and controlled by appetites that lie beyond the verbal 
consciousness, both undoubtedly evince the influence of the Behaviourist paradigm 
of psychology during the period. But crucially these novelists are preoccupied by 
observable behaviour and the surface of the real only for their capacity to reveal the 
unobservable, internal events of the mind. A literary parallel for the cognitive 
revolution of the fifties, they seek to open up the “black box” of the mind, and to find 
ways in fiction to hypothesise about the unconscious domain that lies beyond the 
reach of the linguistic and its effects upon the ways in which humans create meaning 
out of their encounters with the world. These novelists are no longer convinced about 
the unity and integrity of the self, or about the capacity of psychology to provide an 
account of its depths. Sarraute defines the era as the ‘age of suspicion’16  in which 
the character in fiction has become a vehicle for a disingenuous form of “realism” 
that is more concerned with paraphernalia than penetration and which has come to 
occupy a position of mutual distrust between author and reader. The exploration of 
interiority undertaken in modernist novels, like those of Proust, Woolf and Joyce, 
argues Sarraute, sought to shine a light upon the ‘dark places of psychology’ but 
found not Proust’s ‘ultimate deep’ but merely ‘a superficial network of conventional 
opinions taken over just as they were from the group to which he belonged’.17 
Disembodiment is the condition of universal psychological truth within these fictions, 
and by positing a model of the mind in which consciousness is dispersed amongst 
the trappings of modernity, these novelists sought to discover new kinds of objective 
correlative with which to metaphorise its mechanisms and dynamics. 
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For if modernism could be said, as D.H. Lawrence commented, to have taken 
flight from the ‘slowly revolving madness of civilisation’, it was also fascinated by 
modernity’s accoutrements: the cars, telephones, typewriters, household furniture 
and landscaped gardens that were no doubt the subject of Lawrence’s ire. Between 
the ‘high’ modernist period, and this later iteration, however, there is a significant 
difference in the way in which “things” function. Mrs Ramsay’s stockings in To The 
Lighthouse (1927), for example, are not Josephine’s roses in ‘Look At All Those 
Roses’ (1941). Maud Ellmann, in her brilliant study of Bowen’s work, makes this 
crucial distinction between Woolf’s world of objects and Bowen’s: 
 
In Woolf, consciousness exists in opposition to the object; in Bowen, 
consciousness escapes into the object, leaving human beings as vacant as 
the landscapes that threaten to devour them.18 
 
Between Woolf and Bowen characters’ relationships with the perceptual world have 
changed. Object relations have shifted; the boundary between the ego and the 
external realm has been effaced. We are now, as Ellmann comments, in Merleau-
Ponty’s inside-out world, which ‘reciprocates the gaze of the spectator’.19 The 
inanimate world is animated by the self’s psychic distress which is projected upon 
neurotic objects that constitute metonymically-charged objective correlatives of the 
psyche. In this way, the vociferous clamour of our primitive instincts is registered 
upon the very paraphernalia with which characters mark the distance between their 
civilised selves and their atavistic impulses: the places they live, the things that 
surround them.  
The knockings and batterings of that lunatic giant are heard across the fiction 
of the mid-century. In the novels of the period, we encounter elusive and undefined 
husks of subjects who appeal to the spoils of bourgeois materialism to mediate and 
insulate their monstrous depths, projecting upon objects the invisible injuries of their 
damaged psyches, which, thus endowed with an atavistic charge, implicate them. In 
Murdoch’s The Black Prince (1973) rooms have a ‘sinister tedium’ and ‘[breathe] the 
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flat horror of genuine mortality’.20 In Green’s Nothing (1950), they ‘[stand] prepared’ 
and emit an ‘untenanted attention’.21 In Caught (1943) consciousness spills out of 
the mind and colours the scene like a theatrical gel and houses shriek with 
supressed violence.22 In Spark, characters are mere hollowed-out grotesques – 
‘gargoyles’ as Caroline Rose describes Mrs Hogg in The Comforters (1957) – who, 
having fulfilled their functions, recede back into the wallpaper of Sparkworld.23 
Typewriters (The Comforters) and telephones (Memento Mori [1959]) are the 
repositories for uncanny anxieties. Though, of course, in Spark’s ‘sacramental 
view’24 it is not the unconscious that is the absence that looms, but the divine fiction 
to which the earthly but insubstantial world of human fiction is always subordinate. 
Giving voice to the desperate, blackened truth hidden within the smooth, monied 
ease of the propertied petty aristocracy, the stiflingly claustrophobic domestic milieu 
of Ivy Compton Burnett’s novels provides the arena for ritualised violence of Greek 
tragedy proportions in which murder, incest and blackmail pass without comment 
whilst poor table manners are subject to harsh rebukes. Compton Burnett’s novels, 
writes Storm Jameson, with their repetitive ‘acting-out of the powerful impulses that 
run counter to an accepted social morality… [offer] ritual purgation in a modern 
idiom’.25 
The cross-channel alliance I am attempting to forge might seem like a rather 
unlikely one. The approach of Bowen, Green and Murdoch et al, is explicitly 
phenomenological; their novels seek to reveal the presence of things as the objects 
of consciousness in all their phenomenality. The project of the nouveau roman – a 
‘case apart in the house of fiction’,26 as Ann Jefferson puts it – is surely quite the 
opposite. Reacting against nineteenth-century realistic writing for its elevation and 
aestheticisation of bourgeois materialism, critics tend to associate the “anti-novels” of 
Robbe Grillet and Sarraute with the – either radical and heroic or needlessly 
antagonistic and aesthetically bankrupt – attempt to slough off fiction’s 
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phenomenological bases and “return” to the noumenal. That is, the thing-in-itself, the 
world independent of what is perceived by these writers as the tyranny of human 
perspective, which attempts, at every turn, to enlist the world of objects into 
complicity with its own false consciousness.  
Robbe Grillet’s theory of fiction, developed in his collection of essays, 
Towards a New Novel (1965), seeks ‘a path for the future novel’. In his eponymous 
1956 essay he advocates a flat, precise, descriptive mode of fictional writing, shorn 
of figurative language and human-imposed significance: 
 
[T]he first impact of objects and gestures should be that of their presence, and 
that this presence should then continue to dominate, taking precedence over 
any explanatory theory which would attempt to imprison them in some system 
of reference…27 
 
Sarraute too is committed to a mode of writing that seeks to resist the human 
colonisation of the external world: 
 
To achieve this [the writer] works unceasingly to rid what he sees of the matrix 
of preconceived ideas and ready-made images that encase it, as also of all 
the surface reality that anyone can easily see and which, for want of anything 
better, everyone uses; and occasionally he succeeds in attaining to something 
that is thus far unknown, which it seems to him he is the first to have seen.28 
 
These theories were validated by Roland Barthes’ hugely influential reading of 
Robbe Grillet’s novels in his essay “Objective Literature”, which positions the writer 
as the founding father of the école du regard.29 In Robbe Grillet’s work, Barthes 
found a fictional exemplar of his ‘writing degree zero’. This interpretation has tended 
to constitute the critical context against which the work of the nouveau romanciers is 
read. Celia Britton comments that ‘particularly in the academic context in which the 
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Nouveau Roman is most usually read’ the nouveaux romanciers’ theories are used 
‘as a kind of key with which to “explain” their fiction’.30 
The critical debates surrounding the nouveau roman are dominated by the 
issues surrounding this, the phenomenological (or otherwise) quality of their work: 
questions of whether, for example, Robbe Grillet is as Barthes argues the founder of 
an ‘objective school of literature’, or as Bruce Morrissette’s dissenting realistic 
reading, has it, in fact an extreme subjectivist and his works ones of psychological 
realism,31 or, in fact, as Stephen Heath suggests, a “bad” phenomenologist, whose 
fiction is classically materialist in its failure to recognise the intentionality of 
consciousness.32 Certainly, within their own critical writings, the nouveaux 
romanciers espouse a kind of theoretically problematic phenomenological anti-
phenomenology. Their call for a return to pre-reflective states of perception has an 
affinity with Husserl’s conceptualisation of the phenomenological reduction and with 
the broader phenomenological project of bracketing the “natural attitude” in order to 
focus upon the ways in which we bestow meaning upon things. And yet their vision 
of a world beyond the percepts populated by non-meaningful objects and, moreover, 
the paradoxical insistence that, via this process of reduction, such a world might 
nevertheless reveal itself to those very percepts, appeals to its opposite.  
When Robbe Grillet assures us, ad nauseam, that his descriptions are 
‘without meaning’ or that they ‘lead only to nothing’ then ‘we may assume the 
contrary’, argues Christine Brooke Rose in A Rhetoric of the Unreal.33 ‘[P]rotesting 
much could mean the opposite’, she tartly observes.34 Although their theoretical 
writings speculate upon an authentically contingent reality and signal towards the 
possibility of, via a non-signifying fictional language, “discovering” this register of 
human experience in fiction, the nouveaux romanciers do not – and, in any case 
cannot – reach a ‘degree zero of writing’. Instead, these novels do something far 
more ambiguous and, arguably, more significant. Maintaining a modernist faith in the 
representational quality of words, their fictional language is one of signifying non-
signification, where the opacity of language mimics the solidity of objects but 
crucially, in this very neutrality, always posits the possibility of meaning. See for 
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example, in the early novels of Robbe Grillet, and their insistently recurring motifs: 
doors, windows and walls. All apparently blameless objects, all described in the 
neutral terms of their smooth, clean lines and abstract geometrical forms and yet all, 
nonetheless, so freighted, so interminably allusive of boundaries (and their 
transgression), of looking (and being blind), or internment (and freedom). Even upon 
bracketing their human significance – if such a thing were possible – and returning 
them to a neutral existence as objects in space, they are still so meaningful, 
indicative, as they are, of the ways in which humans use geometry and form to order, 
organise and therefore master the space that surrounds them. And in this way these 
novels at once depict the merciless disinterest of objects and our indefatigable desire 
to make them meaningful.  
Robbe-Grillet’s third novel, Jealousy (1957), transforms the domestic sphere 
into a crime scene, as the unnamed narrator appeals to its constituent objects to 
confirm his suspicions of an affair between his wife, referred to only as ‘A…’, and 
family friend, Franck. They will not, of course. Like a memory game they are 
obsessively revisited; their surfaces, their proximity, their arrangement, forensically 
examined and re-examined as the narrator seeks to quell his ontological unease 
about things not being as they seem: 
 
On the ring finger gleams a thin ribbon of gold that barely rises above the 
flesh. Around the hand radiate the creases, looser and looser as they move 
out from the center, but also wider and wider, finally becoming a uniform white 
surface on which Franck’s brown, muscular hand wearing a large flat ring of 
the same type comes to rest.35 
 
Things remain (for both the narrator and the reader) maddeningly ambiguous, 
adulterous even, accumulating to form a perceptual screen against which one can 
project any number of possible meanings. In this way, the “solid” elements of our 
world, those that we claim and own and endow synecdochically with the meaning of 
our lives just as easily betray us.  
Similarly, Sarraute’s oeuvre chronicles the rarified world of the Parisian haute 
bourgeoisie, who desperately accumulate the Balzacian trappings of their social 
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milieu in the attempt to shore themselves up against what lies beneath, a realm she 
designates as “tropisms”. Borrowing the term from plant biology, where it describes 
the phenomenon whereby plants move or grow in response to environmental 
stimulus, tropisms are made to constitute the instinctual inner drama of human 
intersubjective relations, that ‘terrible desire to establish contact’. Circumventing the 
impasse of attempting to depict in language that register of experience that 
necessarily lies beyond language, she employs tropisms metaphorically to posit an 
instinctual realm on the very threshold of consciousness, an ‘ultimate deep’ – pre-
rational, pre-linguistic and beyond the remit of psychology, that is the secret source 
of human existence. This realm is metaphorised by Sarraute as a seething, pulsing 
mass which collects at the very lowest strata of being; tentacular, molluscan, 
positively oozing, it seeps out as ‘mysterious effluvia’ in her novel, Portrait of a Man 
Unknown (1958),36 ‘like a live animal curled up on itself’ in Between Life and Death 
(1968)37 and as ‘noxious swarmings’ in The Golden Fruits (1963).38 To defend 
themselves, Sarraute’s characters build domestic fortresses of Chesterfield sofas, 
silver-plate cocktail shakers, Italian leather shoes, coveting and maniacally amassing 
the fetish-objects of bourgeois life – ‘things made of tortoise shell… frames of lapis 
lazuli… that honey-coloured cigarette holder’39 – in hope that the paraphernalia of 
existence, in its abundance and its visceral pleasure, might fend off the subterranean 
world within:  
 
Between them and a formless, strange, threatening universe, the world of 
things has interposed itself like a screen to protect them.40   
 
 
Objects of Desire 
 
The world of objects has a similar function in Three. At home, Ruth and Leonard 
‘move around each other’ (5), the minutiae of their every action – their every jitter 
and tic and twitch – is nervily over-narrated. Like stage directions for the 
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performance of banal and useless tasks, the descriptions of the way they move read 
like the notation of some obscure ritual. Just as, in Berg domestic settings are merely 
‘[a] background composed of things for reassurance, knick-knacks to fill in the odd 
gaps between petty rows and worked up passion’ (60), in Three objects seem to 
mediate and contain Ruth and Leonard’s distress. So intensely phenomenologically 
charged are objects, the dioramas of domestic life are made to pulse and crackle 
with neurotic energy. Ruth is forever restlessly arranging and rearranging the props 
of their domestic scene: fiddling, adjusting, straightening, opening and closing:  
 
She slid her feet out of her mules, brought them up, under a cushion… 
Cleaned her spectacles, breathed on slowly, held to the light. Reached for a 
cigarette, the pistol lighter, the metal shiny part she stroked, put down. She 
jumped up and opened the door. Switched on all the lights in every ground 
floor room. Opened all the doors, moved from room to room. Switched off all 
the lights, left the doors open, and crouched in front of the television. The cat 
curled at her feet she caressed him with her toes. (11) 
 
‘At least’, Ruth writes in her diary, ‘everything here around us has substance give 
security. A home we have built together.’ (124) Sartre, too, recognises the comfort of 
things. Humans forge intricate and intimate relationships with objects ‘to delay the 
collapse of the human world of measures, of quantities, of bearings’, he writes, in 
denial of the irrefutable ontology that 
 
Existence if not necessity. To exist is simply to be there; what exists appears, 
lets itself be encountered, but you can never deduce it.41 
  
But seemingly unable to contain the psychic pressure exerted upon them, these 
objects frequently incriminate Leonard: the snail squashed underfoot, the kicked cat, 
the wet patch on the sheet in the morning, the jelly spilled on the carpet: ‘Get a cloth 
darling – ohhhhhh what a mess.’ (49) And animistically endowed with vibrancy and 
movement, the objects sometimes appear to reciprocate. 
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As Waugh writes of Muriel Spark, the world of these mid-century fictions 
‘takes on the strange and disturbing sense of what psychiatrists sometimes refer to 
as the Stimmung – the feeling or mood or eeriness experienced by the psychotic 
and, in particular, schizophrenic sufferers.’42 But crucially, these spooky irruptions 
are not assimilable as the mere delusions of a single, damaged focalising 
consciousness. If these are mere hallucinations, then they are collective ones that 
extend to the reader too. These are visions which, when called upon to verify, the 
author consistently absents themselves. Endowed with such an intensity of feeling, 
these objects seem to take on an atavistic life of their own, which begs the question: 
do such depictions reflect a kind of materio-mysticism or are they merely solipsistic 
fantasy? Quin’s Three, like other Anglo-French fictions of the period, defers its 
answer, instead calling into question the perceptual relationship the self and the 
world. The ‘perceptual instability’ of these fictions, as Jacqueline Rose writes of 
Bowen, shakes ‘our confidence that there is a world which, simply by looking at it, is 
there to be seen.’43 As Iris Murdoch, in an interview in 1978, comments in response 
to being reminded of the title of ‘the Mrs Radcliffe de nos jours’, which was bestowed 
upon her by the critic A.L. Rowse on account of her ‘Gothic fantasies and unreal 
horrors’: 
 
I don’t know what these “unreal horrors” are that he’s speaking of. It is 
ordinary life that I’m talking about which after all is full of horrors.44 
 
The secret monstrosity that lies within us also makes itself known in the way that 
fictional characters talk. Perhaps most notably in the conversation novels of Green 
and Compton Burnett – which are composed almost entirely of direct discourse, 
supplemented with the thinnest of stage direction – conversation is the earthly agent 
of internal disorder. For all its ‘commonplace appearance’, Sarraute writes, 
conversation is the ‘daily, insidious and very effective weapon responsible for 
countless minor crimes’.45 It is always silently appended, she explains, by a 
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communicative register that she designates as “sub-conversation”. Dialogue, 
Sarraute argues, is merely the outward extrusion of the inner life that she conceives 
as taking place on the frontiers of consciousness. In her terms, conversation, in the 
realm of external reality, sets off a tropistic reaction at the level of sub-conversation, 
which, in turn, is projected externally as dialogue.  
For the characters within these novels, conversation is, as Green puts it, 
‘beautifully inadequate to their condition’.46 But although it cannot convey it, 
conversation can, nonetheless, communicate the vast, latent reservoir of the unsaid 
that accompanies every speech act. Parapractic and ever prone to slippage, 
dialogue reflects the constant negotiations of the private, fragmented self with the 
other. With its preverbal impulses and unspoken sentiments, conversation always 
conveys more or less than what is said; the intersubjective encounter becomes the 
scene of countless mutual (mis)recognitions. Ruth and Leonard’s everyday 
conversations are a doublespeak of the stock phrases and clichés of a 
claustrophobic kind of middle-class domesticity: pet names and flummery, barely 
concealed resentment, passive aggression and barbed comments about one 
another’s drinking: 
 
Aren’t you going out then? What’s the point? I thought you wanted to. Like a 
drink now? That’s the third you’ve poured out Leon. All right Sherlock envious 
have one do you good relax for Godsake and sit down. I drank too much last 
night still quite headachey think I’ll take one of my pills. Drink might do it love 
you haven’t a migraine one have you? A little nothing to worry about. Where 
are your pills Ruth you know you should take them as soon as… Upstairs be 
a pet and get them will you? (3) 
 
Undifferentiated and scarcely punctuated, speech is without rhythm or 
emphasis and riddled with mid-sentence anacolutha that blur one voice with another. 
Quin’s unpunctuated sentences are certainly not Joyce’s. They connote not the 
breathless, word-tripping discharge of vibrancy and human vitality of Molly Bloom, 
but the mere monotone accretion of banality upon banality. Ruth and Leonard’s 
conversations are shammed intersubjectivity, the exchange of a phony communality, 
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all too frequently misheard, misinterpreted, misarticulated and misremembered: ‘I 
never said that – never. Sorry thought you had.’ (3) Hardly speech acts at all, their 
attempt to mime human connection merely connotes its opposite. As in Sarraute’s 
novels, in Three it is the very cliché formulae that Ruth and Leonard appeal to with 
which to mime human connection that, in fact, reveals their unutterable solitude, their 
solipsistic plight. 
 
 
‘Some Life if You Can’t Even Read Them’ 
 
Tellingly, in Three, people only say what they mean when they are alone. Together, 
engaged in the embodied, dialogic exchange of meaning, they are always the 
unreliable narrators of their own lives, whilst in the disembodied voices that emanate 
from their journals and audio diaries we glimpse the truth. ‘You look for one thing… 
and you frequently find another’47 advises Muriel Spark in Memento Mori. And 
nowhere is this truer than in the illicit reading of diaries, especially in fiction. Other 
people’s diaries are where we, and the characters in novels, look to catch 
clandestine and revelatory glimpses of others’ private selves. These are selves that 
are mediated, to be sure, ones textually constructed, rendered with varying degrees 
of fictionality, literariness, reflexivity and self-censorship and perhaps, even, written 
in the tacit acknowledgement of a potential audience. But still we assume that the 
textual self constructed within this “private” writing is more unified and more 
authentic than the “real” one that we enact for others, our public face. This is not so 
in the case of S.’s diary, which provides ‘not a word not a clue’ (116). As Ruth says, 
in what might be read as an arch dig at the often baffled critical reception of Quinian 
irrealis: ‘There’s a life here all right. Some life if you can’t even read them Leon. I 
prefer to listen. Still it’s difficult to follow the way she says things…’ (51). 
S.’s diary, then, apparently reveals nothing disturbing but somehow disturbs 
everything. It depicts the events of the previous summer in that characteristically 
Quinian undecidable and equivocal mode of expressionist rendition that blurs 
memory, perception and fantasy, focalised through divided selves that posit and then 
swiftly erase their shifting imagos of the world. S.’s narrative consistently defers the 
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private revelations of introspection. In the final passages, toying elusively with the 
idea of suicide, she decides that ‘to write it down would almost be like performing the 
action itself’, that it is ‘better to let it nurture.’ (139) S. suffers that characteristically 
Quinian belatedness: ‘All seems now a dream, attempts at piecing together, and 
other dreams only are remembered.’ (139) She realises her quest for recognition has 
an ‘[a]lmost accidental’ genesis: ‘An unconscious action at the time. Only afterwards 
the predetermined appreciated.’ (139) S.’s diaries offer not a secret aperture upon an 
authentic self, but draw us within only in order to look outwards through her 
focalising consciousness upon the external world. In Three, as in the rest of her 
novels, S. narrates from the bifurcated perspective of a Laingian divided self that is 
trapped in the intercessory space between thought and action, the mind disengaged, 
ruminating voyeuristically upon a scene from which it is far removed, an onlooker 
upon a surrogate embodied self which it deploys into the world. S., like Berg, is an 
inveterate schemer. She ‘hang[s] over many desultory designs, toy[s] with 
subterfuges.’ (56) As in this earlier novel, in Three a disembodied “true” self lies in 
wait, ‘[m]antis-like’, planning ‘[m]anipulations they must never be aware of’. This self 
is a would-be tyrant, a hyperconscious megalomaniac with fantasies of omnipotence 
which is metaphorised as a ‘figure monstrous in shape chiselled from soft 
substances’ from which thoughts are ‘chipped out’ and are realised metaphorically 
as ‘titbits’ thrown benevolently to her hungry quarry. ‘My certainty’, she decides, 
‘shall be their confusion.’ (53) 
This “true” self is, in turn, under siege from the manipulations of the external 
world from which it seeks to preserve its integrity:  
 
Attempts at censoring any desire to think what should be felt. This is the most 
difficult. So conditioned are the reflexes they become part of the 
mausoleum… (56) 
 
Into the life-world S. deploys a false, embodied self that is detached and felt as 
merely one object amongst others, ‘almost a shadow’ (62), in fact. She is an 
onlooker upon herself, she ‘hear[s] [her]self talk, laugh’ (57). Looking in the mirror 
she is ‘startled by [her] own reflection a carved face in the middle of a stone wall’ 
(60). S.’s disembodied self lacks all sense of a presence in the world, she is a voyeur 
upon a scene that lacks all sense of solidity and substantiality. And outside, the 
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social milieu of the ‘bourgeois stronghold’ depicted within S.’s diaries is peopled with 
mummies, ‘[s]hadow players’ on ‘revolving stages’ (56), ‘new dolls’ (57) and 
marionettes that ‘[d]angle from waxed strings’ (19). Here the players rehearse 
‘repertoires never exhausted’ (57), ‘[hoping] for the others to take their cue’ (57), in a 
desperate masque of the normalcy that scarcely disguises the perilous void of reality 
beneath. Social transactions are military manoeuvres, each party busily working at 
their ‘areas of chosen colour’ from the ‘bases they had secured’ (56) upon the 
battlefield of social life.  
During a heat wave, S. perceives people suddenly roused from this state of 
somnambulant dissociation. Their ‘faces seem more expansive… aware of their 
bodies, their surroundings, in a heightened way.’ But this state of receptivity and 
openness ‘hardly lasted, and soon everyone started to grumble.’ (141) At the beach, 
she finds an appropriate metaphor for her two-level topography of the real. She 
paddles in cold breakwaters, watching children build and re-build sandcastles which, 
like the characters’ fabrications of reality, are repeatedly engulfed and felled by the 
‘dark eddies’ of the tide. Fed by sewage pipes, the sea creates ‘mucous masses’ 
which suspends alluvial rubbish. It seems to ‘[shift] as though by some underground 
motivation’ (55). ‘No sooner,’ she writes, ‘had one construction fallen, or been 
pushed over, than another one was quickly put together’ (55). She dares Leonard to 
take off his shoes and join her; Ruth has retreated to the cliffs. He, it seems, has 
shared her metaphorical vision. He ‘shudders’, equivocates, ‘locked in some quiet 
confusion of his own’ (55) and returns to shore. For in Quin’s writing, objective 
correlatives have not only symbolic power. ‘Emotions’ also have the capacity to 
‘outweigh surrounding matter’ (56). They are externalisations of the psyche given 
form, substantiated, and thus endowed with an animistic power and, once shared, 
they threaten to usurp the frail quotidian. 
S.’s gaze is as keen as an anthropologist’s, then, but one keenly attuned to 
and privileged with the ability to decode the secret significance of every gesture, 
every movement, every facial expression: 
 
A time ago I was more vulnerable to my own reactions, responses, taking into 
account only what others might say, voice inflections, gestures dismissed. But 
after a series of mime lessons, with masks, I realised how much can be 
interpreted by mere movement. How easy it is to camouflage with a flux of 
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innuendos. The habitual nervousness of animals, but never so predictable. 
(62) 
 
She notes the way they ‘pamper’ their cigars, fiddle with lighters, stroke the stems of 
their liquor glasses (57). These actions are fleeting betrayals of their true selves 
which intimate a more solid, and more menacing, realm below the surface of the 
real’s wearied performance. At length, her privileged perspective reveals the truth of 
the bourgeois illusion: the abscesses, the plastic surgery, the fertility treatment that 
are its scaffolding, making explicit what remains hinted at, half-glimpsed, in the main 
narrative.  
 
 
Quin’s Phenomenology of Desire 
 
For Quin, like Merleau-Ponty, sex is the paradigmatic encounter of human 
intersubjective relations and state of human corporeality, rather than, as it is for 
psychoanalysis, a hidden substructure of human life. In the ‘linking of body to body’, 
Merleau-Ponty writes in his study of sexuality, ‘desire comprehends blindly’48. 
‘Blindly’, that is, in the Hegelian sense of a comprehension that operates prior to the 
order of understanding, where the contents of experience are subsumed by 
cognition. Sexual perception is an ‘erotic comprehension’49 that offers access to the 
presence and fullness of embodied experience in the awareness of ourselves as, at 
once, autonomous and dependent subjects. 
Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualisation of the universality of bodily experience and 
libidinised perception has, unsurprisingly, been subject to feminist critique by 
thinkers like Judith Butler (“Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description: A 
Feminist Critique of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception”) Luce Irigaray 
(“The Invisible of the Flesh”) and Linda Martin Alcoff (“Merleau-Ponty and Feminist 
Theory on Experience”), amongst others. Whilst Merleau-Ponty purports to offer ‘a 
view of sexuality freed from naturalistic ideology’, writes Butler, in fact his thinking 
‘contains tacit normative assumptions about the heterosexual character of 
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sexuality’.50 For all his notion of libidinal perception apparently seeks to emphasise 
ontological ambiguity, openness and reversibility, she argues, it is modelled upon a 
gender-coded master-slave dialectic and, in fact, reiterates the unethical and 
unproductive dichotomies of sexual binaries. In this way, Butler argues, Merleau-
Ponty’s existential phenomenology ‘manages to reify cultural relations between the 
sexes… by calling them “essential” or “metaphysical”.’51 These relations, as Simone 
de Beauvoir explains in The Second Sex, are by no means innate or organic but are 
socially conditioned. She dismisses the assumption that frigidity is an exemplary act 
of female passivity and therefore associated with some essentially female state of 
objecthood. It is, instead, for de Beauvoir, a meaningful gesture reflective of ‘the 
complexity of the feminine situation’,52 a symbolic act of active female resistance to 
male domination and cultural oppression and therefore indicative of unjust power 
relations. Similarly, male domination by no means follows from some metaphysical 
“maleness”, but issues from the man’s freedom to ‘assume [awareness of his body] 
easily and with pride in its desires.’53 
 Whilst conceptually invested in the liberatory possibilities of a Merleau-
Pontian ideal of libidinal perception, Quin’s exploration of sex and states of 
embodiment in Three shares Butler and Irigaray et al.’s scepticism about its hidden 
assumptions and seeks to imagine alternative possibilities. In Quin’s novels, 
marriage is merely the formalisation, with dresses and rings, of these cultural 
relations between the sexes, the lashing together of master and slave in wedlock to 
forever play out their power struggle. And accordingly for Quin, within the 
sanctioned, normative sex of marriage, there can be no access to the embodied 
subjectivity of erotic comprehension. Within marriage, sex is, at best, the reluctantly 
embarked upon and mutually dissatisfying discharge of marital obligations, a 
skirmish in the marital power play conducted via the gendered codes of male 
domineering concupiscence and female resistant frigidity that only serves to 
underline the couple’s estrangement. ‘You always have to get sexy in the bath 
Leon… You must admit it’s hardly the time or the place’ (44), Ruth complains. At 
worst, sex is sexualised violence, in which the man overcomes his female spouse’s 
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resistance through force: ‘Going to fuck you fuck you fuck you until… She screamed 
out as he went deeper in.’ (128). 
Although the text pulses with a chaos of erotic energies, sexual desire in 
Three is always misdirected, unreciprocated, frustrated or, if realised at all, then 
discharged destructively. Sex in Three is frequently depicted as the mere desperate 
attempt to stage connection by compulsively re-enacting this paradigmatic encounter 
of intersubjective human relations. In one extraordinary sex scene, told in parallel 
alternating paragraphs – a device Quin frequently uses in Three to foreground the 
psychic distance between Ruth and Leonard – the couple separately embark upon a 
kind of erotic intercourse with objects. 
Ruth dresses and undresses, festoons herself with jewellery, flings herself 
into a mountain of clothes: 
 
Her tongue slithered over lower lip, drew it in. She licked the beads, replaced 
them on the extended nipples, her head thrown back, knees parted, pressed 
into the carpet, feet together. (12-13) 
 
Here Quin literalises the libidinal metaphor. Caressed, poked, fondled, rubbed, 
stroked: for Ruth objects are always fetish-objects, the neurotic repositories of a 
paraphiliac desire endowed with an erotic significance. Ernest Dichter, the father of 
motivation research, describes our ‘every-increasing intimacy with objects’: 
 
The objects which surround us to not simply have utilitarian aspects; rather 
they serve as a kind of mirror which reflects our own image. Objects which 
surround us permit us to discover more and more about ourselves.54 
 
This, argues Jean Baudrillard in his The System of Objects, constitutes the ‘new 
humanism of consumption’: 
 
The thesis is simple: (1) the consumer society (objects, products, advertising) 
offers the individual the possibility, for the first time in history, of total liberation 
and self-realization; (2) transcending consumption pure and simple in the 
                                                          
54
 Ernest Dichter, The Strategy of Desire (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 2004), 91. 
160 
 
direction of the individual and collective self-expression, the system of 
consumption constitutes a true language, a new culture.55  
 
In Ruth’s narcissistic desire for the spoils of bourgeois materialism, Quin depicts 
Marcuse’s ‘repressive desublimation’ of libidinal desires captured, misdirected and 
channelled onto the accoutrements of consumer capitalism. This desire is policed 
and regulated, and serves only to affirm the status quo.  
Leonard, meanwhile, has a thing for orchids. He turns the pages of his 
horticultural catalogues as furtively as if it had been Playboy. He retreats to his 
greenhouse, hot, damp, dark and heady where the plants ‘sucked and dripped 
around and above’ (12). A ‘bee orchid leaned over… touched his mouth’ (11), he ‘ran 
a finger along stems, pink against pink laid there’ (12), ‘[t]ips of red and purple 
dipped, shrivelled in the darkness’ (12), ‘he parted leaves. Thrust through’ (12), 
‘tongues striped, tilted towards him’ (12) he ‘pressed the earth in, smoothed over’ 
(12). Leonard ‘murmured with pleasure, sometimes sighed… His fingers trembled. 
His body sloped. Face flushed in the one stream of light.’ (12) 
The disordered subject of William Sansom’s earlier mid-century novel, The 
Body (1949), is also an amateur botanist, who, like Leonard, putters about in his 
suburban garden harbouring barely-concealed megalomaniacal fantasies and 
paranoid delusions. In Quin’s novel and in Sansom’s botanical themes bring together 
the period’s ambivalence about scientific rationality and the vexed figure of the 
scientist with a Freudian protoplasmic vision of existence which draws upon 
Sarraute’s vegetal metaphors for the dark side of consciousness and Sartre’s inquiry 
into the significative basis of the slimy in the final chapter of his Being and 
Nothingness (1943). Sarraute and Sartre, Jennifer Willging neatly has it, are 
‘partners in slime’.56 Both argue that an authentic human intersubjectivity – one that 
is never simply benignly communicative, but always fraught and perilous – is forged 
in this primordial region, only to be forced apart by the entry into the linguistic. Sartre 
shares what he acutely identifies as Sarraute’s ‘protoplasmic vision of our inner 
universe’, filled with ‘running discharges, slobbering, mucous, hesitant, amoeba-like 
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movement’ in his introduction to her novel, Portrait of a Man Unknown.57 For Sartre, 
our horror of slime relates to its psychic significance. He argues that ‘the slimy’ 
represents the ‘revenge of the in-itself’: the simultaneous promise of transcendence 
and the threat of stagnation which thereby reveals the impossibility of transcending 
oneself.   
Like Leonard, Henry Bishop, the narrator of Sansom’s novel, is a keen 
amateur naturalist, seeking respite in the garden away from the house with its ‘ivy, 
strangling everything’.58 Nostalgic for the ‘great age of scientific belief’, there he 
discovers ‘a certain solidity, a certainty, a diligent sense of inquiry that I find missing 
in my life nowadays’.59 In both Three and The Body, there is something terrible about 
horticulture: it is portrayed as a scientifically mediated erotic obsession, a desire for 
the unknowable that is sublimated into sadism. This attempt to “play god”, to impose 
reason and order upon the dark side of consciousness, can be seen in the following 
passage, which depicts Henry executing a fly: 
 
[C]arefully prod, no tickle – tickle the long dead leg on the leaf… down by the 
ivy I was secure, nothing to disturb the secret moment…That squat syringe 
filled with brown glutinous killer armed me powerfully; still – it was forbidden, 
naughty to play with flies, embarrassing an adult to be uncovered at such 
play. Close there to the leaves, with the world contracted and all small things 
made huge as in the first world of private garden games, I could see the 
gothic melancholy of last year’s cobwebs hung with mortar dust on the dark 
wall underneath the ivy. A fearful place – but the dragon slept unmoved in 
such forest quiet, in the faint luminous mixture of shade and reflected sunlight. 
Then huge, bullying, god-like, I drew back the piston of the syringe.60 
 
Whilst conventional desire, for Quin, is always frustrated, or manipulated, or 
discharged onto objects or mediated with terrible consequences, illicit, adulterous 
sex, by liberating desire from the perpetual frustrations of lordship and bondage, 
offers access to a truly, albeit fleetingly, embodied subjectivity. “Free love” practiced 
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outside the dualistic strictures of marriage and conducted according to the 
transgressive logic of three offers access to a mode of existence where the private 
consciousness and the physical body can be finally re-conjoined. In Three, perhaps 
more so than in any of her other novels, there occur erotic moments of a kind of 
(textual) bliss in which it seems her characters finally lose themselves, that they cast 
off the fixity of identity and liberate themselves from their minds and their bodies to 
achieve such a state of ambiguity and indeterminacy. At times, heady deluges of 
text, suffused with affective rhythms and erotic jouissance, create sense of unity and 
of sublime submission coupled with the affirmation – with echoes of Molly Bloom’s 
final words – of a fluid and equivocal sense of identity and of the facticity of 
existence: 
 
Hurt me hurt 
me hurt me 
there 
here 
anywhere. This way. If you like. Talk to me talk. 
Talk 
to 
me  
Was it like this with 
Never before. Not like this. No one has touched me ever 
never never 
like this. Before. Like waves. The coming 
slowly. Dual roles 
realised. Yes yes 
yes 
Be a boy. If you like. Anything. Be 
Just be. (114) 
 
It cannot be sustained, however. Even having attained a state of delicious 
post-coital indeterminacy, in which S. and her lover are ‘invisible’, no longer self-
divided, at last ‘[c]ontained in [their] bodies… that had crossed borders never 
realised’ S. realises that ‘soon it would evaporate’ and become ‘something that 
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would be impossible to recall’ (142). And ‘[a]ttempting to hold onto the smell of each 
other… the sense of touch, fantasies re-explored’ the couple fuck in the frenzied 
attempt to avert inter- and intra-subjective dislocation, in the attempt to sustain the 
moment, in the hope that ‘this could last like this’ (142): 
 
Have you tried it with three? Have you? Be three now. And incest? Whip me 
with your hair. Let me come between your breasts. In your mouth. Ear. (142) 
 
But they do so no longer in pursuit of the jouissance of the limitless and 
ecstatic flow between two blissfully embodied subjects, but by engaging in edgy and 
transgressive sexual acts seek to reconfirm the existence of the body by literally 
forcing it into feeling through the giving and receiving of bodily pain and degradation 
in order to reunite their pathologically Cartesian selves by force and thereby prove 
their existence. Sex is like this for Quin: the transitory pleasure which is the object of 
a perpetual want and which we attempt to recover through pain. In this way “free 
love”, the transgressive and clandestine desire of illicit sex, amounts to much to 
same thing as its legitimate counterpart. Sex, then, for Quin, although the life-
strategy her characters most often make recourse to in the attempt to re-conjoin 
mind and body, and then, via the joining of self-body with self-body, to reconcile the 
self and the external world, serves to underline their distance, and their solipsistic 
alienation from one another and the world.  
And in Three, as in Passages, these fleeting moments of full and vital 
embodiment are starkly juxtaposed against resonant images of bodies that have 
been desiccated and torn asunder. S., for example, encounters a ‘party of cripples’ 
on the beach: ‘[a] few men without arms were in the water’ (143). The female 
protagonist of Passages swim with and is groped by a war veteran with ‘[b]roken 
black teeth, one side of his face scarred, one eye hung down, met his cheek covered 
with black hairs’ and his ‘arms cut off at the elbows’ (20), his ‘patterned stumps’ 
which fondle her like ‘two animals’ (21). In the placing of these bodies side-by-side, 
Quin implies the dreadful irony in the analogy between those, on the one hand, that 
are bodily “incomplete” and yet nonetheless fully embodied (in the Merleau-Pontian 
sense), vital, unified and desirous and, on the other, the “complete” body that has 
been psychically amputated, rent apart from the mind. 
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Revealing Mysteries 
 
So, as one review of the novel asked: what became of S.?61 The text, certainly, 
remains undecidable. By enacting what Bernard Duyfhuizen has called the ‘drama of 
intertextuality’62 as a detective investigation, Three evokes the witnessing structure 
where meaning is forged communally in the fictionalised gathering together of the 
threads of disparate accounts. But here there are no such congruencies. As the 
novel ends, S. is preparing to drown herself in a mountain lake: 
 
The boat is ready, as planned. And all that’s necessary now is a note. I know 
nothing will change. (143) 
 
S. seems stoically resigned to an inexorable fate. She accepts that, according 
to the symbolic logic of her quandary, like all good literary madwomen, having failed 
in her quest to reveal the truth of the illusion and her desire perpetually frustrated 
she must, necessarily, sacrifice herself by surrendering to the dark and primitive 
forces that lay beneath the quotidian. Forces that are here, as they are so often and 
so significantly in Quin, symbolised by bodies of water, with their mythic 
ambivalence, their simultaneous threat of engulfment and promise of dissolution. But 
ambiguity persists, has even been accounted for by S. in the planning of her death: 
‘How easy for a body to drift out, caught up in a current, and never be discovered, or 
for anyone to ever be certain.’ (139) Although heavily foreshadowed and alluded to, 
her intention is never fully articulated. Closure proper within a first-person narrative 
of suicide is, of course, impossible; notwithstanding posthumous narration, such an 
ending must necessarily occur outside of text. But still, uncanny echoes seem to 
contradict the projected conclusion of Three, seeming to imply a murder, and to 
implicate Leonard as her murderer. He watches apparently incognito as she meets 
and talks to the band of men who had assaulted him in their garden. Perhaps, then, 
he suspected her of subterfuge? Certainly in the closing passages of the novel he 
pauses – perhaps significantly? – over a newspaper report of the murder of an 
unidentified woman at the Sugarloaf mountain, near to where S. had planned to 
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commit suicide (131). And Ruth in her diary confesses her own murderous designs 
upon S. recalling: 
 
The time when we were on the bed together, her white neck, hadn’t my 
fingers felt a strange tingling sensation, as though they were someone else’s 
hands, a murderer’s hands grafted? (125) 
 
On the other, more implicit, scandal of the novel – that of whether Ruth’s 
suspicions of Leonard’s adultery with S. were justified – the novel also remains 
inconclusive. Ruth’s diary records: ‘there is nothing definite to go on. No substantial 
evidence as it were.’ (124) S.’s own is filled with erotically charged depictions of 
snatched trysts with an anonymous lover under waterfalls, in caves after dark, in 
hotel rooms, in ‘places that replace the boundaries of bed, floor, walls’, but Leonard 
is never named. Significantly, S.’s description of erotic bliss, which first appears in 
her journal, and is echoed soon after, almost word-for-word, in Leonard’s audio 
diary, provides the only moment of textual congruence in the novel, the only point at 
which the accounts intersect and therefore the only answer to the mystery posed by 
the text, seeming to confirm Ruth (and our) suspicions that the final third apex of 
their triangular relationship was conjoined. In sex, then, they finally attain a kind of 
fleeting certainty, an experience authentically shared and communally forged.  
But it remains unclear whether these encounters belong to the realm of 
reality, of fantasy, or of dreams. Within the diary’s heady and disorientating textual 
flux, what is representation and what is metarepresentation is impossible to 
distinguish. The boundary where the mind ends and the world begins has been 
effaced. The objects of the world and the objects of the mind all “appear” along the 
same indefinable perceptual plane, all rendered in the same irregular condensed 
conjugations that frequently lack the verb “to be” that describe without bestowing 
existence upon. They are told in the present tense, but it’s unclear whether S. is 
constructing an onanistic fantasy, reconstructing a dream or reliving a memory. And, 
moreover, even when memory-states are explicitly that, recalled in repose past 
experiences seem more like dreams. The quicksilver of experience, its presence, 
once consigned to memory, is forgotten. Recall constitutes the simultaneous 
comprehension and disintegration of experience: ’Leaving gaps / as sleep. In an 
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afternoon.’ (111) Fragmentary, irrecoverable with ‘[p]arts lost like stolen flowers 
dropped on the way back.’ (111) 
By the end of the novel, the false selves that Ruth and Leonard have crafted 
with which to confront a publicly verifiable reality do finally and irrevocably crumble. 
The statuettes that appear as a motif throughout the book for the couple’s petrified 
selves are found by Ruth having been trodden into tiny pieces: ‘she tried placing 
them together, but found some could not be joined for some were missing’ (82). 
However, Quin in no sense romantically valorises S.’s “great refusal”, her pursuit and 
final destructive embrace of the void. Pressing the logic of the phenomenological 
bases of the theories of social constructedness that pervaded the thought of the 
period, Quin depicts the profound solitude of a life conducted in that private world of 
the percepts that S. calls, in an allusion to the Platonic allegory, a ‘[c]ave of our own 
making’ (61). Three, with its open form, its dissonance, contradictions and 
incomprehensibility, is a meditation upon the tragedy of human solipsism. The sifted 
fragments of the narrative reveal three protagonists that co-exist in private worlds. Its 
dialogic threesome dramatises the plight of human intersubjective relations, where 
the inner life and the outer world can never be reconciled. Humans are insulated, 
opaque beings, irretrievably destined to be strangers not only to one another but also 
to themselves.  
If life inside the Lebenswelt is lonely and fraught with unutterable menaces, 
then life outside it is lonelier still. For Quin, transgression is never simply a benign 
liberation of happy and harmonious consciousnesses. Three, like her later novel 
Passages, by no means unproblematically endorses the ‘polymorphous’ sexuality it 
depicts. Both novels examine the destructive, self-shattering implications of the 
countercultural theories of sexual liberation that permeated the thought of the time. 
Quin is by no means convinced about the possibilities of liberating desire. She is, in 
a sense, a classical Freudian; her protagonists’ inner lives are well beyond 
reclamation, their disordered desires the product not of scientific rationality but 
immanent in the structure of the subject itself. The pursuit of the myriad erotic 
possibilities of transcending the self are in Quin shown to be mere onanistic 
phantasy.  
On the one hand, Three depicts the struggle of the self to articulate – and, 
even prior to this, to apprehend in the moment – those forms of experience that, by 
definition, cannot be brought to speech. And on the other it depicts, on the part of the 
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other, the failure of textual understanding and impossibility of interpretation. In the 
ways in which it, both internally and externally, promises but does not deliver the 
unveiling of a secret, Three is an allegory of interpretation or, more properly, of 
unreadability. In this way, the novel is what J. Hillis Miller calls an ‘uncanny text’,63 
one which metafictionally enacts the all-too-human search for an “ideal reader” and a 
fictional analogue for Quin’s own predicament as an “experimental” writer, which 
reflects her authorly anxieties (and ambivalence) about being understood.  
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The Map and the Territory of Liberation in Passages 
 
As it had been for successive generations of refuseniks before them, in the sixties, 
the process of “finding oneself” was not just an inner quest, but one embarked upon 
outwardly too. If, as R.D. Laing proposes in his The Politics of Experience (1967), 
reality and fantasy, perception and imagination, experience and memory, were 
simply ‘different ‘modalities of experience, none more “inner” or “outer” than any 
other’,1, then the metaphysical search would also be a geographical one. Those who 
could not wait for utopia to manifest followed predecessors like Byron, Gauguin, 
Lawrence, Miller and Burroughs and countless others in seeking their promised land 
someplace else. By inducing disorientation and alienation through exiling oneself 
from home, one could catalyse the psychic epiphanies of self-transformation, or else, 
discover a world whose lineaments made a more hospitable setting for a different 
way of life. Accordingly, by the mid-seventies, hippie enclaves had sprung up on the 
by now inchoately post-colonial peripheries of empire and the geographical fringes of 
the West: in North Africa, especially Morocco, for example, in India, Thailand and, 
closer to home, in Greece and along the west coast of the United States.  
Like Lawrence Durrell, Quin sought the spiritual antipodes – both psychic and 
physical – of Britain, and eked out a hand-to-mouth living from her Calder & Boyars 
advances, Arts Council grants and the occasional book prize and fellowship to fund 
extended sorties to Ireland, Greece, the U.S., the Bahamas and Mexico. The region 
she sought, she admitted, would not be found on the map. In art, as in life, Quin’s 
bearings were set for the region she calls, in an allusion to George Eliot’s Daniel 
Deronda, the ‘unmapped country’, a phrase which became the title of her final novel, 
which remained unpublished at the time of her death. Quin’s 1967 book, Passages, 
is set in one such place. It is a picaresque in which two questing lovers maraud 
across a terra incognita of both map and mind. She, like Antigone, is looking for her 
brother who has gone missing from a detention camp and is presumed dead. He, 
meanwhile, is in search of himself. A self-fashioning existential hero, his quest is 
Sisyphean. He has ‘an argument to follow through’, one ‘he must endur[e]… without 
any hope for an answer’.2 Their quests are linked. Both are seeking to climb out of 
the quotidian: she to defy the limits imposed by home and state, he the frontiers 
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imposed by the bounded self. In both mood and form Passages bears resemblance 
to the existential Bonnie and Clyde narratives of Jean-Luc Godard’s cinematic 
period: The Little Soldier (1960, released 1963), Breathless (1960) and Pierrot le Fou 
(1965). The novel chronicles its unnamed protagonists’ parallel quests.  
Her search is continually thwarted by the machinations of a truly Kafkaesque 
bureaucracy. Although the couple’s bearings are set for transcendence, as in 
Godard’s films, the political present lurks around every corner: 
 
They spoke at times in a dialect we didn’t understand. We were 
misinterpreted. Information given in exchange for money, clothes, cigarettes, 
drink. We were misinformed… She knew it was impossible. She remained. (7-
8)  
 
He, equally, is ‘completely lost in this country – this climate’ (31). The novel follows 
his sexual adventures and misadventures as he frequents the bacchic rituals and 
sadomasochistic orgies of a bohemian underworld in the attempt to invoke Dionysus, 
to induce a ‘madness he almost wants’ (62):  
 
Women in backless dresses, they paid little attention to the men, talked 
amongst themselves. Shrieked with laughter. The men smoked, talked of the 
navy, army, wars and cars… Each room had the latest fashionable paintings, 
illuminated from lights under. From balcony city lights fingered the sky. (23) 
 
Writers and thinkers have frequently drawn upon the links between the terrain 
of the consciousness and that of cartography to figure psychic, social and cultural 
transgression in geographical terms. Lacking a language with which to describe what 
might lie beyond the limits of the human – that which, necessarily, lies beyond 
language – writers imaginatively invent spatial metaphorisations of other realms and 
regions – be they worldly or otherworldly – to stand for the distant objects of our 
metaphysical drives, the aterritorial freedoms of romantic exile. Metaphors of self-
exile – or, more appropriately, self-banishment – of nomadism and of 
deterritorialization have been deployed by writers and thinkers throughout history, 
but perhaps most notably within the Romantic and the Gothic traditions, during the 
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Modernist period and later by the many legatees of oeuvre of Gilles Deleuze, for 
their earthly echo of the transcendental. 
In the writing of the long sixties, the quest for liberation, as it had been for 
their modernist predecessors, was frequently imagined as a “savage pilgrimage”. 
Taking what is perhaps the ur-text of this tendency, Jack Kerouac’s On the Road, as 
their map, in many sixties novels the quest for liberation is frequently imagined as a 
Dionysian odyssey of travel, drugs and erotic deviance. In novels like Lawrence 
Durrell’s The Alexandria Quartet (1960) and John Fowles’ The Magus (1966), for 
example, for the ways in which they proffer but then rescind their elusive promise of 
a Lawrentian encounter with some lost, primitive unity that might redeem the 
fragmentary and destabilised subject of modernity, these Orients function as the 
paradigmatic loci of the existential encounter. Like Camus’ Algiers, with its 
‘paralysing’ abundance and  the ‘violent throbbing of the two o’clock sun’ which 
afford a sense of being-in-the-world apparently without consolation,3 these are 
places whose attendant myths of authenticity are revealed to be, in fact, just one of 
the many fictional constructs with which we mediate our relationship with the world. 
Crucially, and unlike their forebears, these characters are not on the run from 
Western rationality, but towards it. They “return” to Durrell’s Alexandria and Fowles’ 
Phraxos to implore the cradles of civilisation to yield some authentic truth that has 
been lost to modernity. But in both cases, in the end, their protagonists, like Quin’s in 
Passages, are forced to accept the phenomenal and political limitations of the self 
and to acknowledge the delusory nature of their freedoms. 
Passages’ geographical setting is an island archipelago and mainland coast 
that is arid and sand-blown and beaten by a constant midday sun. Naming it is, of 
course, beside the point: the ‘city… might be any city’ (12), the ‘illusion… is the most 
real thing here’ (43). For the protagonists of Passages, as for their ‘fellow bankrupts’ 
in the novels of Durrell and Fowles, place is inscrutable, pregnant with an 
indecipherable significance, but in the end functions only as that upon which they 
project myths of brutal vitality and orgiastic sensuality that are discovered, in the end, 
to be mere moral sun-blindness. With its poverty, its amputee peasants, its war-torn 
landscapes, bullet hole pockmarks, detention camps, prisoner beatings and 
authoritarian state control, Passages’ setting might be Greece under the military 
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junta of 1967-1974. Quin explores, but – ever morally ambiguous – stops short of 
explicitly indicting the decadence, the unforgiveable hubris of these neo-colonials.  
In this chapter, I will explore the ways in which in Passages Quin interrogates 
the ambivalence of the liberation project. Here, where Dionysian spectacle and 
authoritarian tyranny co-exist cheek-by-jowl, there seems to be little distinction 
between the sadomasochistic orgies and the bacchic rituals enacted by the travellers 
and the political torture and rape inflicted upon the region’s native inhabitants. They 
shrink in horror from beggars, ‘who could not be ignored, though their faces were 
part of the wall they leaned against’ (15-6), but not from the whip. He considers 
employing the services of a child prostitute. Quin demonstrates that limitless 
freedoms and unbounded tyranny amount to much the same thing. The quest to 
‘transcend the limits of the possible’ always involves the exploitation of suffering – 
both their own and others’. And, crucially, whilst men are able to enjoy the 
bacchanal’s temporary respite from reason, women have no such luxury. This 
chapter will examine how Passages, in its figure of the Janus-faced picaro, examines 
the gendered paradigms of liberation and thereby problematizes the political and 
personal efficacy of the liberation project. For the protagonists, the surrender of 
reason is a dangerous experience of self-dispossession. As Quin’s protagonists 
edge the abyss, courting, willing the divine madness that promises an ecstatic 
ascent from quotidian life, there is no sense of the limitless possibilities, the anarchic 
productivity, the jouissance, that characterises the post-structuralist vision of 
liberation. The protagonists’ metaphysical quest is shown, on the one hand, to be 
just as hubristic and as futile as its opposite and, on the other, to be self-distressing 
and perilous. 
 
 
Folie à Deux 
 
The novel is narrated from the two enmeshed perspectives of two lovers which, at 
length, begin to merge. Hers, on the one hand, describes the submission of an 
unbounded self to its disordered and disorderly yearnings. His, on the other, is a 
hypertrophied, introspective and acutely self-reflexive awareness. The woman’s 
narrative continually oscillates between first- and third-person, devolving subjecthood 
to objecthood, perceiver to the perceived. Hers is a radically embodied 
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consciousness for whom the boundary between self and other, inner and outer, are 
blurred. A self that both orders and is ordered by the external world, that dissolves 
outwards to commune with the objects of its desires: ‘[s]hapes suiting [her] fancy’ (5) 
and shapes that ‘shaped her moods’ (19). Her account is a series of discontinuous 
and fragmentary vignettes, enfluxed by jump cuts which Quin, like Godard, uses to 
forge metonymic links between discrete events; to suspend a moment, or a thought, 
infinitely or to depict, almost simultaneously, the occurrence of an event and its 
opposite placing both under erasure, or to give intransitive verbs an object. She 
enjambs, for example, the lines of a murmuration of birds with the lines on a face 
(16), the spaces between objects and the spaces between bodies (18). An 
ambiguous longing becomes, after the caesura, a longing for rain (6). She ‘stepped 
out of / Into the swimmingpool’ (17).  
Within the woman’s experiential story-world, objects lack solidity and 
consistency; events a sense of having actually occurred. Her self-abnegating voice 
depicts impossible vignettes of passivised experience. Just as in Berg the process of 
perception is materialised; in Passages the woman apprehends the world literally as 
if through glass. Phenomena are experienced at such distance they are not merely 
externalised – perceived voyeuristically as being enacted upon some real-world 
surrogate – but appear to occur only as the phantasms of the imagination. In the 
opening passages of the novel, for example, she seemingly observes someone who 
might perhaps be herself having sex in an adjacent room: 
 
I listened to sounds, waited for those that never came. I didn’t look up. Their 
bodies rotated, she above. Legs, arms moved with the music over him… 
Movement so near… I couldn’t see, but saw what next would happen… 
Laughter. Afterwards recognized as my own… In the next room I pictured her 
smile, larger than it seemed a face could hold. (5) 
 
His narrative, in contrast, explores an introspective self that has turned in upon itself 
and lost all contact with the outside world. He is a ‘voyeur in all senses’: ‘[h]ow many 
hours I waste lying in bed thinking about getting up. I see myself get up, go out, 
move, drink, eat, go up, go down’ (108). His narrative maps the inner cosmology of a 
hyperreflexive subject turned epistemological bricoleur who continually attempts to 
abstract, order and to rationalise the experiential and the sensorial. His diaries 
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reshape experience into lists and marginalia, retell it as aphorisms, dialogues and 
fictionalised vignettes which appeal to a salad of explicatory systems: narratological, 
mythical, mystical, archetypal, geometrical, psychoanalytic and psychological. 
The man’s account chronicles his attempt to climb out of his hyperreflexive 
cosmology, a madness that is ‘not swift enough’ (39). He seeks an ‘unambiguous 
truth’ (29): the ability ‘to determine the truth of things, to share an experience’ (29), to 
‘play it cool’ (33), to ‘forget everything’ (30). A modest form of knowledge, of 
knowing, in fact, that would usurp his ‘morbid habit of self-examination’ (32): ‘Just to 
be in some hotel, part of the room, chairs, table. A little music perhaps.’ (28) A return 
to the body, to become ‘some drifting thing that at least had found somewhere for 
inhabiting’. (94) He strives for what Camus, in his later essay, “The Myth of 
Sisyphus” (1942), calls ‘lucidity in the face of experience’,4 the cognitive self-restraint 
that defies the tragic human impulse of ordering experience and meaning-making – 
the ‘desire for unity, this longing to solve, this need for clarity and cohesion’ – and 
instead accepts the absurdity of man’s relationship with the world.  
At length, the couple’s experiential worlds begin to merge, they become 
‘mediums inhabiting each others’ imagination’ (39) and they embark upon an 
intersubjective power struggle, a ‘master/slave situation’, he writes, in which ‘]r]oles 
[are] reversed from day to day’ (90). In this war of nerves, what is at stake is the 
possibility of transcendence: ‘[t]he need to find some unambiguous truth’ (29). They 
challenge one another not to accept the phenomenal limits of the self. Defeat is 
‘submission to the image’, the images that in Passages are all there is. In Matter and 
Memory, Henri Bergson formulates his theory of ‘pure perception’. Mediating 
between the traditionally opposed doctrines of realism and idealism, the first of which 
holds that matter exists independently of its representation and the second, that 
matter’s existence is equivalent to the representation that one can have of it, in 
Matter and Memory, Bergson invents a third position. Embracing both doctrines, 
Bergson appropriates the concept of the ‘image’ from philosophical theories of 
representation to solve the problem of dualism: 
 
Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of “images”. And by “image” we mean a 
certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a 
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representation, but less than what which the realist calls a thing – an 
existence placed half-way between the “thing” and the “representation”.5  
 
He argues that both the material and mental worlds are made up of an 
‘aggregate of images’ and are thereby not antithetical, but capable of approximating 
one another. But in “solving” the problem of dualism, Bergson’s conceptualisation of 
the image throws up yet more. By affirming both sides of the subject-object split, 
Bergson at once denies the existence of the absolute and the possibility of knowing 
what lies outside of ourselves. This philosophical quandary provides the troubled 
terrain of Passages: somewhere indefinable between the internal and external 
worlds. The couple dare one another to acknowledge that one’s percepts are not 
representative of a “real world” beyond the internality of the self but that equally, 
although reality may only be apparent, those percepts are percepts of something, 
that contrary to philosophical idealism, perception is attached to a real that can only 
be accessed through images. Having abandoned the real, the couple exist in a kind 
of purgatorial virtuality from which they seek to metaphysically ascend.  
 
 
The Sexual Politics of Madness 
 
Madness has traditionally been associatively gendered. Altogether more curiously 
and sympathetically received in antiquity for its wisdom and prophetic knowledge, 
with modernity it became a cultural repository for everything that Enlightenment 
rationality was not, a counterforce that posed a dangerous threat to the age of 
reason and was therefore marginalised by allying it with womanhood. As Showalter 
argues in her eponymous book, madness has traditionally been positioned as ‘the 
feminine malady’.6 Women, on the one hand, are situated on the ‘side of irrationality, 
silence, nature and the body, while men are situated on the side of reason, 
discourse, culture, and mind… Thus madness, even when experienced by men, is 
metaphorically and symbolically represented as feminine’.7 The Feminist protest 
against the pathologisation of the feminine that emerged in the early seventies with 
                                                          
5
 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), vii-viii. 
6
 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830-1980 (London: Penguin, 
1987). 
7
 Ibid., 4. 
175 
 
books like Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics (1969) (she was later to chronicle her own 
experiences of being incarcerated in psychiatric facilities in The Loony-Bin Trip 
[1990]), Phyllis Chesler’s Women in Madness (1972) and Sheila Rowbotham’s 
Woman’s Consciousness, Man’s World (1973) drew upon the antipsychiatry that 
predated it – and with which by conservative commentators it was often lumped.  
Feminism and antipsychiatry similarly condemned the abuses of psychiatry 
and psychiatric institutions’ attempts to police diversity and disavowal, both identified 
“mental illness” as a socio-political construct and the two movements held shared 
beliefs about the oppressive nature of domesticity and an antipathy towards the 
nuclear family. However, although Thomas Szasz, in The Manufacture of Madness 
(1970), touches upon the social control of women, drawing parallels between 
psychiatry and witch-hunting,8 and R.D. Laing disputes the psychiatric construction 
of the ‘schizophrenogenic mother’ – mothers ‘are always the first to get the blame for 
everything’, he comments9 – antipsychiatry was a male-dominated movement which 
had largely neglected (and, moreover, as has been argued in the case of Mary 
Barnes amongst others, exploited) the sexual politics of madness. Amongst the 
legacies of the antipsychiatry movement is the initiation of a shift in the gendering of 
madness from female to male, as Angela Woods notes.10 One that is formalised, as 
Woods suggests, in the work of Louis Sass, who in his Madness and Modernism 
insists that, contrary to prevailing thought, schizophrenia is ‘an alienation not from 
reason but from the emotions, instincts and the body’.11 Within Sass’ 
conceptualisation of madness, the ‘”feminine” experience of embodied subjectivity’ 
represents an attempt to establish distance from the ‘hyperreflexivity of 
schizophrenia’ which is, for Sass, a fundamentally masculine experience of atrophied 
instrumental reason.12  
But if Oedipus was to be liberated, then what would become of the 
madwoman in the attic, or the nineteenth-century “hysteric”? Simone de Beauvoir 
notes that what she perceives as Freud’s cobbled-together account of female 
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subjectivity was just a diminished mirror image of that of her male counterpart, 
wherein feminine desire figures merely as the desire to be the object of masculine 
desire. Oedipus’ female counterpart, Electra, de Beauvoir argues, had been 
furnished with neither a satisfactory schema for her desire, nor a robust model for 
the subjugation of those desires – never mind the emancipation of them.13 And if, for 
Freudo-Marxist thinkers, escape for the constraints of scientific rationality and 
instrumental reason was to be found in the ecstatic embrace of anti-rationality, 
unreason and embodiment, then what recourse had women who had, historically, 
been shunted into such a position and there found not liberation but a fraught and 
perilous experience of profound suffering, disempowerment and self-dispossession? 
Although the feminist movement was to draw deeply upon the theories and 
formulations of anti-psychiatry it also, undoubtedly, grew out of a profound 
scepticism about its implicitly gendered paradigms of revolution. Sexual liberation, as 
Kate Millett warns in “Sexual Politics: A Manifesto for Revolution”, a 1968 speech at 
Columbia University, could easily lead to ‘exploitative license for patriarchal and 
reactionary ends.’14 For a group of thinkers affiliated with what become known 
(problematically) as “French feminism”, including Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva and 
Luce Irigaray, amongst others, the attempt to destroy the oedipal motifs of culture 
and the self via what was often perceived as the strategic embrace of feminine 
values of difference and non-identity simply reaffirmed Oedipus as a model for 
universal identity. Whither, then, a model of female liberation? 
French feminism sought to circumvent Oedipus by proposing an alternative 
model of female subjectivity that drew upon de Beauvoir’s critique of the Oedipus 
complex and reinvented Lacan’s ideas about the acquisition of language. The 
Freudo-Lacanian woman, assigned the inferior position of the not-I, the eternal 
Other, belongs, to borrow the heavily punning title of Irigary’s 1977 work, to the ‘sex 
which is not one’. She is not subject but object, and her existence is defined as a 
function of male self-representation.15 And if the male subject is tasked with the 
oedipal work of civilisation-building – the language, culture, reason and law of the 
Symbolic – whilst women are allied with the body, emotions, silence and 
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“nothingness” of the Imaginary, then, French feminism queried, how can a woman 
speak? 
For Irigaray, the feminine is not simply the inverse of the masculine; it is not to 
be defined by the position of subjugation which is imposed upon it by binaristic 
thinking of masculine reason.16 It is instead, to be understood in its multiplicity, its 
lack of a single, unified (and therefore masculine) sense of selfhood, and therefore it 
demands an entirely new way of thinking, the invention of a resolutely non-
phallogentic system which is not governed by what de Beauvoir memorably calls the 
‘primacy of the penis’ and in which desire is no longer defined by its presence or 
absence. Drawing upon de Beauvoir’s critique of the Oedipus complex, together with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s designation of the ‘nomadic’ and ‘deterritorialized’ circulation 
of desire, French feminism sought to reorient Freud’s distinction between pre-
Oedipal and Oedipal drives and Lacan’s concepts of the ‘imaginary’ and the 
‘symbolic’, refocusing attention upon the pre-Oedipal or pre-symbolic, which Kristeva 
in her Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) calls ‘the semiotic’. This realm precedes 
meaning and signification, it is archaic and instinctual, it marks the return of the 
speaking subject to a pre-linguistic phrase. Its source is what Kristeva following 
Plato’s Timaeus, calls the chora: ‘an ancient, mobile, unstable receptacle, prior to the 
One, to the father, and even to the syllable, metaphorically suggesting something 
nourishing and maternal’.17 The semiotic surfaces in poetic language as a feminine 
aesthetic of digressive writing that is more in tune with the intangible rhythms of the 
human body and its unconscious desires that are held in check by masculine 
civilisation. It disrupts symbolic structures, functioning within signifying practice as 
the transmittal of pulsations and vibrations, a ‘dissonance within the thetic, paternal 
function of language’.18  
Cixous understands écriture féminine as a kind of writing that eschews the 
need for closure and the restrictions of linearity: ‘The quest for origins, illustrated by 
Oedipus, doesn’t haunt a feminine unconscious. Rather it’s the beginning, or 
beginning… not promptly with the phallus in order to close with the phallus, but 
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starting on all sides at once’.19 And as such, it is politically productive; by disrupting 
the order and the law of language through which the world is defined and structured, 
écriture féminine has the potential to not only linguistically but also socially disrupt 
those definitions and structures. In this way, by embracing the feminine’s inferior 
status as a space of anarchic and subversive potential that precedes the imposition 
of the symbolic order, French feminism sought to valorise the marginal position as 
one of empowerment.  
In the figure of the Janus-faced picaro, in Passages Quin draws together 
these two gendered accounts of liberation and finds that both are wanting. The man 
envies the woman her lightness, her polyvalent signifiers, her embodied self, her 
harmonious consciousness and its radical receptivity to the external world. The way 
in which she ‘cannot live without sensations’, that ‘like a sorceress’, she ‘shape[s] 
them out of the air itself it seems’ (105):  
 
You will dance and look back at me, not count the scribbling foolishness that 
put wings on your heels, behind your ears. (87) 
 
The protagonists’ attempts to loosen the bonds of reason amount to dangerous and 
hubristic psychic tourism. His mime of madness in the attempt to escape the 
quandary of hyperreflexivity is merely the mastery and negation of being-in-itself, 
and fundamentally fails to efface the division between subject and object. And for the 
woman, madness is anything but liberating. It is a self-dissolution and self-
dispossession that surrenders coherent selfhood as well as human agency and 
political purchase. If the challenge for men during the period was to “go mad” and 
thereby to self-deconstruct the bourgeois liberal construction of selfhood, then the 
challenge for women was to go sane. Without a stable, self-consistent sense of self 
to rebel against, Quin seems to ask, how can women afford to heed the era’s 
injuction to “lose themselves”. And, in this sense, doesn’t the male drive towards 
self-destruction and negation constitute merely yet another – and more insidious – 
manoeuvre within the Cartesian tradition of subjecthood? In Passages, the 
madwoman still cannot speak.  
                                                          
19
 Hélène Cixous, “Castration or Decapitation?” trans. Annette Kuhn, Signs 7, no. 1 (1981): 53 
179 
 
In the novel, Quin seeks to test the Marcusean logic that the revolutionary 
critique of society depends upon a sex revolutionary critique of culture. For Quin’s 
protagonists’ disordered desires are already well beyond reclamation and, as 
elsewhere in her work, their desublimation is just another form of determinism. In the 
novel, polymorphous sexuality simply serves to re-impose the power structures that 
it would seek to explode. In another of Quin’s extraordinary sex scenes, the man 
initiates a sex game in which the woman is kidnapped, tortured and raped: 
 
She felt them in the small room he brought her to. Kept her there until there 
was no sense of day, of night. A blinding flashlight on her face. No sense of 
who touched her, who she was stripped by, who woke her as soon as she 
tried to sleep. (71) 
 
Her account blurs the description of real (but ritual) and imagined (but actual) 
violence. She is beaten, bitten, whipped; a police informer (her brother?) is thrown 
from a building, a cigarette stubbed out on his chest, his clothes searched (74). Sex 
is imaginatively transformed into a bloody shooting (79). The other side of freedom is 
tyranny. Erotic deviance is merely a grotesque parody of authoritarian brutality. 
Passages explores the ambivalent implications of the masculine ‘de-Oedipalized” 
consciousness as a kind of megalomania of experiential mastery – ‘I only want to 
dominate’, (48) the man admits – in which the woman inevitably figures as the slave 
who is instinctually schooled to yearn for an intoxicating and yet perilous surrender.  
The man’s metaphysical quest to invoke Dionysus is, as he admits, a journey 
without a destination, it is a ‘distance… that never reaches its limits.’ (111) There 
are, he concludes, ‘so many routes’ but ‘all lead me finally to the edge of where I am 
at the moment: in a room I know only too well, a woman I love, but hardly know, and 
a city where every street declares its defeat.’ (111) That said, for the man, divine 
madness sustains on the one hand the ever-present possibility of transcendence – 
the ‘sea that soon perhaps we will cross’ (112) – and, on the other, a home to which 
he can return. For the woman, however, both exits are blocked. She is bounded, on 
the one hand, by the mirror and, on the other, by the cliff, the two images which in 
the novel frequently appear overlaid atop one another in the manner of a double-
exposed photograph, as twinned metaphorisations of the limits of the real, both 
equally impossible to cross.   
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For the woman, the world is apprehended as if a ‘Pan-like figure held the side 
of a concave mirror’ (16). The mirror is the reflective boundary which simultaneously 
marks the edges of the phenomenal world and signals the impossibility of 
transgressing that world. It is the reflective lens which purports to offer a spectacular 
vision of what lies beyond and yet forever turns perception back on itself, dividing the 
self, offering the reflected image of a false self – ‘some other person, some other life’ 
(72) – that is disembodied, ephemeral, without identity. That false self with which the 
self confronts the outside world, but with whom the self can never be reconciled. 
Quin places the mirrors face to face, creating a vertiginously self-referential abyss 
which entraps the woman in a world in which the ever-diminishing image of the real, 
replicated endlessly, is all that can exist: 
 
The first mirror reflected in the second. The second in the first. Images within 
images. Smaller than the last, one inside the other. (25) 
 
The cliff, on the other hand, represents a perceptual precipice that promises not the 
transcending, but the terminus of all experience in the actual self-annihilation of 
death. The man’s quest might remain unfulfilled, transcendence might never be 
reached, but he, at least, retains the liberty of committing free acts in pursuit of it. His 
quest will continue. ‘He would catch the train to another place. Some other life.’ (82) 
The women’s account ends at the cliff’s edge as she gazes at her own reflection in 
the window of a halted train superimposed upon the vista of the sea below (83). 
Within her involuted experiential world, such possibilities are continually foreclosed.  
Just as the Oedipal architecture of Quin’s first novel, Berg, renders as self-
fulfilling prophesy the doomed masculine attempt to redefine one’s existence within 
the a priori terms of the family romance, Passages takes for its mythic underpinning 
the story of Antigone, daughter of Oedipus, who defies the law of home and polis, as 
well as the station of womanhood, in order to bury her dead brother, Polynices. 
Rebels both, Oedipus and Antigone are, as Silke-Maria Weineck argues, partners in 
perversion.20 However whilst Oedipus’ act of rebellion, in its reaffirmation of 
naturalised desire and the patriarchal logic of prohibition and displacement, is 
enacted purely in the terms of this world, Antigone’s sights are set on the next. For 
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her embodiment of difference, and her realisation of the productive potentials of the 
womanly threat to public order, within feminist thought, most notably in the work of 
de Beauvoir, Irigaray and Showalter, the figure of Antigone has been elevated as a 
specifically feminine paradigm of subjectivity and, crucially, one not merely, as Freud 
had it, a derivation or a reversal of the Oedipal model. She has been mobilised as a 
metaphor for the ethical life, a desire that will not compromise, for feminist revolt 
against the authority of the superego.  
In Passages, as elsewhere in her writing, however, Quin insists on asking: but 
at what cost? Liberation is a perilous project, and particularly for women. Oedipus, 
blinded by insight, might be condemned to live out his days within the high walls of 
the polis, but for his daughter, reimagined within Quin’s novels, life in the 
metaphysical desert that lies outside might be still worse. In Passages, limitless 
freedoms and unbounded tyranny are shown to amount to much the same thing. In 
her death by suicide Antigone is vindicated; as the last of the line she has, at last, 
repealed the Theban curse. But although Quin’s fictions are suffused by the 
undeniable seductions of Thanatos, in the end Quin insists that death, even on one’s 
own account, is still mere annihilation.  
 
 
182 
 
Living in the Present: Tripticks and the “Texty Texts” of the 
British Experimental Novel 
 
Quin’s fourth and final published novel, Tripticks, is a raucous and Rabelaisian 
excursion across the spectacular Amerikan dreamscape. A jitteringly paranoid 
exploration, on the one hand, of consumer culture’s debauch and, on the other, of 
the moral nihilism and political vacuity of the counterculture, Tripticks is peopled by 
the skewed archetypes of the mediascape’s spiritual malaise. Here, catatonic 
tycoons anaesthetise their disenchantment by watching infomercials, bored 
housewives channel their discontent into Black Mass orgies, executives frantically 
attempt to preserve their youth by strapping themselves into futuristic fitness 
machines in roof terrace gyms and families sun themselves beside heated outdoor 
swimming pools garlanded with plastic ivy. 
Tripticks, is Quin’s first – as Christine Brooke Rose would put it – ‘texty text’. 
At the close of the sixties, she abandons the montaging of inner speech that had 
characterised the intimate mode of her earlier novels and turns instead to new 
techniques of vocal collage, exchanging the private language of the perceptual 
imagination for a cut/up glossolia of the extra-literary discourses of the mass media. 
The novel’s primary texts are drawn from the readymade fabric of the modern 
mediascape – True Crime potboilers, psychometric testing, spaghetti westerns, 
Freudian psychoanalysis, hard-boiled detective fiction, advertising puffery, daytime 
soap operas, infomercials, televangelism, tabloid newspapers and horoscopes – that 
have colonised and live within the memories, dreams and desires of the 
protagonist’s focalising consciousness. In the novel, Quin discursively constructs a 
self and a story-world that is as dizzyingly plurivocal as a cracked jukebox.  
Quin was not alone in her new interest in textual experimentation; other British 
writers had also begun speaking in tongues. In what follows, this chapter will explore 
Quin’s burgeoning interest in what one reviewer derided as ‘Ambit-dextrous 
punpricks, Joycean parody and sub-Burrovian cut-uppery’1 and its relation to the 
“language games” embarked upon in the novels of Christine Brooke Rose, Brigid 
Brophy and others. Once again picking up the story of British Kulturkritik, which 
provides, as I have sought to demonstrate, a hugely significant parallel narrative to 
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that of British experimental writing, in this chapter I will examine the different ways in 
which the British writers of the period sought to re-negotiate and re-envision a 
dissenting role for the novel in Britain after its traditional role as a ‘court of human 
appeal’ was perceived to have lapsed. A role which would allow the novel to, as the 
title of one of Quin’s texty short stories has it, ‘live in the present’ and not persist as 
its own fiction of the “as if”, endlessly harking back to an imagined past in order to 
fictionally project an impossible future.  
Quin’s new interest in textual experimentation was first signalled three years 
earlier in short stories published in Dr Martin Bax and J.G. Ballard’s Ambit, the 
literary magazine that was to become the spiritual home of this new, cut/up, visual-
textual mode of writing. ‘Living In the Present’ (1968) co-authored with Robert 
Sward, is, like J.G. Ballard’s The Atrocity Exhibition, which was published the 
following year, a composition of headlined micro-narratives told in a Ballardian dead 
pan that borrows and burlesques the stylistic tics of newspaper report pseudo-
naturalism. However, theirs is an altogether looser and more freewheeling text than 
Ballard’s. The juxtapositions produced by The Atrocity Exhibition’s generative 
grammar of significations create allegorical meanings which for all their promiscuity 
are nonetheless carefully controlled by Ballard’s finely-wrought surreal logic. In 
‘Living In The Present’, on the other hand, syntax and signification are condensed 
almost beyond all recognition to produce a mosaic of bizarre vignettes within which 
juxtapositions of meaning are left orphaned and dangling, to create a text that is 
more zeugmatic than surreal: 
 
Crisp sales in recent weeks have shown a marked increase and the third part 
of the stars; so as the third part of them was darkened. Salt ‘n’ Vinegar flavour 
crisps. And the day shown an unkind critic. The name of the star is called 
Wormwood.2  
 
The second story, ‘Tripticks’,3 is an early draft of what would become the first chapter 
of Quin’s novel of the same name, and won her the £40 first prize in Ambit 
magazine’s Drugs and the Creative Writer competition, awarded to the best poem or 
short story by an author under the influence of drugs, one of a number of provocative 
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wheezes hatched by editor J.G. Ballard, which raised the ire of Prime Minster Harold 
Wilson’s legal counsel Lord Goodman who, as Ballard recounts in his autobiography, 
Miracles of Life, ‘denounced Ambit for committing a public mischief (a criminal 
offence) and in effect threatened us with prosecution.’4 The incident gained minor 
notoriety, a side note in accounts of the many skirmishes between the art world and 
the establishment around issues of censorship and “public decency” during the 
period – debates that Ballard, an inveterate provocateur all too keen to prick the 
pieties of public moralism, was eager to inflame.  
In a 1972 interview, she recounts the beneficial effects that her experiments 
with LSD and peyote during her time in New Mexico had on the development of her 
writing practice: 
 
Taking peyote was particularly beautiful taken in such a beautiful landscape, 
with all that vast space. Perhaps if I’d stayed in England and not taken drugs, 
it would have taken me ten to 15 years to reach that particular stage that I 
reached then. Peyote verified and made concrete things I’d thought about, 
and made fantasies more real. It made an outer reality seem equivalent to an 
inner landscape. It seemed to make all things possible. I just found that when 
I did write, it all seemed to tie up, and I don’t think it would have been the 
same if I hadn’t had this experience of drugs.5  
 
‘Tripticks’, however, had been written under the influence of nothing more innocuous 
than Orthonovin 2, or the contraceptive pill. Tripticks proper, named punningly for 
both the tripartite work of art and the American travel guides, was to be Quin’s 
Amerikan epic. ‘[T]here is a sense,’ Bernard Bergonzi reluctantly admits, ‘in which 
the very air of America seems more highly charged, more oxygenated, than the 
atmosphere in England’.6 He cannot resist adding: ‘It is not, perhaps, wise for 
Americans to be so hooked on excitement since their society as a whole could use 
some English tranquillity.’7 Quin, like so many other writers and artists during this 
period, found America’s ambience intoxicating. During the early sixties, she had 
worked as a secretary to the Head of Painting, Carel Wright, at the Royal College of 
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Art,8 where she had come into contact with an art scene incubated at the RCA during 
the period that was similarly attuned to and energised by the icon of modernity that 
loomed so large in the mid-century cultural imagination: those associated with the 
nascent Pop art movement like David Hockney, Peter Blake, Pauline Boty, Patrick 
Caulfield and others. Amongst the earliest writings in her corpus are texts ghost-
written on behalf of her lover, the New Zealand pop artist, Billy Apple, who was a 
student at the RCA at that time. Popcorn is an imagined dialogue between Vincent 
Van Gogh and the American painter Larry Rivers set at The Five Spot Jazz Club in 
New York,9 and B.B.’s Second Manifesto is a self-conscious parody of blasting and 
bombardiering proclamations issued by the high modernist avant-garde which 
begins, appositely lackadaisically with: ‘Yeah maybe I ought to get organised, trouble 
is I don’t know what I really want to do.’10 In them Quin, like Nabokov before her, 
luxuriates in the vulgarisms of her borrowed idiom, inventing, as Nabokov does in his 
Lolita (1955), a not-quite-authentic macaronic second language of jive talk and 
hipster slang alongside Britishism non-sequiturs. In Quin’s Amerikan lingo, although 
lovers “make it”, “fag” always means cigarette. See, for example, this passage from 
an unpublished text from the period, with its self-conscious nod to Henry Miller: 
 
Neh man it’s like this I’m though with image, it’s the word now, reality that’s 
what I want. Take this guy with six others leaving the Bronx, cops were 
waiting for them, so he shot one down, just that, man it’s real, none of this 
stuff slobs care about. Look at that cat in his crappy outback outfit, what a 
slob. What do you think they’re thinking? Whether or not he’ll make it with her, 
and she’s wishing she could make it with the guy two yards away. Made it with 
a gorgeous nymphomaniac negress, man she was wild, crazy, in full view of 
the whole of New York, with the light on, man across the way cleaning his 
teeth, having an orgasm. O.K. Henry Miller.11  
 
The novel, which appeared in 1972, was rather more ambitious. It is, in her 
own words: ‘Part love story part lecture in existential psychoanalysis and part 
rumination on the frayed boot-straps of mankind.’ (T, 163) Following Passages’ more 
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abstract reverie upon the dark drive towards distintegration within European 
expatriate bohemia, Tripticks is Quin’s most explicit thematic engagement with the 
sixties counterculture. Indeed, it draws upon – often in order to self-consciously 
burlesque – the countercultural aesthetic associated with that movement, including 
the picaresque-psychedelic hippy narratives of Ken Kesey’s Merry Pranksters and 
Tom Wolfe, the Menippean satires of Kurt Vonnegut, and the cabbalistic paranoia of 
Thomas Pynchon and William Gaddis. Resituating the rootless, vagabond narrator 
familiar from her earlier novels on the road, it resonates too with the American road 
movie that came of age in the sixties. The filmic celebration of Romantic flight, 
visionary rebellion, motorised mobility and machinic desire had been seeded in the 
Beat movement, and particularly in Jack Kerouac’s pronouncements about the 
transcendental promise of the “holy road”. It emerged in films like The Wild One 
(1963), and in Rebel Without A Cause (1955), both ciphers for the era’s anxieties 
about “youthquake” which embodied the freedoms and intoxicating possibilities of 
the period. By the high sixties, however, wide-eyed optimism began to be replaced 
by the sense that there was, after all, nowhere to run and the limitless potential of 
“just going” irrevocably lapsed. The existential angst and mindless violence of films 
like Bonnie and Clyde (1967) with its spectacularly bloody ending, Five Easy Pieces 
(1970), the nightmare odyssey of Spielberg’s first film, Duel (1970) and Badlands 
(1973) came to epitomise an age of political unrest, countercultural disenchantment 
and continuing civil rights struggles.   
 
 
The ‘Word Virus’ in British Fiction 
 
 “Textualism” and linguistic experimentation, which were to become synonymous 
with the most notoriously, “unreadably” self-indulgent – or most significant and 
radically innovative – excesses of what would become known as postmodernism, are 
perhaps more familiar from the literary high postmodernism of American authors like 
John Barth, Donald Barthelme, Ronald Sukenick and later Kathy Acker (the “avant-
pop” writer who is often name-checked as Quin’s more-or-less sole legatee) and 
David Foster Wallace, amongst others, or the theoretical avant-garde of French post-
structuralist critical theory. But within the British experimental writing of the sixties, by 
the dog days of that decade, one can detect a common interest within the work of 
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Quin, alongside that of Christine Brooke Rose, Brigid Brophy, Alan Burns, J.G. 
Ballard and others, in linguistic experimentation and adventures into textuality, 
polyphony and eclecticism. Never, it must be said, easily (or willingly) corralled, one 
can nevertheless trace a shared trajectory in their writing practice: a new recognition 
of the materiality of language, the apprehension that the self is discursively 
constructed by the linguistic universe that one inhabits – or, rather, that inhabits one 
– and that, as Saussure discovered, meaning is only ever one element amongst 
many others. By critics seeking to emphasise British postmodernism’s own keen 
embrace and assimilation of the radical new theoretical agenda from continental 
Europe, the “linguistic turn” within British experimental writing of the sixties is often 
assumed to evince the increasing influence of French structuralist and post-
structuralist theories of language, the novels the product of the cross-pollination of 
literary discourses, a kind of anomalous Anglo-French literary hybrid.  
Seeded in the political ferment of mid-sixties France, the theories that 
coalesced variously under the umbrella of post-structuralism sought to make 
structuralism’s latent political content explicit via a methodology of the 
epistemological critique of not just socially produced structures, but of the very act of 
structure-building. Turning to fictional narrative, theorists such as Roland Barthes, 
Julia Kristeva and the Tel Quel movement in France attempted to model an ideal, 
revolutionary form of literary practice. For them, the realist text is perceived as an 
agent of ideology, and literature’s resistance to domination is in the attack through 
‘textual production’, the ‘critique, subversion and transformation of language and 
literary conventions’.12 Kristeva saw the potentialities of poetic language in the 
displacement of the thetic safeguard between signifier and signified, freeing le 
sémiotique, the subterranean meaning of the signifer which does not signify, but 
reveals the patriarchal ideology inherent in realist representation. Barthes' S/Z 
creates a typology of ‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ texts: the first representational, with an 
ideological value that is ‘committed to the closure system of the West, produced 
according to the goals of this system, devoted to the law of the Signified’13 and the 
second a ‘galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds’14 which is plural, 
indeterminable, reversible.  
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What scant critical attention the British experimental novel of the sixties has 
received, as I have argued, has tended to be focused upon this later period of more 
explicitly linguistic experimentation. The “texty texts” of Quin, Burns, and Brophy 
have languished within a critical gap, perceived as naïve Burroughsian copyists and 
overshadowed by their American counterparts. But Quin, in an interview prior to the 
publication of Tripticks in 1972, claims not to be influenced by Burroughs at all, but 
by ‘Dostoevsky, Beckett, Virginia Woolf, Camus, Gide, Antonioni, Fellini and… [the 
Robbe Grillet scripted, Alain Renais-directed film] “Last Year at Marienbad”’.15 If 
accounted for at all, within these critical surveys, this tendency has mostly been 
grafted on to later developments in postmodern aesthetics as exemplary of a 
premature and provisional “proto-postmodernist” style. But such a reading is 
generally deployed to support a time-worn thesis in which the advent of 
postmodernism represents a radical break with a “straw man” version of modernism 
perceived as intellectually mandarin, ideologically monolithic and psychically 
monadic, and a new, radically sceptical attitude towards novelistic truth. But in fact, 
the “linguistic turn” in British experimental fiction by no means signals the 
thoroughgoing displacement of modernist attitudes towards novelistic truth, but the 
continuation of them. Modernism, write Bradbury and MacFarlane in their critical 
survey of the movement, ‘is the art consequent on the dis-establishing of communal 
reality and conventional notions of causality, on the destruction of traditional notions 
of individual character, on the linguistic chaos that ensues when public notions of 
language have been discredited and when all realities have become subjective 
fictions.’16 Reality, of course, had long since receded and the foundations of 
language’s claims to truth had been shaken. Pound, Joyce, Woolf, James, Proust, 
Eliot and Beckett were already what Richard Rorty would call ‘textualists’,17 all 
recognised, and exploited artistically, the notion that modernity had loosened 
language from its referents and therefore that language is a way of organising and 
conceptualising human experience that is not necessarily connected to a pre-existing 
reality. Disabused of Nietzsche’s ‘metaphysical consolations’, through aesthetic self-
consciousness, ambiguity, uncertainty, juxtaposition and montage, they sought to 
explore the experience of being-in-the-world where human truths have been 
                                                          
15
 Hall, “The Mighty Quin,” 10. 
16
 Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, Modernism, 1890-1930 (London: Penguin, 1981), 27. 
17
 Richard Rorty, “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism,” in Consequences of 
Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 139-159. 
189 
 
irrevocably denuded and revealed to be fictions and therefore, as Hayden White 
explains, the written text constitutes a ‘paradigm of culture’.18 
What was new, however – and what this mid-period shift in British 
experimental style represents – was, as Patricia Waugh argues, the recognition of 
the ‘comprehensive nature of postmodern intertextuality’ and with it the 
apprehension of the inescapable reciprocity of textuality, the idea that one is not just 
‘radically situated in a linguistic culture, but that one is entirely constructed through 
it’.19 As just one text amongst many, fiction had lost what Jameson calls the written 
text’s ‘privileged and exemplary status’ and with it, its claims upon aesthetic 
autonomy.20 Modernist assumptions about the status of the individual and their 
relationship with the world and a commitment to the aesthetic as an oppositional 
space in which literary innovation might renovate and replenish a fallen communal 
language would have to be reassessed and renegotiated. Crucially, however, they 
were not discarded altogether. Works like Christine Brooke-Rose’s Out (1964), Such 
(1966), Between (1968) and Thru (1975), Brigid Brophy’s In Transit (1969), Alan 
Burns’ Babel (1969) and Dreamerika! (1971) and J.G. Ballard’s The Atrocity 
Exhibition (1970), together with Quin’s Tripticks, explore the potentials for fiction as 
an intertextual but nonetheless oppositional space. If the novel, as a ‘linguistic 
artefact’ caught within Jameson’s prison-house of language could not escape 
institutionalisation, then it could, at least, seek to disrupt the agent of its 
institutionalisation – language – from within.  
Accordingly, these novelists sought to turn the materiality of language against 
itself, mobilising the Bakhtinian function of the novel as the ideal form for the literary 
embodiment of heteroglossia, his hugely influential designation of the myriad 
discursive strata of language and their dialogic interaction. Writers like Brooke-Rose, 
Brophy, Burns, Ballard and Quin began to explore the productive potentials of a 
polyvocal mode of linguistic experimentation capable of seeking out and then 
deconstructing the internal contradictions within the structures of institutionally-
produced meaning encoded within language itself. This way of writing sought to 
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exploit languages’ escape from referentiality and use fiction’s characteristic 
plurivocality to demonstrate Saussure’s ideas about the multiplicity of meaning.  
Christine Brooke-Rose was first, abandoning her brittle and deeply self-
conscious Sparkishly satirical novels of the fifties to produce a quadriptych of 
explosively experimental mononymical works, including the magisterial and 
notoriously “unreadable” apex of the cycle, Thru. The author herself was keen to 
excise the novels she deemed mere juvenilia from the Brooke-Rose canon: ‘[A]ll 
those novels were satires – but it struck me as much too easy… I was somehow 
taken seriously. I hadn’t read Bakhtin yet.’21 Out is a witty subversion of Robbe-
Grillean neo-phenomenology, the novel rewrites his Jealousy in order to reveal the 
aesthetic and political fallacy of his project to rid language of its human meanings 
and describe the world as is, demonstrating, in no uncertain terms, Barthes’ truism 
that ‘language is never innocent’. In Brooke Rose’s hands, the enfant terrible of 
French letters becomes quite the literary conservative. She flags up his ontological 
blindspot – the fundamental realism that underlies Robbe Grillet’s epistemological 
tricksterism. Wheeling out an array of fantastic scientific instruments she points out 
the perceptual limits of Robbe-Grillet’s so-called “objective literature”: A 
‘psychoscope’ penetrates Mrs Mgulu’s smile to reveal narcissism or is it perhaps 
magnanimity in a set-piece reproduction of Robbe-Grillet’s surveillance of ‘A…’ at 
her dressing table in Jealousy22. An ‘oscillograph’ charts the pitch of hammering, an 
‘electroencelograph’ separates the elements of conversation into ‘silence, reality and 
unreality’.23  
Having cleared the decks, then, and armed with Bahktin’s concept of 
heteroglossia, the blending of world views through language that creates a complex 
unity from a hybrid of utterances, together with Jakobson’s structural linguistics and 
Saussurian semiotics, the novels that follow exploit the concept of textuality to 
produce romans à clef of discourse in which subjecthood is effaced and character 
reduced to the transcription of a plurivocal narrative voice that interweaves extra-
literary discourses including biochemistry and astrophysics (Out and Such), foreign 
languages (Between) and finally the metalanguage of linguistics itself (Thru).  
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Och, the anarchic heroine of Brophy’s 1969 novel, In Transit, declares: ‘To be 
absolutely frank, what I should most like to resemble is a small but powerful and 
concentrated bomb. My ambition is to explode and shatter the rules.’ Accordingly, 
the novel is a comic, textually labyrinthine feminist fantasy about the performativity of 
language. ‘A cross,’ comments Karen Lawrence , ‘between Norman O. Brown and 
Luce Irigaray’24 and an airport novel in the literal sense, it chronicles the increasingly 
unlikely escapades of Evelyn Hillary O’Rooley, a protagonist of uncertain gender, 
who decides to defer his/her flight in favour of remaining within the departure 
lounge’s state of intransience. Euphoric at first, s/he revels in this new non-static, 
non-defined state of becoming: 
  
I was in a capsule enclaved not only in the sequence of time but in political 
geography. I was inhabiting an embodiment come true of such splendid notion 
al diplomatic entities as free ports and extraterritorial territory.25 
 
However, suddenly afflicted by ‘linguistic leprosy’, s/he quickly discovers that 
extraterritoriality does not only entail the throwing off of the arbitrary limits of human 
self-definition, but also involves the loss of the language by which they are 
performatively inscribed which, thereby, results in the loss too of gender distinctions. 
In short, the narrator can no longer recall whether he or she is male or female, and 
embarks upon a quest to find out via a series of fictionalised syllogisms in which she 
tries on and tests parodic discourses of masculinity and femininity.  
For Roland Barthes, the ‘writerly’ text was a text of bliss [jouissance], a ‘happy 
Babel’26 whose plurivocality no longer represents the ‘confounded speech’ meted out 
by a jealous and wrathful God. ‘[T]he confusion of tongues’, he writes, ‘is no longer a 
punishment; the subject gains access to bliss by the cohabitation of languages 
working side by side.’27 And both Brooke-Rose and Brophy embrace the new 
paradigm of self-as-text for its playfulness, its comedy, its self-subversive qualities, 
for the infinite capacities of the self-as-experimental-narrative. These are, as Judy 
Little comments of Brooke-Rose’s novels, ‘voices [that] are… prepared to face an 
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experimental future, even one where the grand narratives of “difference”, origin, and 
(textual) authority are themselves hypothetical and simulatable.’28  
Theirs, then, is an art of humanist affirmation, one that seeks to carve out the 
productive potentials of the discursively constructed self. But Quin, Ballard and 
Burns are rather less optimistic. Whilst Brooke Rose and Brophy sought to explore 
the condition of a language that is already fictional – the, as the neo-
phenomenologist Shaun Gallagher writes, ‘essential hermeneutical dimension of 
language’ which is ‘the one that operates “behind our backs”29 – this trio of writers 
turned to the mythic speech of mass culture, replacing the affirmative ethos of 
Brooke Rose and Brophy’s “textual production” with altogether more ambivalent 
strategies of détournement, to explore the subliminal qualities of a language that 
would by no means  so willingly give up its ideological charge. Theirs is a Beckettian 
anguished acceptance, rather than ecstatic embrace, of the self as text. If Quin’s first 
three novels chronicle their protagonists’ terrible apprehension of the void, and their 
desperate search for oppositional spaces – the unconscious in Berg, for example, or 
the Mediterranean alternative living scene in Passages, even Three’s suicide (for the 
will not to live surely bears the trace of the transcendental ego) – then in Tripticks 
there are, no longer any hiding places.  
Quin, alongside Ballard and Burns, then, sought not to create a new 
language, but to remake it from remnants of the old. As Quin’s narrator declares in 
Tripticks: ‘I had a new surge for a tired old idiom the seedbed for a psychic 
revolution’.30 They choose to engage with mass culture – with lurid fascination and 
revulsion – over the revolutions promised by the free-floating signifier. Theirs is a 
more pessimistic take on textuality: morally ambiguous, ethically ambivalent and 
fundamentally non-utopian. In this study, I want to explore an alternative context for 
this “negative” tendency within the “linguistic turn”, an indigenous structure of feeling 
that resonates more powerfully and – bearing in mind the literary-historical 
disjunction between these novels of the late sixties and early seventies and the 
theories that emerged (and then only within the academy) during the mid-to-late 
seventies – in a less anachronistic fashion and is signalled in Quin’s own juvenilia: 
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that of the “proto”-Pop attitudes that emerged in the art of fifties and early sixties in 
Britain. This sensibility can be seen, for example, in the work of the multidisciplinary 
art collective that coalesced around the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London, the 
self-styled “fathers of Pop”, the Independent Group, and in the image-text collage 
that was curated within publications like Ambit magazine. 
 
 
‘Brideshead and the Tower Blocks’: “Soft” Modernism at Mid-century 
 
This radical new idiom within the visual arts in Britain had been seeded, as Isabelle 
Moffat notes,31 in the civic jamboree of post-war optimism that surrounded the 
Festival of Britain of 1951. Bryan Appleyard, in his The Pleasures of Peace, argues 
that it was only then, with the national exhibition that sought to galvanise post-war 
recovery and morale, and to position Britain as a future-facing nation at the forefront 
of developments in science, technology, industrial design, architecture and the arts, 
that the ‘significance of the modern was established’ in Britain.32 In America, during 
the post-war years at the beginnings of the Cold War, perplexed and anxious liberal 
commentators mobilised a reinvented version of modernism as what Alfred Kazin 
called ‘our only real tradition’33 to assuage America’s crisis of identity and to manifest 
through culture a vision of renewal, rebellion and reinvigoration. Similarly, on the 
other side of the Atlantic, the organisers of the Festival of Britain sought to propagate 
a softened, and more humane version of modernism, one that was egalitarian and 
yet elegant, demotic and yet refined, one heavily inflected by the social thought of 
the period and that – like the original – had a complicated relationship to tradition. 
This belated embrace of “the modern” was emphatically future-oriented and 
technologically engaged, seeking to bridge ‘the two cultures’ it placed its faith in the 
potentials of scientific discovery to deliver its utopian dreams by transforming 
everyday life: in mass production to deliver plenty for the many, in the high-rise tower 
blocks which were later to become such a troubled and heavily-freighted symbol of 
the failure of this project and a monument to the wreckage of 1945, to deliver decent 
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and habitable housing for all.  But it was also tasked with the work of nation-building, 
of manifesting a new, technologically-inflected incarnation of the old English 
metaphysic of virtue, character and heritage: 
 
New people thinking new thoughts could do things better than in the past. 
What was being celebrated at the Festival was not Imperial pomp but British 
ingenuity and humanity, the wonders of science and the sheer lightness of the 
world to come. It was an attempt to will into existence a prevailing myth, 
humanist and reasonable, which would sweep away the darknesses of the 
past and replace them with towns as picturesque as the countryside.34  
 
F.R. Leavis and Franco Marinetti certainly made uneasy bedfellows. Modernism’s 
American apologists had sought – and struggled – to reconcile their nostalgic 
investment in modernism’s progressivism and dynamism as the fulfilment of the 
Enlightenment project and an ethical repugnance towards the reactionary politics of 
some of its principal protagonists. Such a manoeuvre, argues Peter Brooker, 
demanded ‘extraordinary contrivance’.35 And so too did the post-war reinvention of 
modernism in Britain. It was obliged to negotiate the ‘ubiquitous antinomies’ of this 
vision of the nation as both ‘pragmatic and visionary; urban and rural; international 
and national, and most importantly – refined and popular.’36 Whether it succeeded is 
another matter. The tensions within the polarity of culture that the Festival attempted 
to bring to a productive détente, which Patrick Wright brilliantly sums up as ‘the 
void… between the polarized clichés of Brideshead and the tower blocks’,37 were to 
continue to dominate the political climate in Britain for the remainder of the twentieth 
century and beyond.  
The Independent Group and their affiliated cadre of the fifties retained the 
Festival’s preoccupation with the intersections between the arts, technology and 
mass culture, its futurity, its new understanding of contemporary life and of 
transformations within the discursive environment, its cultural materialist attention to 
the ordinary, and its quest to find an appropriate cultural and artistic idiom with which 
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to reflect it. But they turned away from Brideshead, the ‘great tradition’ and the 
venerable “truths” of Britishness, and towards America to attempt to develop new 
representational practices that could articulate, and both celebrate and critique, the 
realities of life within a British consumer culture that was increasingly influenced by 
American values and attitudes.  
 
 
‘Over Here’: Americanisation in Fifties Britain 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, Britain had been irrevocably transformed from an 
obstinately parochial nation, clinging to the remnants of Empire, into a battered ex-
world power, grievously dependent upon the Marshall Plan for economic relief, but 
with a new, tentatively cosmopolitan, outlook. But whilst Britain struggled to reconcile 
itself with its new, more modest status on the world stage, the end of rationing in 
1954 heralded a consumer boom; as the lead article in a 1959 edition of Queen 
magazine devoted to the “boom... boom... boom” of the mid-fifties asked, ‘when did 
you last hear the word austerity?’38 Full employment and rising wages brought about 
a “social revolution” in which the fruits of affluence were not only confined to the 
upper echelons of the middle classes, ‘even working class families... found 
themselves in Priestley's “new England” with wirelesses, television sets, cinema 
visits and free-flowing gas and electricity’39. As Harry Hopkins writes: 
 
From hula hoops to Zen Buddhism, from do-it-yourself to laundrettes or the 
latest sociological catch-phrase or typographical trick, from Rock n' Roll to 
Action Painting, barbecued chickens rotating on their spits in the shop 
windows to parking meters, clearways, bowling alleys, glass-skyscrapers, 
flying saucers, pay-roll raids, armoured trucks and beatniks, American habits 
and vogues now crossed the Atlantic with a speed and certainty that 
suggested Britain was just one more offshore island.40 
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The upswing of the British economy in the affluent fifties meant booming consumer 
demand was met by the fruits of market revival in the United States, and the 
indefatigable rise of mass culture in Britain was fuelled by American cultural imports: 
the jukeboxes, rock and roll and paperback novels that Hoggart declaims in his 
virulently anti-Americanisation auto-ethnographic memoir, The Uses of Literacy, as 
‘sex in shiny packets’.41 
These aftershocks felt in the wake of World War II only deepened pre-existing 
anxieties about a weakened indigenous culture that was seen in the climate of 
cultural protectionism that had coalesced around the ‘Anglocentric turn’ of the thirties 
and 1940s. Whilst Britain, in geopolitical terms, was felt to be in the doldrums, 
arriviste America was enjoying an irresistible rise. Writing of the so-called cultural 
consensus of the post-war era, Dick Hebdige, explores Britain’s cultural antagonism 
towards America, identifying a set of ‘ideologically charged connotational codes’42 
which were shared and understood amongst a vast number of the great and the 
good of  the British cultural establishment: 
 
Groups and individuals as apparently unrelated as the British Modern Design 
establishment, BBC staff members, Picture Post and music paper journalists, 
critical sociologists, ‘independent’ cultural critics like [George] Orwell and 
[Richard] Hoggart, a Frankfurt-trained Marxist like [Herbert] Marcuse, even an 
obsessive isolationist like Evelyn Waugh, all had access to these codes.43 
 
For a British school of Kulturkritik that remained dominated by the Culture and 
Society tradition of thought, the “contamination” of British culture with American 
values posed a grievous threat to the attempt to mobilise a narrowly construed 
conceptualisation of (high) ‘culture’ against an increasingly and inexorably barbaric 
‘society’. As Duncan Webster astutely identifies: ‘America-as-threat goes back to the 
mid-nineteenth century and the reason that Americanisation is “absorbed” into the 
Culture and Society tradition [of British Kulturkritik] is because that is where the term 
came from’.44 
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The perceived threat of Americanisation prompted a new investigation of 
human experience and culture as “lived” from the Left. Distinguished from the 
metaphysical inheritance model of the Eliot-Leavis orthodoxy, the nascent field of 
English Cultural Studies had its precedents in the “ordinary concerns” of social 
documentary fiction (such as the thirties novels of George Orwell and the “proletarian 
authors” that emerged via John Lehmann’s Penguin New Writing series in the 
forties) and the Mass Observation movement of the thirties. But despite its proto-de 
Certeauan regard for the symbolic value of everyday life, its critique of elitist 
conceptualisations of culture and insistence upon broader definitions and a more 
expansive field of enquiry, this impulse amongst British intellectuals remained caught 
within the historical undertow of the sovereign tradition of British thought. The 
‘predominant tendency’ in the work of Williams, Hoggart, Thompson et al, Francis 
Mulhern argues, ‘has been to negate the specific social values of Kulturkritik while 
retaining their deep form, which it therefore repeats as the pattern of its own strategic 
imagination’.45 Accordingly, their attempts to take stock of cultural change remain 
fraught with anti-American feeling; these more inclusive, more egalitarian theories of 
a ‘common culture’ still balk at their own fevered visions of a low-rent, chromium-
plated, apple pie future. 
Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy (1957) registers this perceived threat in no 
uncertain terms, examining the folk devil ‘juke-box boys’ with their ‘American slouch’  
listening to the nickelodeon in ‘harshly lighted milk bars’, playing records that ‘almost 
all are American’, who ‘stare, as desperately as Humphrey Bogart, across tubular 
chairs.’46 They are, Hoggart writes, ‘living to a large extent in a myth world 
compounded of a few simple elements which they take to be those of American life’: 
the ‘modernistic knick-knacks… [and] glaring showiness’ that, for him, amount to an 
‘aesthetic breakdown’ which departs from ‘a balanced and civilised [tradition]’.47  
E.P. Thompson's The Making of The English Working Class (1963) sought to 
present the forgotten “biography” of the first working class political movement in the 
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century: 
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I am seeking to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 
“obsolete” hand-loom weaver, and even the deluded follower of Joanna 
Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity.48 
 
Thompson sought to formulate class as a dynamic ‘historical phenomenon’,49 not a 
static concept but a structure of human relationships. Since the English working 
classes have never made a bid for dominance, Thompson is forced to ‘make visible’ 
a tradition of dissent from a rebellious popular cultural tradition – from Jacobian 
agitation, the syndicalised workers groups of the Industrial Revolution, plebian 
Radicalism, the rioting Luddites and the “heroic” articulation of class consciousness 
at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. For him, popular culture is the manifestation of 
class consciousness. It is transmitted not from above via an élite, or a literary 
intelligentsia, but, as he argues in his later work, Customs and Culture (1991), via 
the ‘slowly differentiating ambiance of custom’.50 Just as Hoggart mourns the 
passing of an authentic popular culture eroded by the mass culture of the post-war 
era, Thompson's reading of its tradition of dissent is an attempt to galvanise its vital, 
rebellious spirit and present a historicised opposition to this new cultural hegemony. 
Raymond Williams' materialist approach to mass culture is more permissive. 
His thesis, developed in a triad of books – Culture and Society (1958), The Long 
Revolution (1961) and Marxism and Literature (1977) – argues for a sense of 
continuity in culture. As defined in The Long Revolution, this is the attempt to track 
the ‘meanings and values which are lived in works and relationships’ through the 
process of historical development.51 He seeks to undermine the ‘bad fiction of our 
second-rate social analysts’, whose ‘ritual indignation and despair at the cultural 
condition of “the masses” replicates the structures of domination they are attempting 
to analyse. Williams emphasises the social forces embedded in the concept: 
 
The version of the ordinary people as masses is not only the conscious 
creation of the élites (who work very hard at it, by the way). It is also a 
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conclusion from actual experience within the forms of a society which 
requires the existence of masses.52 
 
As such, he removes the distinction between popular “folk” culture and the mass 
culture of the contemporary scene, tracing the changing manifestations of a tradition 
of popular culture from the “rough music” of the seventeenth century to the mass-
produced entertainments of the mid-twentieth century as a product of social change 
rather than an index of cultural decline. He refutes the passivity and manipulation 
implicit in an ahistorical concept of mass culture. Under capitalism the cultural 
system may be in the hands of cowboy speculators but – as he reminds us – it is we 
who bankroll it.53 He insists that mass culture must be understood in these terms, 
legitimised as a cultural manifestation of social change with human dimensions, 
rather than condemned as the ahistorical imposition of capitalism's “invisible hands”. 
Culture, for Williams, is a ‘whole way of life’. As he writes in his 1958 essay, “Culture 
is Ordinary”, maintaining the distinction between high and low constitutes an 
‘extraordinary decision to call certain things culture and then separate them, as with 
a park wall, from ordinary people and ordinary work’.54  
But as Hoggart’s nightmare vision of jukebox Britain indicates, what tends to 
be at issue in these accounts is not simply the perceived threat of an American 
cultural imperialism but more a moral panic about the willingness with which the 
rebellious youth of the new mass working-class teenage market eschewed the 
‘peculiar gripping wholeness’ of a working class life bounded by hearth and lathe in 
favour of the ‘shiny barbarism’ of a appropriated and re-inscribed American 
mythology. And here lie the ‘deep forms’ of which Mulhern writes. What the debates 
about mass culture and Americanisation that emanated from the Birmingham School 
with one hand give – their insistence upon an understanding of mass culture as a 
series of complex interrelations which comprise of ‘whole way of life’, lending 
credence and legitimacy to the new mass culture – they, with the other, take away. 
By tacitly relying upon the quasi-mythical programme of betterment-by-Bildung, 
Hoggart, Williams et al. fail to theoretically interrogate the ways in which that culture 
is disseminated, effectively re-imposing the old hierarchies and value judgements.  
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In fact, an imagined community of wholeness and harmony – national culture, 
heritage and authentic “Englishness” – was being imperilled by far more diffuse 
forces. America had a lot to answer for. But its elevation as an icon of modernity 
indicates not so much the confidence and vitality of American culture, but the 
perhaps terminal decline of Britain’s own. As Dominic Sandbrook points out in his 
history of the period, Never Had It So Good, critics were ‘really arguing about the 
changing values of the affluent society rather than about Americans and American 
products themselves’.55 The old shibboleth of Americanisation was made to stand for 
a vast repertoire of the era’s most pressing concerns, including massification, 
generational conflict, technological advance and social mobility. A moral panic about 
what Christopher Brooker in his The Neophiliacs describes as a ‘new, more fluid, 
and dare one say it, more neurotic social structure in which no-one any longer knew 
with quite such certainty who or where they stood all the familiar landmarks were 
being eroded, nothing any longer seemed to be quite so real’.56 George Steiner 
mourns the distintegration of the ‘hierarchised, definitional value-gradients’ upon 
which ‘civilisation itself’ was based.57 Perhaps, commentators seemed to be 
suggesting at the time, the Leavis-Eliot orthodoxy, with their fears of the collapse of 
the citadels of “good culture” against which they had asserted a moral aesthetic, had 
been right after all.  
For its compelling sense of novelty and its egalitarian vitality, this ‘new 
classless Americanized world of Wimpy bars, coffee-bars, television, mini-motors, 
pre-packaged food, ice-skating, Marks and Spencers, Vespas and airport lounges’ 
described by Anthony Sampson in his 1962 Anatomy of Britain was embraced by 
many.58 What Hoggart derided as a ‘candy floss world’ represented for downtrodden 
Britons a thrilling alternative to fossilised and yet still pervasive establishmentarian 
attitudes, cultural conservatism and the stiff upper lip. As Alan Sinfield writes, ‘if 
“Americanization” was indeed cultural imperialism, it was also… a mode of 
resistance.’59 By the youth of the fifties, ‘a fantasy image of US cultural power’ was 
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deployed ‘against a home situation that offered them little’.60 And it was beginning to 
be theorised similarly by the cultural commentators of the period. Even whilst the 
culture wars continued to rage, there began to emerge what Susan Sontag, in her 
seminal 1965 essay of the same name, called ‘the new sensibility’; an approach to 
culture that was devoutly pluralistic and anti-elitist, one that has ‘broken… with the 
Matthew Arnold notion of culture, finding it historically and humanly obsolescent’ and 
no longer ‘demand[s] that pleasure in art necessarily be associated with edification’, 
that can experience a Rauschenberg painting, a song by the Supremes, the ‘brio and 
elegance of Budd Boetticher’s The Rise and Fall of Legs Diamond’ and the ‘singing 
style of Dionne Warwick’ equally and ‘without condescension’ as alike in richness 
and in value.61 The ‘new sensibility’ began to discard the hitherto unchallenged 
Greenbergian view of “kitsch” and to engage affirmatively with mass culture, 
attempting to do away with the old distinctions between “high” and “low,  “popular” 
and “mass”, along with the intellectual’s traditional antipathy towards technology, 
whilst navigating the legacies of modernism. America, or rather, Amerika provided 
writers and artists with the material – often quite literally – with which to do so. Within 
the cultural landscape of the fifties and sixties in Britain, these ‘hysterical 
constructions of America as “enemy”, Dick Hebdige argues, represented ‘a 
repressed, potentially fertile realm invoked against the grain’ where between “official” 
and “unofficial” taste formations’ transgressive and potentially oppositional meanings 
could be articulated in a ‘productive clash of opposing forces’.62 The writers affiliated 
with the Independent Group like Hebdige and Lawrence Alloway credit the IG with 
effecting a paradigmatic shift in notions of cultural hierarchy. In a 1958 essay 
Alloway coined the important term the ‘long front of culture’ to describe a continuum 
between high and mass art wherein ‘unique oil paintings’ sit comfortably beside 
‘mass-distributed magazines’ and ‘highly personal poems’ alongside ‘group-aimed 
magazines’.63  
Reactivating a radical (and largely continental) artistic heritage that included 
Surrealism’s signature juxtapositions, its use of objets trouvés and its investigations 
into the unconscious, Dadaism’s elevation of the aleatory and anti-art rejection of 
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traditional notions of aesthetic value, Cubism’s interest in collage forms and multi-
perspectivity and Futurism’s preoccupation with the machine aesthetic, speed and 
technological revolution, and enmeshing it with the Freudo-Marxist thought of the 
period, they sought to develop a new, demotic artistic vernacular that would 
constitute – as the Independent Group entitled their inaugural exhibition at the ICA in 
1953 – a ‘parallel of life and art’, a new form of artistic attention that was capable at 
once of articulating the new ways of contemporary life and of penetrating its “forest 
of signs” to expose mass culture’s hidden interior logics. This alternative paradigm of 
dissident thinking came in reaction against the traditions of thought that still 
continued, in modified forms, to dominate the intellectual climate of the post-war so-
called consensus: the perceived impoverishment of the ideals of the Culture and 
Society tradition, with its “moral aesthetic”, its ethos of “commitment”, its overtly 
egalitarian attitudes and yet persistently-held demarcations between high and low 
culture, welfare culture’s paternalistically well-intended but complacently mandarin 
values, hands tied by its betrothal to both the state and the Oxbridge axis, and its 
attempts to dole out the castor oil of “good culture”.  
In what follows, by exploring Quin’s Tripticks, and its resonances within the 
literature and art of the period, I want to examine the ways in which the writers and 
artists of this tendency turned to an Amerikan dreamscape in order to speculate 
upon a new role for art in a mass media age. One that did not so much represent a 
radical break from earlier forms of representation as a transformation of them. And, 
in doing so, I want to argue that these British experimental writers of the sixties were 
not so much legatees of thinkers like the Tel Quel group, Roland Barthes, Jacques 
Derrida and Julia Kristeva, but co-explorers in parallel – although, significantly 
through fiction rather than theory – of shared but differently concieved literary-
philosophical preoccupations with language that also animated Situationism’s 
critique of the mass media “spectacle” of advanced capitalism, for example, and Tel 
Quel’s epistemological interrogation of the sign system. 
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The Policeman Inside All of Our Heads 
 
By comparison to the critiques of mass culture that were emerging from Frankfurt, 
Berkeley and Paris during the period, British intellectual culture’s own attempts at 
resistance seem rather parochial. Freudo-Marxism, the attempt to synthesise a 
reinterpretation of Freudian psychoanalytic theory with the political philosophy of 
Marx, was begun by Frankfurt School thinkers like Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas 
and dispersed mostly to the United States following the rise of Nazism in Europe. 
Following a bizarre but highly influential detour via Wilhelm Reich’s cloud-busting 
orgasmatrons in the thirties and forties, in the fifties, it become popularised in the 
U.S. with books like Herbert Marcuse’s Eros and Civilisation (1955), Norman O. 
Brown’s Life Against Death (1959) and Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civilisation 
(1964). This group of critical theorists sought to supplement the socio-economic 
analysis of historical development with Freud’s conceptualisation of the dynamic 
unconscious, and by drawing together the theory and methodology of Marxism with a 
psychoanalytic account of the self and of human motivation, to attempt to explain the 
appeal of political and capitalist authoritarianism. And, elaborating upon Adorno and 
Horkeimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), whose hermetic logic of co-optation, 
commodification and absorption had led to stalemate, these thinkers sought to plot 
routes of resistance by exploring the interaction between the individual and society: 
the ways in which capitalism imposes its norms upon its subjects and how these 
norms are introjected by the intra-psychic mechanism described by Freud’s schema.  
Herbert Marcuse, like Adorno and Horkheimer, identifies the inherent 
contradictions within this stage of capitalism and his One-Dimensional Man (1964) 
attempts to uncover its potentials, as well as the system’s efforts to close these 
loopholes:  
 
The technological processes of mechanization and standardization might 
release individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of freedom beyond 
necessity... the individual would be free to exert autonomy over a life that 
would be his own. If the productive apparatus could be organized and 
directed toward the satisfaction of vital needs, its control might well be 
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centralized; such control would not prevent individual autonomy, but render 
it possible.64 
 
Since, Marcuse argues, the logical end-point of ‘technological rationality’65 would be 
its own destruction, the established order must perpetuate the system via the 
‘manipulation of needs by vested interests’.66 Theodor Roszak calls this the 
‘technocracy’, defining it as the ‘social form in which an industrial society reaches the 
peak of its organizational integration’.67 The aim of the technocracy is ‘human 
organization that matches the precision of our mechanistic organization’, a process 
of ‘social engineering’ that ensures its perpetuation and the elimination of opposition 
to the system. Order is imposed from above, via a ‘regime of experts’68 who ‘assume 
authoritarian influence over even the most seemingly personal aspects of life: sexual 
behaviour, child-rearing, and mental health’. 69 
Behaviourism, a branch of experimental psychology that had emerged 
between the wars, for its attempts to discover and codify techniques for controlling 
human behaviour, was perceived to have spawned a monster. This was the applied 
social science of what became known pejoratively as the “technocracy” and the 
beginnings of the “quanitifed self” where, in an age of Dr. Spock, Alfred Kinsey and 
Anna Freud’s ego psychology, state and corporate institutions employed social 
scientists – psychiatrists, anthropologists and sociologists – to investigate, and to 
monetise, the libidinally-directed motivations of the individual self and sought to 
expand these models of human desire into a schema of mass psychology. Amongst 
commentators, the fate of the individual was felt to be that of a maze-bound rat, 
covertly and insidiously coerced and manipulated by secret armies of malign execs, 
shadowy bureaucrats and sinister lab-coated experts. The cognitive revolution 
rapidly augmented behaviourist techniques with computational models of the mind. 
Psychometric testing, the quantification of human behaviour, was designed to adapt 
the population to the demands of the new corporate life. 
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The archetypal figure of the era was that which William H. Whyte christened 
the “organization man”, in his eponymous book which appeared in 1956 and which 
was just one of a raft of industrial sociology bestsellers that took as their subject 
matter the newly-ubiquitous ‘man in the gray flannel suit’. Whyte argues convincingly 
that throughout the western world, but especially in America, new models of 
bureaucratic collectivism have quietly displaced the myths of rugged individualism 
that had characterised capitalism’s earlier phase. A new secular faith in a “social 
ethic”, which located meaning in what Whyte calls “belongingness”, pursues, via the 
application of scientific rationality, its belief in the capacity of “organization” to deploy 
the techniques of science in order to eliminate conflict in human relationships and to 
create harmony and equilibrium in the relationship between the individual and 
society.70 Suburbia, the large corporation, the Myers-Briggs Type indicator, the new 
class of middle management were all the stuff of the “organization life”. Avatars of 
the period can be found, for example, in B.S. Johnson’s penultimate novel, Christie 
Malry’s Own Double Entry (1973), or in John Berger’s Corker’s Freedom (1964). 
Johnson’s novel is a black farce of technocratic ennui, which chronicles a young 
accounts clerk’s petty grievances and frustrations and his attempts to claim a kind of 
existential recompense for the personal injustices enacted upon him by using the 
organisation systems of the technocracy against itself. He operates a system of 
moral double entry book-keeping, keeping a balance sheet of wrongs and rights and 
claiming his debts via bigger and bigger terrorist atrocities. The novel ends, after 
Malry contracts cancer and dies, with the words “Account Closed”. Corker’s 
Freedom, a diminished mirror image of Joyce’s Ulysses, is set over the course of a 
day and describes the attempts by its protagonist, the septuagenarian proprietor of a 
down-at-heel Croydon employment agency, William Corker, to seize his freedom and 
escape the banality of his white-collar life.   
During the era, the behaviourist’s attempts to make materialist interventions in 
the mind were extended by new methods of “motivation research” which sought to 
probe the consumer unconscious: their fantasies and their desires. This new phase 
in consumer capitalism came first to the affluent America of the post-war era. 
Despite Americans’ increasing disposable incomes due to the post-war market 
revival, market researchers were stumped by the inability of market forces to fully 
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exploit consumer wants. Marketing underwent a “revolution”, shifting its focus from 
satisfying consumer needs to mobilising their libidinal desires. Surveys of the time 
began to debunk the old assumption of the traditional ‘nose-counting’71 school of 
marketing: that the consumer knows what they want, that they can be trusted to tell 
you the truth about those wants and that the consumer will behave rationally, that 
they make economic decision based upon “perfect knowledge”.72 The new figure of 
the consumer in the fifties was capricious, emotional, unreasonable and irrationally-
motivated. In response, marketeers employed new methods of ‘motivation research’, 
using ‘depth research’ to attempt to probe the unconscious. As the founder of the 
Institute for Motivation Research, Ernest Dichter explains, in his The Strategy of 
Desire (1960):  
 
Whatever your attitude toward modern psychology or psychoanalysis, it has 
been proved beyond any doubt that many of our daily decisions are 
governed by motivations over which we have no control and of which we are 
quite often unaware.73 
 
These new findings were employed by the advertising industry to direct and to 
influence consumer motivation by encouraging the desublimation of libidinal desires 
into economic wants. Edward Bernays, an Austrian émigré and Freud’s nephew, had 
combined his uncle’s psychoanalysis, together with the theories of crowd psychology 
developed by psychologists such as Gustave Le Bon and Wilfred Trotter, to found 
the public relations industry, opening his consultancy in New York in 1919. Bernays 
argues that the ‘conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and 
opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society’,74 and not only 
in the commercial sphere, but also in that of politics and social life. The chaos of 
mass society, where the very scale of human experience was undergoing seismic 
shifts, he argued, could and should be tamed through the application of new 
scientific techniques to categorise and organise the masses and the use of new 
technological media of communication to direct human motivation.  
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Bernays famously called this the ‘engineering of consent’. Implicit here is, on 
the one hand, the distrust of the “irrational” subject and the “herd instinct” of mass 
society and, on the other, a belief in capitalism’s inherent benevolence. Both 
Bernays and Dichter characterise the hegemony of the dominant order as a 
fundamentally benign, paternal elite who are motivated by ‘socially constructive 
goals and values’ with the aim of a ‘smooth-running society’.75 Social engineering, 
they argue, is the ‘very essence of the democratic process, the freedom to persuade 
and suggest’.76 Although Bernays admits his methods are open to misuse, for him 
the onus is on a supervisory elite to master the ‘operational know-how of consent 
engineering, and to out-manoeuvre his opponents in the public interest’.77 The 
unimpeachable cultural value of “expertise” has replaced that of “ethics”. Under 
paternal supervision, he argues, the masses could enjoy the spoils of consumer 
capitalism, unfettered by their own ignorance and irrationality.  
Another key avatar of the period was Herbert Marcuse’s “one-dimensional 
man” whose individual capacity for critical thought and dissent has withered away. 
Marcuse describes how in advanced industrial societies, individuals are integrated 
into existing systems of production and consumption via mass media, advertising 
and industrial management, which work to erode the ego and to impose upon man a 
reality principle of false consciousness. Synthesising Marx and Freud to examine the 
pathologising effects of consumer capitalism upon what he called the ‘neurotic 
personality of our time’, in Eros and Civilisation (1955), and later in One Dimensional 
Man, Marcuse explains how technological reality works to impose a Reality Principle 
of false consciousness, then disarms the instinctual revolt via ‘controlled 
desublimation’78 of instinctual drives: the ‘scientific management of libido’.79 
Distinguished from sublimation, which is the transformation of libido into socially 
productive forces, for Marcuse the desublimation effected by consumer culture is 
repressive. It reconfigures the subject as consumer and redirects their libido from the 
tabooed object of desire onto a phantom object, the commodity, that bears the trace 
of that taboo. Marcuse argues that this process erodes the Ego. The technocracy 
produces a new form of “introjection”, not in the Freudian sense of the Ego’s 
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continual adjustment via the Reality Principle, but as a mimetic process that 
constitutes the ‘immediate identification of the individual with his society, and, 
through with, with the society as a whole’.80 
 
 
A Parallel of Life and Art 
 
It was to this new, subliminal quality of culture that the art of the fifties and sixties in 
Britain turned. The Independent Group were a loose agglomeration of artists, 
architects, designers, critics and theorists working in and around the Institute of 
Contemporary Arts in London during the fifties. As an art practice, what Anne 
Massey calls their ‘expendable aesthetic’ was wildly diverse, both within the group 
and within the artists' own oeuvres. When Eduardo Paolozzi began exhibiting his 
scrapbooked mass media collages, he was perhaps best known for his sculptures in 
bronze which are extraterrestrial relics that combine biomorphic and mechanical 
forms. Nigel Henderson produced social documentary photography after Brassai, 
depicting the decay of post-war Britain alongside new advertising hoardings and 
shopfronts, as well as artificially-distressed photomontage in which petrified images 
of the body sit alongside microscopic photographs and advertisements. Richard 
Hamilton, though better known for his collage works – especially “Just what is it that 
makes today's homes so different, so appealing” - produced the early series 
“Trainsition” which married the painterly impulse of Abstract Expressionism and the 
dynamism of Futurism to create paintings that explore mechanisation. The early 
Constructivist collages of John McHale are specifically designed for mass 
production, a maquette of neutral forms designed for self-assembly. Later he 
produced collaged books, headlines and news and advertising photographs cut into 
bound strips to be read in any order, then collage paintings of the ‘media-fed man’,81 
primitivist figures composed of mass media, microscopic and architectural imagery. 
Architects Alison and Peter Smithson were the founders of the Brutalist style of 
architecture that challenged the prevalent “soft Modernism” of the fifties. They 
conjoin architectural draughtsmanship and collage to create blueprints for the city of 
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the future, a sociologically-engaged urbanism that sought to explore the impact of 
mass media on the cityscape. In their (unsuccessful) proposal for the Golden Lane 
housing complex in London, the figures of Joe DiMaggio and Marilyn Monroe are 
embedded in rapidograph plan. 
Perhaps most exemplary of their new strategies of representation is 
Paolozzi’s Bunk (1972) series, comprised of scrapbooked pages of images he had 
collected during the forties and fifties. In the series, images of consumer durables – 
tinned food, wireless sets, kitchen appliances, motorbikes, cars – are collaged 
cheek-by-jowl with those of starlets, beauty queens, models and bodybuilders. In the 
most famous, “I Was a Rich Man's Plaything” - credited with the first appearance of 
the word “pop” - the cover of pulp magazine Intimate Confessions, with its stylised 
portrait of a vamp in lingerie and salacious cover headlines (“I Confess”, “If this be 
Sin”) is decoupaged with a cartoon pop gun, an illustration of cherry pie and a torn 
section from an orange juice advertisement which reads “Real Gold”. This sits 
alongside a jingoistic postcard (“Keep 'Em Flying”) of a bomber aircraft and a section 
of a Coca Cola advertisement.  
 These artists, then, sought to disembowel mass culture's iconography to 
reveal the hidden ideologies at work behind mythic structures. Arising from the same 
moment, in Mythologies (1957), Barthes attempted to develop a structural analysis of 
the communications patterns of the mass media. Modern myth, he argues, is a 
second order semiological system imposed on the sign. It converts the sign into an 
‘empty, parasitical form’82 that liquidates the plurality of meaning in favour of concept 
to be appropriated, ‘confused, made of yielding, shapeless associations’.83 Myth 
‘transforms history into nature’,84 and with this creates a world of essences where 
meaning is immanent. By scrambling the mass media’s coded messages of sex, 
consumerism, violence and power, Bunk debunks their “naturalness”, drawing 
attention to the means of their construction, to the latent machinations of the culture 
industry by which cars are indelibly associated with virility, lipsticks with sex, their, as 
Hebdige writes, ‘loaded arbitrariness’.85 They expose what Julian Myers calls the 
‘distorted logic of fetishism’86 that is operant upon mass culture’s visual imagination. 
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And by detourning the cultural industry’s mythology with the logic of fetish, this 
‘popular art remade according to private fantasy’87 reveals the scaffolding of 
desublimation.  
On the one hand, the Independent Group’s subversion of the messages of 
mass culture sought to reveal the ways in which the culture industry had moved to 
reinvent the commodity value of objects, endowing them with the mythic capabilities 
of fulfilling even our most private desires. Marx had argued that the alienation of the 
worker from the product of his labour had produced the commodity fetish, whereby 
objects are desired for the exchange value over and above their use value: ‘a 
definite social relation between men… assumes the fantastic form of a relation 
between things.’ But as thinkers like Marcuse and Adorno argue, by this later period, 
the social processes (what Adorno calls the object’s ‘social rating’) by which we 
assign value to things had now inhered within the object as its quasi-essential 
properties. Julian Myers argues that the IG's work is a kind of ‘politicized fetishism’88 
that affirmatively engages with mass culture to produce a ‘capitalist surrealism’89 that 
‘rewrote postwar capitalist technoculture as a bizarre, dysfunctional circus, martial 
seriousness as pornographic compulsion’.90 As the IG's Richard Hamilton writes in 
1962, ‘sex is everywhere, symbolized in the glamour of mass-produced luxury – the 
interplay of fleshy plastic and smooth, fleshier metal’.91 And, on the other, they 
sought to examine the processes of aesthetic production in mass culture, the ways in 
which value is similarly assigned to the work of art, despite it being traditionally held 
to be metaphysically removed from the machinations of the culture industry by its 
privileged status. By reversing the process which Walter Benjamin describes in his 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, whereby an ‘aura’ inheres 
as a ritual value within unique works of art that is absent in their mere reproduction, 
the Independent Group sought to question the role of art in an age where, as John 
Berger argues, in an oft-quoted passage of his landmark Ways of Seeing: ‘[f]or the 
first time ever, images of art have become ephemeral, ubiquitous, insubstantial, 
available, valueless, free’.92 For if – as Adorno argues – the significance of the work 
of art is defined as its exchange-value and therefore it is ‘valuable only to the extent 
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that it can be exchanged’,93 then what is it that distinguishes that which is art from 
that which is not?  
In 1967, prose editor J.G. Ballard recruited Paolozzi to join Ambit, a quarterly 
“little magazine” with the same set of preoccupations – modernism, mass culture and 
technology – as the Independent Group. Under the editorship of paediatrician Dr. 
Martin Bax, Ambit sought to erase the boundaries and hierarchies between image 
and text, publishing word art and visual fiction alongside short stories, poems, 
criticism, graphic design, illustration and photomontage. For Paolozzi, the magazine 
was the ideal medium to explore this matrix of interests. Marshall McLuhan agreed, 
noting the upsurge in magazines like Time and Newsweek and the format's mimicry 
of television's ‘mosaic format’ in his Understanding Media (1964). With the advent of 
TV, the old, linear pictoral world has been replaced by mosaic imagery, a ‘trend 
towards the iconic image’94 which replaces the consumer image of a product with 
‘compressed images that include producer and consumer, seller and society in a 
single image’.95 Television's new mosaic image, according to McLuhan, has its 
precedent in the symbolist techniques of modernism – those of Mallarmé, Eliot, 
Pound and Joyce. The mosaic is a constellation of synecdochic images, where 
signification is achieved through juxtaposition. The mesh of fragments must be 
welded together by the viewer to complete the image. In relying on surrogates, the 
mosaic image of the magazine, or of television, is a ‘cool medium’ that ‘invites 
maximal participation in the social process’.96 Yet again, mass culture has a 
subliminal, coercive quality, as McLuhan writes: 
 
By requiring us to constantly fill in the spaces of the mosaic mesh, the 
iconoscope is tattooing its message directly on our skins.97 
 
Ambit co-opted the medium, producing its own mosaic images to subvert the linearity 
and consequentiality of print media towards the discontinuity of the electronic 
universe in order to probe the ways in which media “massages” consciousness. 
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‘Noses Pressed Against the Glass’ 
 
The preoccupation with Americana in the art of the fifties and sixties was criticised at 
the time for its lurid fascination with American culture, which was perceived by some 
critics as a thoroughly uncritical (in fact, anti-critical) and un-dialectical infatuation 
that amounted in a disingenuous collusion with the very worst of the culture industry. 
What later became known as “Pop” was simply, John Adkins Richardson writes, a 
‘revelation of the obvious’, with tiredly satiric designs upon the straw man of 
American culture. In subsequent critical surveys of the period, Pop has been credited 
and denigrated in turn for opening up the floodgates of postmodernism. Now, when 
postmodernism’s discourse of aesthetic inclusiveness is increasingly thought to 
militate against the singularity and difference of cultural forms that it purports to 
permit and, worse, there is the suspicion that its ability to recuperate all-comers 
masks its absconding from the political sphere and its ideological collusion with the 
status quo, Pop’s camp refusal to differentiate looks like hubris. Its most abiding 
legacy seems to be the commercially ubiquitous Pop aesthetic and the priceless and 
endlessly reproduced Andy Warhol screen prints, and the ethics of this movement’s 
attempts to co-opt the co-opted co-option seem more difficult to locate than ever.  
 Within the culture industry’s complex and insidious economies of desire, this 
tendency within the art of the fifties and sixties played the markets. These artists 
sought to draw out the latent erotic qualities of mass culture by détourning the visual 
grammars of advertising and the mass media to reveal the hidden economies of 
desire that lay behind the billboards. But also, and in equal measure, by – quite 
literally – reframing the detritus of mass culture within a new, fine art context, they 
sought to dismantle the ‘vertical fallacy’98 of cultural hierarchy. And beyond the 
debates about their collusion (or otherwise) with mass culture, this essential 
ambivalence sought to circumnavigate the fundamental Adornian impasse within 
Western thought that failed to match its ideals with praxis. The old hopes, for 
example, of transcendence in art which were only ever open to a self-perpetuating 
dynastical elite. The “disinterested pleasure” of Kantian aesthetic judgement would 
wash its hands of the new mass art, failing, on the one hand, to acknowledge its 
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aesthetic value and generative possibilities, and, on the other, to interrogate its 
significance. As Alison and Peter Smithson write: 
 
Today we are being edged out of our traditional role by the new phenomenon 
of the popular arts – advertising… We must somehow get the measure of this 
intervention if we are to match its powerful and exciting impulses with our 
own.99 
 
Marcuse argues that ‘the progress of technological rationality is liquidating the 
oppositional and transcendent elements in the “higher culture”’,100 and not by the 
shifting of cultural values – as the apologists for mass culture celebrate – but via 
mechanical reproduction and dissemination, ‘through their wholesale incorporation 
into the established order, through their production and display on a massive 
scale’.101 The totality of the culture industry subsumes all, in a ‘stereotyped 
appropriation of everything’.102 Mass culture is, for Adorno, the ultimate stylist. It 
strives for a ‘prearranged harmony’103 where ‘the formula replaces the work’104 to 
create a caricature of style. This is style as imposition, with its regularity and 
predictability it is an expression of social power. When the culture industry works to 
effect an immediate identification of the individual with society, as manifested in the 
romance between consumer and product, purity of style becomes a form of 
domination: 
 
From every sound film and every broadcast program the social effect can 
be inferred which is exclusive to none but shared by all alike. The culture 
industry as a whole has molded men as a type unfailingly produced in every 
product.105 
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Maverick deviations are regarded as ‘calculated mutations’ which ‘confirm the validity 
of the system’.106 In this sense, the ‘parallel of life and art’ constitutes the potential 
for resistance. As the machinations of the culture industry work to liquidate the high 
culture's ideals, their avant-garde position is valorised. Their affirmative engagement 
with mass culture co-opts, détournes, and – in William Burrough's terms – “sprays 
back” its non-Aristotelian logic. Though they remain politically ambiguous, in refuting 
the totalising impulses of mass culture, of nineteenth-century bourgeois art, and of a 
modernist legacy haunted by nostalgia for totality, they mark out a separate space 
within which art – and literature – might operate.  
 
 
‘Adventure Lies Ahead’: British experimental writing and ‘naïve mimesis’ 
 
But it is quite beyond doubt that the development of writing will not be 
indefinitely bound by the claims to power of academic and commercial 
activity; rather, quantity is approaching the moment of a qualitative leap 
when writing, advancing ever more deeply into the graphic regions of its new 
eccentric figurativeness will take sudden possession of adequate factual 
content. In this picture writing, poets, who will now as in earlier times be first 
and foremost experts in writing, will be able to participate only by mastering 
the fields in which (quite unobtrusively) it is being constructed: the statistical 
and technical diagram.107 
 
Walter Benjamin speculates on the future of the book in the age of mass media, 
when print is ‘subjected to the brutal heteronomies of economic chaos’,108 torn from 
its ‘refuge in the book’ to be ‘dragged out on the street in advertisements’.109 He 
foresees a ‘qualitative leap’ when the old disputes between high and low culture will 
be laid aside, and poetry will begin to co-opt and master the new techniques of 
advertising to assert its primacy in the construction of ‘picture writing’.110 He was not 
alone in recognising the potentials of technological mass media for literature. George 
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Steiner speculates that ‘the “textual” character of our writing’ and the ‘private library 
may soon be archaic and increasingly “luxurious” modes’ and ‘[p]rivacies of 
perception… may be lost’ but in equal measure remains tentatively optimistic about 
‘the excitement, the sense of discovery, being registered by those who can make 
sentences dance and change on the screen’.111 Amongst literary intellectuals of the 
sixties, visions of technological apocalypse were tempered by the recognition of its 
generative possibilities. Technology presented the opportunity to step out of a literary 
history that was a process of hierarchical displacement organised around 
experimentation and cliché and to widen the remit of art. As William Burroughs writes 
in “The Future of the Novel”: 
 
If writers are to travel in space time and explore areas opened up by the 
space age, i [sic] think they must develope [sic] techniques quite as new and 
definite as the techniques of physical space travel.112 
 
By no means convinced that “another world is possible”, that the new, textual 
world might, whilst demolishing our long-held notions about truth, meaning and 
identity, also furnish us with radical new life-strategies with which to navigate these 
new ways of living, writers like Quin, Ballard and Burns choose to accept their status 
as the hyper-mediated denizens of Guy Debord’s ‘society of the spectacle’. Their 
work occupies, as Roger Luckhurst has written, that uneasy ‘knife edge of complicity 
and critique’.113 As a kind of neo-avant-garde writing with a sophisticated awareness 
of the problems of co-optation, commodification and absorption, this mode of writing 
is altogether less assured about the radical potential and political efficacy of the 
project of interrogating language’s foundational structures. The attempt to sublate life 
and art here has a more modest remit. These writers chose to engage with mass 
culture not to plot paths of resistance but, on the one hand, to develop new, neo-
realist strategies of representation. For if the hyper-mediated experience of 
contemporary life is already beyond belief, if the truth is already stranger than fiction, 
then the fiction could at least evolve better and more perceptive ways in which to 
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capture that experience. And, on the other hand, by doing violence to an already 
degraded language and by disembowelling mass culture’s iconography, these novels 
problematize the hierarchical positioning of art and mass culture. For Quin, Ballard, 
Burns and others, mass culture is a rich and legitimate source of generative material. 
Finding a literary idiom that demonstrates an awareness of the materiality of 
language, of the visual, rather than textual, imagination of the mediatised subject and 
of the book as a physical object, in works such as Quin’s Tripticks, as well as, for 
example, Burns’ Dreamerika! and Ballard’s The Atrocity Exhibition, these writers 
speculate upon what the new, non-redemptive role of art might be.  
Amongst their effects, British literary cut/up employed the disruption of syntax 
via the welding of embedded narratives; the use of ideogrammatic devices that make 
page layout representational (such as listing, subtitles, the epistolary format) and the 
incorporation of facsimile found graphic-typographic elements within the page (such 
as newspaper headlines, illustrations or photographs). The first does not disrupt the 
weave of the text, in fact it employs the conventional linearity of narrative to catalyse 
its strange juxtapositions. The latter two, however, are examples of what Glyn White 
calls ‘graphic devices’.114 In the introduction to his study of their effects, Reading the 
Graphic Surface, White argues that the use of such devices is not merely an 
instance of Shklovskian defamiliarisation, used – as Brian McHale’s Postmodernist 
Fiction argues – to foreground the presence of the book as object. Instead, he 
argues that ‘such disruptions may be the result of efforts to make the text function in 
a more mimetic manner’.115 All three maintain the status of the book, not attempting 
to climb out of its consecutive, bound pages, but, like Ambit magazine, putting the 
medium to work. White, borrowing Christine Brooke-Rose’s term, calls this 
overturning of literary convention ‘naïve mimesis’.116 As Brooke-Rose explains 
elsewhere: 
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All right, people will say, “How do you expect your reader to follow this?” But 
I'm surprised that readers find this difficult. They all live like this.117 
 
These techniques signalled a new recognition of the materiality of language, 
of the book as an object, of text as construction and of narrative as arrangement. 
This tendency of British cut/up – in Dadaist style – consistently defers political 
commitment, remaining deeply ambiguous. It chooses engagement - and fascination 
with – mass culture over the revolutions promised by the free-floating signifier.  As 
paratactic works they speculate on linguistic and typographical innovation, not 
through the theorising of a potential literature, but via the development of the novel 
form. This is a surrealism for the Jet Age: politically ambiguous, pornographic, 
militant whilst systematically refusing the moral gratifications of satire. This mode 
openly acknowledges its modernist inheritance, although whilst modernism’s effects 
were employed to materialise the experience of modernity as trauma, by the fifties, 
for the writers and artists of this coterie, there was no longer any need to simulate 
insanity: psychopathology was already manifest at the level of everyday life. As J.G. 
Ballard cautionary oeuvre attests: 
 
We must bear in mind, however sadly, that psychopathology is no longer the 
exclusive preserve of the degenerate and perverse. The Congo, Vietnam, 
Biafra – these are games anyone can play.118  
 
Tripticks is Quin’s first visual-textual work. Vast tracts of ventriloquised, stream-of-
consciousness narrative are interspersed with comic strip-style doodles by the artist, 
Carol Annand which depict stills from the inner fantasia, including Dali-esque scenes 
of melting wedding parties, crude cartoons of fragmented female bodies, portraits 
reproduced as shooting range targets, painstaking pen-and-ink renderings of 
advertising hoardings and iconic Hollywood images: Shirley Temple illustrated in 
type and a doodle of Marlene Dietrich. It chronicles the journey of its unnamed 
narrator in pursuit of his ‘No. 1 X-wife and her schoolboy gigolo’ (7) and, in turn, 
pursued – literally rather than figuratively – by his own demons across a phantasmic 
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Amerikan landscape that is an oneiric projection of his own fractured and colonised 
inner space. As she does in her earlier fictions, here once again, Quin deploys 
narrative’s Oedipal rationale to dramatise in fiction the all-too-human search for a 
fiction of origin that might solve the riddle of identity. A quest that in Tripticks Quin, 
anticipating Fredric Jameson’s definition of identity as ‘the effect of a certain 
temporal unification of past and future with one’s present’,119 defines as: 
 
An attempt explicit, ardent, heroic perhaps, though at best only half successful 
– to perform the most necessary task: to connect the past with the future. 
(176) 
 
Here, however, who is pursed and who the pursuer is no longer clear: ‘[w]ho was 
chasing who I had forgotten’ (136). Jittery and trigger-happy, the protagonist’s 
paranoid imagination weaves the dizzingly inchoate fragments of his world into an 
elaborate conspiracy whose threat has become internalised. Its origins remain 
unclear. Is it the shadowy Nightripper, a.k.a. the ‘Mystic Murderer’ (59), a drug 
pusher and a Black Mass leader straight from the pages of Black Mask magazine, 
with ‘war-painted face’ and ‘silvered toenails’ who whilst hallucinating a ‘Bosch vision 
of hell’ the protagonist  become convinced is his ‘motherfucking father’? Is it his 
mother in law’s women’s liberation group WITCH (Women’s International Terrorist 
Conspiracy from Hell)? Or is it the Man from U.N.C.L.E. (22)?  
Our anti-hero is a man without qualities, a mere ‘particularity of flesh attired in 
a grey suit and a button-down Brooks Brothers shirt’ (7). In Quin’s hands the self-
made man of Amerikan myth becomes a mediated and mediatised self-fashioning 
hero. This protean self has ‘many names’ and [m]any faces’ (7), inventing and 
reinventing himself as an ever-proliferating series of fantasy personae through 
recourse to desultory fragments of pre-existing representational codes. He ‘trie[s] on 
his faces in the rear-view mirror’ (163): an angelheaded hipster-prophet spooked by 
his own interior visions (9), a corrupt drunkard politician (9), a serial rapist (9), the 
‘surly, inarticulate “man like I mean”’ (15), a ‘long-haired stranger from across the 
border’ (24), Superman (50), a would-be Thoreau in search of his Walden (83), an 
‘infamous gunslinger’ (122), a ‘sensitive intellectual’ (122), and a ‘crime fighter’ (136). 
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As the novel progresses, his fantasy avatars become ever more elaborate; 
composed of unlikely minutiae that parody the metrics and archetypes of personality 
testing: an ‘health faddist and sometime plumbing engineer and now an itinerant 
diemaker on his way out’, for example, (163), an ‘artful managerial mechanism, oiled 
with serenity, unanimity and self-confidence’ (163),and a ‘big bear of a man’ with the 
‘hard blue eyes of a riverboat gambler’ who is a ‘budding billionaire’ with a ‘strong 
fondness for the trappings of success’ but who is ‘never given credit for exceptional 
performances or generous impulses’ (172), but also the ‘little man beset by terrors 
and nightmares’ (174).  
‘Now I could try to ease my way out of this by saying I didn’t ask questions, 
just stated my personality’ (16), the unnamed protagonist reasons. But in Tripticks 
personhood is externally and discursively constructed and always demands 
complicity with a world that depersonalises. Here the authenticity, mystery and the 
privacy of human character have been scientifically winnowed by a culture industry 
and psychological establishment in cahoots to create quantified selves that reduce 
human identity to the atomised assemblage of meaningless signifiers. ‘The E-meter’, 
one scrap of pseudo-puffery announces, ‘can not only detect unhealthy habit 
patterns during the oedipal period, but can also pick up subtle emanations from a 
tomato.’ (21) Here, then, the claims of identity can only be a tick-box litany of parodic 
Myers-Briggs-style metrics: 
 
I am sophisticated 
considered attractive 
interested in marriage 
liberal regarding sex 
more of a dove than a hawk 
my date should be psychologically weaker 
I am optimistic 
Pot and pop-pills are morally right 
I drink regularly (21) 
 
Like Hangover Square’s George Harvey Bone, the protagonist of Tripticks suffers 
what Patrick Hamilton calls ‘dead moods’, which Quin depicts via the literal 
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contrivance of “waking” and “dreaming”: ‘I woke up in a cold sweat. What was real, 
what wasn’t?’ (138). He surfaces, momentarily, to address the reader:  
 
The time has come to call a halt to this Theatre of the Absurd, to examine 
the motivation of the authors of the absurdity and challenge their star 
players. Let me now, as they say in court, connect up with the current scene. 
(156) 
 
‘Was I brainwashed?’ he asks himself. The narrative oscillates between the 
narrator’s struggle to make sense of the patterning of his life and his surrender to a 
spectacular flux of images and representations which can never be authenticated. 
Suspecting that that catch-22 whereby the very means by which he might verify his 
reality have themselves been manipulated, he ponders: ‘Would I think I was 
brainwashed if I had been brainwashed?’ Is he involved in ‘little more than an 
engagement in a shaggy-dog story?’ However he is all too soon re-engulfed: ‘Go 
back to sleep. Go on with the game. The chase. The kill. Get the gun loaded.’ (138) 
He slides into depersonalised third-person narration (“Oh God, he cried, I wish I 
could be in my own pad like in Malibu...” [157]) and then back into fantasy, (“O-oh 
here comes that Emotional charge in me again.” [158]). 
Quin develops her own topographical metaphors for the protagonist’s psyche. 
It is a cave-like crevice in which 
 
[t]houghts now encounter shelves of projecting ideals from these enormous 
arcs of nostalgia thrown high in the air rising 20 feet and spanning 50 feet in 
the arc. A large depression whose floor is scarred by numerous ideals. (42) 
 
Here memory is no more constitutive of stable identity than the protagonist’s 
borrowed idioms; it is similarly depersonalised “other” speech. Describing self-
reflection, and, by extension, the process of narrating the chaos of the inner life, 
Quin employs the metaphor of dredging also used previously by B.S. Johnson in his 
novel, Trawl, which chronicles a period of self-imposed exile upon a deep sea fishing 
vessel and an anguished stock take of the archive of experience: 
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[T]he content of dreams [was] so dense that the only life within them 
consisted of small briny shrimp and the pupae of the ephyda fly. I began to 
organise a free-form dimensional equipment in the shape of a bucket. Digging 
below the surface the continuous bucket line operated 24 hours a day, except 
on July 4th and December 25th, and I viewed the dredge from foreign lands. 
(42) 
 
It is this psychic sub-strata that provides Tripticks' setting. Upon the “desert of the 
real” the narrator projects a map of his crisis of consciousness. This is an ‘immense 
interior region’ of profound ontological instability, an ‘endless desert’ in which ‘[d]ays 
were nights’ and ‘[d]reams were reality’ with ‘[n]o sense of time’, through which 
characters who are merely ‘chartered shadows’ chase their own tails. 
Tripticks’ is not a world to be inhabited, then, but a world that inhabits. The 
narrator internalises and then re-externalises as oneiric projection a mesh of 
fragmentary scraps of discourse. In this passage from the opening pages of the 
novel, for example, we meet our protagonist on an armed stake-out outside the 
home of his first ex-wife and her lover:  
 
Reproductions 
a gristmill 
wine press 
and the reservoir with its undershot waterwheel, a restored chapel and 
adjoining wing of seven rooms she has taken over with the fourth husband 
of my No. 2 wife. Under the rough-hewn redwood timbers they were lashed 
together with rawhide. Open during daylight hours an unusual arrangement 
of garden pools. Hours subject to change in summer. No dog, with the 
exception of seeing-eye dogs, are allowed. Cats are permitted to stay 
overnight provided they are on a leash. A naturalist is on duty. As members 
of the 89-person party died, those remaining resorted to cannibalism. Only 
47 were rescued. Picnicking. Campsites near the original area. Where I 
waited. (9) 
 
Here, Quin welds a complex chain of associations, code-switching between the, by 
turn, illusory, hyperbolic and pornotropic discursive styles of tourist advertising 
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(‘Open during daylight hours...’), newspaper reporting (‘As members of the 89-
person party died...’) and sadomasochism (‘…lashed together with rawhide’). 
Narrative proceeds via a diabolical metaphoric logic, where meaning drifts between 
the description of his former spouse’s home, which is, in itself, with its reproduction 
mill and wine press, an “authentic replica” of a charming rural chateau which triggers 
a voyeuristic sexual fantasy which, in turn sets in motion the vision of their home as 
a tourist attraction (“Hours subject to change in summer...”). The next link springs 
from the double meaning of “naturalist” – referring to a natural historian and to a 
naturalist philosopher, whose moral assumptions involve a disregard for metaphysics 
and the positing of truth in nature which couples obscurely with cannibalism, which, 
in turn, is made analogous to picnicking.  
In Tripticks, as in Berg, Quin makes recourse to the generic conventions and 
moral codes of Noir to articulate this inchoate and contingent world in which the 
existential dilemma is a hollow one. Where “authenticity” and “freedom” are 
unreachable ideals and the rebellious potential of meaningful action has been 
replaced by acts of arbitrary self-assertion against a world which withholds human 
agency. Here, however, unlike in Berg, the noir universe is all there is, it is the stable 
referent, the reality whose anxieties and dread it once articulated has been all but 
displaced. Here the Camusian “man of action” is reimagined as – in fact, discursively 
fashions himself into – a post-existentialist hard-boiled hero. Over a thoroughly 
Baudrillardian desert of the real, with its ghost towns, health resorts, leisure parks 
and seedy motels, the protagonist hounds his quarry, with the intention of committing 
a lover’s lane crime passionnelle: 
 
I decided it would be a stunning scientific and intellectual accomplishment for 
a creature, who, in the space of a few million years – the bat of an eyelash in 
evolutionary accounting – emerged from the desert to hurl himself at two 
bodies. Its effects on human civilisation would be a matter of conjecture. But it 
would in any event be a shining reaffirmation of the optimistic premise that 
whatever man imagines he can bring to pass. (73) 
 
 But the forward thrust of the protagonist’s narrative desire is continually 
frustrated. Its linear progression is simultaneously driven backwards analeptically  
into the past that is anterior to the narrative present and fissured outwards 
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metaleptically onto the paratextual semiotic structures that constitute its textuality by 
the irruption of fragments of memory, discourse and visual images that are ‘a kind of 
emotional fishhook, snagged in the mind. Not wholly explicable, but impossible to 
dislodge’ (146). The horizontal and vertical axes that situate the agents, events and 
actions over time and space with reference to the broader social order have 
collapsed. Present experience is displaced; ‘[m]ixing / Memory and desire’ – as Eliot 
describes in the opening lines of his The Waste Land – Quin’s narrative describes a 
diachronic flux of experience that is overwritten by the phantasmic projections of 
desublimated desire. Here ‘memories [are] handled like auto-erotic symbols’ (72).  
The ontological distinctions between memory, perception and fantasy have been 
sublated. The perceptual present merges and unmerges with memory, collapsing 
orders of time, and memory, in turn, merges with fantasy which is, in any case, no 
less “real” than perceptions and memories that are themselves in fact doubly 
“unreal”, the unreliable percepts or memory traces of a reality that is merely 
simulacrum.  
Is, then, the protagonist “mad”? And if he is, is Quin positing the cause as the 
Oedipalisation by the enculturation of the socio-symbolic order, the ontological 
uncertainty that results when the reality that encroaches is already an “authentic 
copy”? As she does throughout her oeuvre, in Tripticks,  Quin provides a traditionally 
Freudo-Lacanian aetiology for her protagonist’s psychic distress, implicating a failure 
of the Paternal function in his psychosis. Fantasising about ‘a case of [sexual] 
initiation involving mother and son’ he reflects, ‘[h]ow often I had wished mine had’ 
(72). He identifies the origins of his own ontological unravelling in the belated 
breaking of the mother-child dyad during adolescence. Recalling the first closing in of 
his inner space, he recounts the synaesthetic transformation of his mother’s body 
onto the geological formations with which he externalises his crisis of consciousness: 
 
This was particularly so when I was sixteen and she stopped tucking me up in 
bed, that was when the moraines where enormous. The descent on my own 
into sleep became extremely diverse, with sheer drops of 2,000 and 3,000 
feet into rock bound gorges, carpeted with hairy patches and wildflowers 
sprouted from overhanging breasts. (72)  
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After the appearance of his step-father on the scene, an ‘ex-surf, ex-track, ex-movie 
star’ degenerate gold digger, ‘who somehow thought mother was well off and out to 
explore the outer reaches of eros’ (73), he recalls, ‘ I doubt if I ever forgave mother 
for marrying again’ (73): 
 
As soon as he turned up the scene of our family life from then on turned from 
a semicircular urn of intimacy, a kind of womb with seats where mother and I 
had nuzzled together so comfortably, into battle scenes played in a 
refrigerator.’ (79) 
 
An unwelcome interloper within the family romance, the step-father here 
represents the Paternal function of sexual rivalry but not of authority, he is a ‘born-
false Messiah’ (77). Here lie the beginnings of the narrator’s textual and 
psychosexual perversity: ‘And that was that. I went about learning how to become a 
fearless self-defence fighter overpowering any bully twice my size.’ (79) In his 
account of the Oedipal origins of narrative, Barthes poses the question: ‘If there is no 
longer any father, why tell stories?’ Quin’s post-patriarchal narrative perhaps 
proposes an answer. Her fatherless protagonist – desire debarred but authority not 
imposed – does so in order to endlessly re-enact that primal scene via the originary 
phantasms of patricide, castration and seduction: ‘I knew I could no longer impose a 
preferred solution,’ the narrator reasons, ‘but I must seek to evoke it.’ (78) 
Evoke it he does, via a cast of characters that people his past, psychically 
extrude into memory and are realised as a bizarre retinue of phantasms: pep pill-
popping, freaked-out ex-wives, an amorous mother-in-law and her over-coddled 
poodle and a depressed tycoon father-in-law. His first wife is the heiress to the 
fortune of a ballpoint pen tycoon with whom he eloped and later found himself 
ensconced within her billionaire father’s compound which ‘seemed like an immense 
swimming pool making me feel like an extra in a home movie’ (151). In this heartland 
of Amerikan domestic psychosis, with its ‘[i]ncreasing hysterical rituals of confession 
and conformity’ violence is always ‘just a dare away’ (34).  The second, whom he 
met at a ‘pretzelrama’ happening which featured an ‘8 foot mound of every kind of 
bread’ is a karate expert, a hippy activist and a ‘militant hedonist in constant search 
of the best that can be eaten, drunk, and fucked or otherwise savoured’, with a side-
line in Black Mass orgies. Which is where he meets the woman who was to become 
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his third wife, a junky with a ‘great desire to expose the pretention of pretending not 
to be pretentious and therefore destroy pretention by a general condition of total 
candour in the mutual acknowledgement of all pretention’ (156).  
 
 
Refusing the “Great Refusal” 
 
By the mid-seventies, the critique of the counterculture that had been mounted by 
American Liberals like Lionel Trilling, Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol during the sixties 
– a moral panic on behalf of the Arnoldian project – warned against a culture infected 
by modernism. This notion of an ‘adversary culture’ that had become mainstream 
and was hell-bent on steering culture away from civilisation, gained credence 
amongst many commentators disillusioned by its legacies. A funny thing happened 
on the way to utopia. The sixties’ status-quo-challenging spirit of rebelliousness had 
ushered in not another world, but an era that Tom Wolfe in the mid-seventies 
christened the “Me Decade”.120 The counterculture’s interest in esoterica, the 
‘eclectic taste for mystic, occult, and magical phenomena [that] has been a marked 
characteristic of our postwar youth since the days of the beatniks’,121 which 
characterised what Theodor Roszak identitied as a new “Age of Aquarius” evolved 
into what would become known as the New Age: a loosely confederated alliance of 
quasi-psychotherapeutic practices and esoteric philosophies which coalesced under 
the umbrella term of the Human Potential Movement. Summed up by Alvin Toffler as 
the ‘odds and ends of Eastern religion, sexual experimentation, game playing and 
old-time revivalism’,122 the movement comprised, variously, the field of humanistic 
and transpersonal psychologies and Fritz Perls’ Gestalt therapy, the Mecca of which 
was his Esalen Institute in Big Sur, alongside pantheistic spiritual practices including 
neo-Paganism, the Goddess movement and from Eastern mysticism, like Taoism, 
Tarot, Zen meditation and Chinese medicine. As the “Age of Aquarius” became the 
“New Age”, the commitment to the capacity of the liberated self as a new alternative 
to political reform had evolved into a belief in the potential of the self as the internal 
wellspring of meaning-making, of “life-direction” and of value which simply needed to 
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be unlocked. Its object was no longer revolution, but personal fulfilment. The 
transitive function of anti-psychiatry – its socially applied aspect, that hypothesis that 
a revolution of the self could and would naturally produce a revolution of the world 
which had never been satisfactorily elucidated – was all but abandoned in favour of a 
Rousseauian quest to “expand human awareness” and “develop human potential” 
via the happiness, creativity and fulfilment of the “fully actualised” self.  
The founder of the Human Potential Movement, Abraham Maslow, in his 
famous Hierarchy of Needs, proposed a theory of motivation which held that human 
happiness was achieved via the satisfaction of a pyramidal system of needs, the 
peak of which was self-actualisation, the fulfilment of one’s full personal potential: ‘to 
become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of 
becoming’, the ‘full realization’ of one’s ‘true self’. And the royal road to self-
actualisation was not, as it had been for antipsychiatry, the articulation of a crisis of 
selfhood and, thereby, the critique of the forces that had produced it, but the 
enactment of that crisis via free expression, by doing your own thing, an ethos which 
was formalised in anarchic therapeutic practices which co-mingled elements of 
Freudian theory and behaviour-modification techniques together with Eastern 
spirituality like primal therapy, encounter groups and re-birthing which sought to 
remove those obstacles that might impinge the scaling of the pyramid by revisiting 
and thereby resolving repressed trauma or “Pain”.  
What was at stake was no longer revolution – indeed, for Trilling, Bell and 
Kristol and others, it never had been – but the radically individualist simonising of the 
self that had become euphemised as “personal growth”. The acolytes of the Human 
Potential Movement were to become self-fashioning “gods of their own universes”, 
moulding themselves into “better” selves. As Wolfe memorably comments, the ‘new 
alchemical dream is: changing one’s personality – remaking, remodelling, elevating, 
and polishing one’s very self… and observing, studying, and doting on it. (Me!)….’. 
By the seventies, then, the counterculture had begun to look very much like its other. 
Christopher Lasch’s epoch-anointing The Culture of Narcissism (1979), together with 
his earlier work, Haven in a Heartless World (1977) virulently condemns the 
mindless hedonism and moral vacuity of the ‘so-called counterculture’ which was 
merely a ‘mirror image of consumer capitalism’:  
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Cultural radicalism has become so fashionable and so pernicious in the 
support it unwittingly provides for the status quo, that any criticism of 
contemporary society that hopes to get beneath the surface has to criticize, at 
the same time, much of what currently goes under the name of radicalism.123  
 
Quin turns to America to explore not only the spiritual destitution of the affluent 
society but also, and in equal measure, the bankruptcy of its discontents. At length, 
the protagonist is led by the couple to the Centre for Studies of the Body and Soul, 
or, as he puts it, ‘Groupe Grope and the Feely Show’ (164), a thinly veiled satire of 
the Esalen Institute and its ilk, peopled with ‘raging sado-masochists’, ‘fire-breathing 
spinsters’ and ‘silicon freaks’ (174). Quin makes great play with the counterculture at 
its most vacuously outré:  
 
‘And in here is a lecturer talking about “Erotica, Ennui and Where Do We Go 
From Here”. We entered and would you believe that he didn’t tell us? […] ‘And 
in here we have instant analysis and querulous criticism.’ As soon as I 
entered someone shouted at me ‘You have an anarchical mentality totally 
rejecting civilized standards of behaviour.’ (168) 
 
Finding himself enlisted into encounter therapy with his second ex-wife, presided 
over by two therapists whom he suspects are collecting information on behalf of ‘the 
Army, the Justice Department and the F.B.I.’ (178), he flees. The Centre’s frenzied 
gropings towards “cosmic consciousness” have failed to assuage his existential 
angst. It is all merely an ‘ego-trip of Shakespearian proportions’ whose ‘verbal glory’ 
masks ‘desperate competitiveness’. He seeks a more authentic spiritual discovery 
than ‘some squalid freakout’ or ‘monstrous Dionysian revel’ where ‘a mob of crazies 
gather to drop acid and groove to hours of amplified cacophony’ (185): 
 
I could understand if I were made to feel it, the terrible figure of Kali, I could 
understand a kind of Lawrencian [sic] blood sacrifice, I could understand if I 
were made to feel it, the marvellous serenity of Krishna love. I needed to feel 
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the premises inundated with the Terrible Mother and the serene 
compassionate Krishna I needed to be shaken by terror and love. (185) 
 
And accordingly the denouement of the novel is an almost parodic set-piece in grand 
countercultural style in which the protagonist (with shades of Jim Morrison) picks up 
a mysterious and prophetic hitchhiker – who might be a Native American shaman or 
just ‘[s]ome hippy having me on’ (183) – who directs him to an adobe village in the 
mesa where he partakes in a mystical drumming ritual. There he catches a glimpse 
of cosmic unity: 
 
So there I was, suddenly it seemed without a past or a future on a flat sandy 
floor, 7,500 feet above sea level, encircled by steep mountain walls, not unlike 
one of the great dry seas of the moon. And as I walked it seemed I had no 
sense of gravity. My pulse, I noticed, kept up the same rhythm as the drums.’ 
(185) 
 
He suspects the Native Americans intend to slaughter him as a ritual sacrifice 
but, he reasons, ‘what better way to croak. Ritualistic, part of an inheritance, I would 
perhaps go down in history after all.’ (185) At last he might have evaded the “depth 
manipulators” and the world of spiralling representations they have spun and 
managed to access a savage, primal authenticity. But released from the captivity of 
the image he soon experiences semiotic Stockholm Syndrome. Bereft of his map of 
words and images he cannot navigate the territory. To the eyes of these ‘Fellini 
figures’ (185) he is ‘an intruder, an invader, a Real Estate speculator’ (187). These 
are ‘ancient witches’, where, he implores, ‘were the young ones to shout Hey there 
he is in a super, supple antiqued leather jacket’ (187)? Suddenly divested of the 
fabric of ready-mades which connects him to the empire of signs, the protagonist 
becomes a hollowed-out husk of a subject in a reality that seems further away than 
ever: 
 
Here on an Indian Reservation, I felt more of an outsider. […] The buildings, 
part of the earth, made from earth, threw me into narrow spaces. Swept along 
by dust rain and wind. And longing for the comfort of four walls. (189) 
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‘If you can’t believe it’s happening, pretend it’s a movie’124 Andy Warhol advises and, 
heeding this, the protagonist appeals for the cinematic apparatus that might frame 
and spectacularise this ‘strange environment’ and render it semiotically 
comprehensible: ‘Where for Christsake the movie cameras, and Bob Hope dressed 
as an Indian would surely appear in the midst of the dancers.’(188) But his phantoms 
reappear in new disguises: his first wife, a strange figure who may or may not be the 
Nightripper, together with a cadre of members from WITCH who form an inquisition 
that chases him across the adobe rooftops until he arrives at the edge. He considers 
a suicide, encoding it as a ‘revolutionary jump’ as ‘[h]istory caught with a stoop-
action [sic] camera’ (191). But in a rare moment of lucidity, the protagonist begins to 
consider the possibility that the inquisition was merely a delusional projection, and 
that his fate is not patterned by the obscure machinations of some external 
conspiracy but that he is subject to processes beyond his control that originate 
within: 
 
Perhaps I had been mistaken, they had not disguised themselves themselves 
at all, but had split, left me to find my own death. By chance. By an absurd 
piece of my own fantasy. (191) 
 
Eschewing a death that is no longer heroic, he hides in a church where he attempts 
to verify his reality by appealing to a kind of empirico-phenomenology: 
 
There must be a detailed patient exploration of evidence in support of an 
original philosophical vision. Or on a humbler level simply testing out 
propositions with data. Dissolving false and ideological constructs about the 
world and letting reality emerge as it really is. (191) 
 
But it cannot. Quin’s first three novels are all characterised, variously, by their 
protagonists’ speechlessness. By the inner voice emanating from some 
subterranean strata between thought and action that cannot extrude into utterance, 
that remains suspended there. It is Hamlet-speech, a muteness that nonetheless 
speaks of that terrible struggle to reconcile the inner design with external chaos. 
                                                          
124
 Andy Warhol, The Philosophy of Andy Warhol: From A to B and Back Again (London: Picador), 176. 
230 
 
Berg’s titular anti-hero ruminates, plots and schemes but speaks only once to utter 
what might be a parapractic tic, or perhaps just a typographical error. Three’s banal 
babble masks a vast, dank reservoir of the unsaid, only finally revealed via S’s 
disembodied speech which emanates from audio tapes long after its subject has 
sought to obliterate her own subjecthood. Passages, meanwhile, reveals the fallacy 
of its protagonists’ vain attempts to remove themselves from symbolic rationality and 
return to the non-linguistic jouissance of the embodied self in the name of liberation, 
whilst all the while their most basic freedoms are continually and brutally foreclosed 
by shady totalitarian agents on the very account of that speechlessness: ‘They spoke 
at times in a dialect we didn’t understand. We were misinterpreted… We were 
misinformed.’ (7). These are selves that are stranded tragically in that liminal space – 
a psychic limbo – in which via the processes of projection and introjection the fusion 
of the inner and outer can only be achieved at the grave expense of a loss of Ego 
boundaries with destructive and self-shattering effects. For Quin the cost is always a 
terrible one. There is no sense of the “ecstatic surrender” of the self here which was 
so valorised by countercultural thinkers as the royal road to accessing a more 
authentic and more vital mode of existence. In Passages, whose protagonists all too 
willingly seek out and drink the kool aid, the performative self-annihilation that was 
the counterculture’s favourite party trick is depicted as merely an ethically corrupt 
burlesque of more real and more dangerous forms of psychic disturbance. 
In Tripticks, at last, Quin finally furnishes her narrative with a speaking 
subject. But the voice is not his own. Sandra, the protagonist of Quin’s final, 
unpublished novel, The Unmapped Country, opines her own speechlessness, the 
loss of her ‘subterranean language with the underground forces’:125 
 
If speech at all then it was the spaces between words, and the echoes the 
words left, or what might be really meant under the surface. She knew, had 
known. No longer knew.126 
 
Electro-shock therapy, Quin writes, has ‘shape[d] [Sandra] into a walky talky doll with 
all the correct responses.’127 And the protagonist of Tripticks, like Sandra and like 
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Berg, also has become a voiceless body – or, indeed, a ventriloquist’s dummy – 
through whom others speak. In the closing passages of the novel, the protagonist 
readies himself to deliver a violent benediction from the church pulpit: ‘The scream 
inside me was working itself loose... a desperate need to break out into a stream of 
verbal images. The pulpit could become an extension of my voice, my skin, my 
dreams.’ (191) However, when he ‘open[s] [his] mouth’ there are ‘no words’: 
 
Only the words of others I saw, like ads, text, psalms, from those who 
attempted to persuade me into their systems. A power I did not want to 
possess. The inquisition. (191) 
 
Quin was fond of claiming that she was telepathic. Her fellow experimental 
writer, Alan Burns, recalls a group reading at the ICA given by Quin, B.S. Johnson, 
himself and others. Quin, he recounts, was ‘doing her Quin thing’ which, he explains, 
involved sitting on the stage staring at the audience in complete silence: ‘she 
wouldn’t say a goddamn word’: 
 
She either implied or she actually stated that we sort of “think-communicate”. 
That we can communicate more in silence than with someone actually putting 
the words across.128 
 
Convinced that this was some kind of avant-garde jape, B.S. Johnson was furious, 
Burns recalls. Both Sontag, in her “The Aesthetics of Silence” (1967), and Ihab 
Hassan, in his The Literature of Silence: Henry Miller and Samuel Beckett (1969), 
have reflected upon the refusal to speak within the art of the sixties, finding – 
contrary to Steiner, for whom the ‘retreat from the word’ constitutes a form of 
absconding from political life129 – in the evasion, renunciation and non-
communication of speechlessness a valid and productive artistic gesture that seeks 
to question the validity of all utterances. But despite her turn at the reading, the 
novels attest that the same cannot be said of Quin. In the ‘subterranean language’ of 
the early novels – found, as Sandra explains, in the ‘space between words’ that, like 
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Felman’s ‘freedom to speak’, lies ‘somewhere between languages’ – there is a 
certain power. But in silence there is none at all or, worse, there is the 
disempowerment of having others speak on one’s behalf. Quin, like Woolf before 
her, is committed to a vision of subjectivity that is distressed and dispersed but 
nonetheless maintains a commitment to the power of language to shape a world and 
power of consciousness to shape a self. Language is the vehicle which enables the 
continuing circulation of those contradictory desires, deferring a Faustian choice 
between the coherent and unified selfhood that is, for Quin, a kind of death-in-life, 
and engulfment. 
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Postscript: ‘Such a Thing as Avant-garde in Literature Has 
Ceased to Exist’ 
 
The English as a nation have always been kind to eccentrics.  
— Ernest Barker, The Character of England 
 
Back in the present, the novel, once again, is caught in a tug of love. Forty-odd years 
after the original “situation of the novel” debates of the sixties and seventies, when 
literary intellectuals speculated upon the role of the novel after the unprecedented 
social and cultural transformations following World War II, the forms and functions of 
fiction are being deliberated anew, in response to the pressing ethical and political 
dilemmas of Anglo-American liberals (multiculturalism, globalisation, global economic 
recession, anxieties about human flourishing), the sense of crisis in the arts effected 
by swingeing public sector cuts, the new post-Browne Report paradigm of higher 
education and the perceived mortal threat to the book posed by the indefatigable rise 
of digital technologies. We demand that the novel tradition anthropologise our twenty-
first century disaffection. We want this form, long privileged (or perhaps charged) with 
making sense of our lives and our selves, to readily provide the consolations of fiction 
against the existential angst of our age. Now, perhaps more than ever, we seek the 
easy, familiar pleasures of the text.  
But equally, in this new digital age of global neo-corporatism, the novel is 
being forced to justify its continued existence as never before. Previous reports of its 
death at the hands of radio, then cinema, then television all proved, in the end, to be 
greatly exaggerated. But with the seemingly indefatigable rise of digital cultures, the 
very medium of the novel – the dog-eared, spine-cracked paperback – finally appears 
to be on its way out. It was not supposed to be this way. The breathless technological 
utopianism of the nineties prophesised the reinvention of what was perceived, even 
then, as an ailing literary anachronism. Early adapters, like the American writer 
Robert Coover, in his influential 1992 essay, “The End of Books”, predicted that with 
the coming of the digital age the novel would die but be gloriously reborn as 
hypertext fiction: ludic, labyrinthine, radically non-linear narratives in the spirit of 
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Jorge Luis Borges.1 In the end, however, the novel’s digital future proved to be rather 
more prosaic. In August 2012, the UK’s biggest bookseller, Amazon, announced that 
sales of e-books now outweigh those of paperbacks and hardbacks combined.2 
‘[E]very generation rewrites the book’s epitaph; all that changes is the whodunit’, 
assures a recent article in the New York Times, noting ‘how rarely one technology 
supersedes another’.3 
In the case of digital media, commerce gave chase. The longer-term problems 
of our increasingly commercial book culture – which is subject to the bottom line of 
multinational publishing conglomerates, the almighty clout of chain bookshops and 
the vagaries of literary prize culture – begin to look like small fry in comparison to 
what is now darkly referred to as ‘the Amazon problem’. Our open-source lives on 
the “cloud” pose a mortal threat not only to the physical book but also, with the near-
impossibility of enforcing digital rights, to the livelihoods of those who write and 
publish them. Brophy’s campaign for the Public Lending Right and her Writer’s 
Action Group which, during the sixties, lobbied to secure a living wage for writers or, 
as she puts it in her inimitable style, ‘justice in the shape of dinner of practitioners’,4 
certainly provides food for thought in an age when writers’ meagre livelihoods look 
more precarious than ever. The crisis in the publishing industry is oft remarked upon. 
Grub Street is said to be rationalising and prioritising as never before in response to 
untenable financial pressures. In these circumstances, the American novelist 
Jonathan Franzen who is rapidly becoming the Anglo-American literary 
establishment’s foremost provocateur, has argued controversially that to be a literary 
innovator is an unforgivable (and commercially unviable) form of artistic 
irresponsibility. Only the most marketable, the surest bet, can ensure the form’s 
survival:  
 
Fiction is the most fundamental human art form. Fiction is storytelling and our 
reality arguably consists of the stories we tell about ourselves. Fiction is also 
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conservative and conventional, because the structure of its market is relatively 
democratic (novelists make a living one book at a time, bringing pleasure to 
large audiences), and because a novel asks for ten or twenty hours of solitary 
attentiveness from each member of its audience. … To wrest the novel away 
from its original owner, the bourgeois reader, required strenuous effort from 
theoreticians. And once literature and its criticism become co-dependent the 
fallacies set in.5  
 
This sense of crisis surrounding the novel was, even in the sixties, nothing new. 
The ‘special fate of the novel’, the most eminent theorist of the novel’s eschatological 
anxieties, Kermode, argues, ‘is always to be dying’.6 Indeed, in Britain, beating our 
chests about the lassitude of novel writing appears to be a critical tradition in its own 
right, stretching back as far as Samuel Johnson, who famously commented with 
devastating inaccuracy of the novel in its infancy: ‘Nothing odd will do long. Tristram 
Shandy did not last’.7 
The difference now is one of expectation. Gone are our Arnoldian assumptions 
about the novel’s role in culture, the powerful and pervasive aesthetic creed of Eliot 
and Leavis which dominated the field of literary criticism in Britain throughout the 
twentieth century finally seems to have lapsed. Our preoccupations with fiction’s 
ability to deliver a coherent whole, or to forge an aesthetic community, have been 
replaced by rather more fundamental doubts about the very possibility of 
representation in an era when the social sphere has already been so thoroughly 
commodified and aestheticised. We now inhabit the order of simulacra, Baudrillard 
proposes, and here there is no real to imitate. The redemptive capacity of literature, 
that traditional bond between the world and the book that assumes, Leo Bersani 
writes, ‘the world of art has the authority to master the raw material of experience in a 
manner than uniquely gives value to, perhaps even redeems, that material’8 – a 
relationship that had been problematised but not severed by fictional self-
consciousness – is now rather more narrowly conceived. What we now hope for from 
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our fictions, Dominic Head argues, is an ‘alternative imaginative space’ with a ‘social 
function’ that is always provisional and that forcefully disputes its own demise by 
‘recognising the existence and potential of that autonomy’.9 Cautiously, he adds that 
the ‘extent of the dissidence, or reinvention such a space makes possible should not 
be overstated’.10 
Why, then, do British novelists seem so reluctant to grasp the nettle of this 
autonomy? Despite the successive incursions of threads, pockets and outcroppings 
of the “experimental” and the realities of a rich and more variegated literary history 
than “official” accounts almost always record, and to which this study has sought to 
attest, the mainstream picture of the British novel is still dominated by the notion of a 
time-worn “English style”. Colm Tóibín recently characterised the ‘quintessential 
English novel of our age’ as ‘well made, low on ambition and filled with restraint, 
taking its bearings from a world that Philip Larkin made in his own image.’11 Zadie 
Smith, in her timely and influential essay, “Two Paths for the Novel” (2008), 
speculates upon the future of fiction in English, by way of reviews of Netherland by 
the latter-day realist, Joseph O’Neill, and Remainder by great white hope for British 
avant-garde writing, Tom McCarthy. She finds O’Neill’s is the road most travelled. His 
‘breed of lyrical Realism’ has ‘had the freedom of the highway for some time now, 
with most other exits blocked’.12 Although Smith specifies the Anglophone novel, her 
view seems more narrowly applicable to fiction in Britain. Disrobed – some would say 
rudely – of its metaphysics, realist fiction has abandoned its claim to reunite the 
individual and the world. The realist contract has had to be rewritten, its terms now 
rather more modestly conceived. Realistic writing, as Smith argues, has itself 
become self-conscious about its own lack of authenticity: ‘it foregrounds its narrative 
nostalgia, asking us to note it, and look kindly upon it’.13 
British literary critics, meanwhile, have tended to remain reverential about the 
innate value of the (capital letter, definite article) Novel, but wholly unconvinced 
about (and in some cases, positively hostile to) the broader imaginative possibilities 
of fictional narrative. The fields of narrative and narrativity are now, of course, no 
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longer the specialist domain of literature, but are terms that are employed throughout 
human discourse as a way of conceptualising cognition. The idea of the narrative 
self, which proposes that narrative meaning-making is innate to the human 
condition, is central to the account of selfhood, identity and consciousness 
developed by philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, in works such as the book 
Consciousness Explained (1991) and the essay “The Self as a Center of Narrative 
Gravity” (1992), Alasdair MacIntyre, most notably in his watershed book After Virtue 
(1981) and Paul Riceour, throughout his oeuvre following his seminal three-volume 
study on the mimetic function of narrative, Time and Narrative (1983-5). This 
‘narrative paradigm’ describes the ways in which humans synthesise reality by 
making narratives out of the disconnected events of our lives, creating a meaningful 
and unified pattern out of the chaos of experience. ‘We are all virtuoso novelists’, as 
Dennett, puts it; we ‘try to make all our material cohere into a single good story … 
that story is our autobiography’ and the ‘chief fictional character … of that 
autobiography is one’s self’.14  
That we understand ourselves through stories is now a given. The narrative 
paradigm’s thesis about human “self-telling” is now ubiquitous amongst fields as 
diverse as psychology, sociology, philosophy, advertising and even medicine and 
finance. As David Herman, Manfred Jahn and Marie-Laure Ryan, in their Introduction 
to the recent Routledge Encyclopaedia of Narrative Theory, comment: ‘[t]he past 
several decades have seen an explosion of interest in narrative’15. Narrative theory 
has begun cropping up in unexpected places: in accounts of the global economic 
recession, for example, Roland Barthes’ proairetic code of narrative expectation is 
invoked to account for the climate of unchecked speculative investment that 
produced the financial crisis and (relatedly) in response to the renewed scrutiny of 
the trustworthiness and perceived integrity of commercial practices, “brand 
storytelling” has become a key concern within the marketing and public relations 
industries. But are novels to be understood merely as the literary incarnation of the 
narrative paradigm? The versions of narrativity that have emerged in the fields of 
marketing, psychology, sociology and medicine, for example, tend to privilege one 
half of the essential binominal impulse of narrative, what the Russian formalists 
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called the fabula (or story), focusing solely upon narrative as a series of events in 
time and neglecting narrative’s crucial other component: the sujet (or plot). That is, 
the way that these events are manifested into discourse, the way that the story is 
told. And, notwithstanding the implications for the art of the novel of its 
underestimation of the complexities of narrative, is such a narrowly-conceived 
paradigm really an appropriate or effective way of conceptualising the breadth and 
the diversity human experience? 
The fictionalists of the sixties, I have argued, in response to the extension of the 
domain of fiction, insisted upon literary fiction’s special status amongst the orders of 
fictionality. These days, it seems literary critics are no longer prepared to make such 
high claims for fiction, but neither are they certain what the alternative might be. 
Perhaps in response to a perceived lapse in the novel’s special claim to knowledge, 
they have sought to safeguard the distinctiveness of literary narrative by attempting 
to define the “novelness” of novels. Liam McIlvanney and Ray Ryan’s recent study, 
The Good of the Novel (2011), for instance, seeks to emphasise that which is 
‘distinctive and ingenious to the novel form’: 
 
One can say, for one thing, that the truth of novels cannot be rendered in any 
other form; it cannot be abstracted or codified, turned into thesis or proposition. 
Novelistic truth is not data, not reportage, not documentary, not philosophical 
tenet, not political slogan. Novelistic truth is dramatic, which means above all it 
has to do with character. … In exploring character, the novel’s key strength is 
the disclosure of human interiority. To the question, what does the novel do?, 
we might most pertinently answer: the novel does character, and the novel 
does interiority.16  
 
Claiming that the academy has ‘retreat[ed] into theoretical obscurantism’17 – that old 
British bugbear – their collection seeks to refocus attention back on the novel itself, 
attesting its unique truth by lifting the taboo on evaluation. However, the emphasis of 
the title seems to have shifted from ‘What good can the novel do?’ to a kind of 
backhanded compliment: ‘How good is the novel at doing what it does?’ And what it 
does seems rather limited: ‘the novel does character, and ‘the novel does interiority’. 
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No mention here of the complex mediatory relationship between the novel and 
society, of the novel’s capacity not only to ‘disclose’ but also to expand the remit of 
human experience, or of the ways in which fiction offers temporary access to other 
ways of perceiving. Or of the novel as thought experiment, as a viable form of 
knowledge all of its own – let alone a ticket to peak experience at the limits of 
language.  
Is this the best that we can hope for from our fictions? Is the novel now, as 
Smith ponders, ‘simply the bedtime story that comforts us most’? And if that is the 
case, should we, as Franzen insists, simply submit to its “guilty pleasures”:  
 
Think of the novel as a lover: Let’s stay home tonight and have a great time. 
Just because you’re touched where you want to be touched, it doesn’t mean 
you’re cheap; before a book can change you, you have to love it.18 
 
In this study, by reassessing the work of the British experimental novelist, Ann Quin, 
I have sought to develop an alternative account of the distinctiveness of literary 
narrative that rests not upon notions about the consolatory capacity of our 
“necessary fictions”, or of craft and technique, or of the metaphysical power of a 
‘great tradition’, but upon the ways in which the novel shapes and is shaped by the 
experiential nuances of imagination, perception, memory, dreams and fantasy, 
which, in turn, themselves shape and are shaped by a culture, a feeling, a place and 
a moment. I suggest that the timely reappraisal of the writing of Quin and her 
colleagues might go some way to establishing the sense of ‘historical continuity’ 
lacking within existing accounts of the British contemporary novel. And I have 
attempted to trace the legacies of British experimentalism beyond the modernist 
watershed, after which it is generally assumed to have collapsed, through to a British 
‘postmodern realism’. Relatedly, this study has attempted to confront and begin to 
explore the important questions begged by the troubled literary-historical fate of the 
British experimental fiction: those to do with the ways we nurture innovative twenty-
first century in Britain and the ways in which we practise literary criticism. As British 
twentieth-century literary history is recast, and the “firm” assumptions of postmodern 
knowledge are discarded, it remains to be seen what form such an inheritance of 
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innovation might take: whether a rear-guard avant-garde will emerge to satisfy what 
appears to be a burgeoning appetite for innovation, or else remain a reward for the 
faithful, quarrying reader.  
 
  
241 
 
Appendix I: An Ann Quin Bibliography 
 
Novels 
Quin, Ann. Berg.  London: Paladin, 1989.  
 
Quin, Ann. Three. Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2003. 
 
Quin, Ann. Passages. Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2003. 
 
Quin, Ann. Tripticks. Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2002. 
 
Published short stories and occasional pieces 
“Land of Enchantment.” Scotsman. July 17, 1965.  
“Leaving School – XI.” London Magazine 4 (July 1966): 63-68 
“Every Cripple Has His Own Way of Walking.” Nova, December, 1966. 
“Never Trust a Man Who Bathes With His Fingernails.” El Corno Enplumado 27 (July 
1968), 8-16. 
 “Living in the Present.” Ambit 34 (1968), 20-21 (with Robert Sward) 
“Tripticks.” Ambit 35 (1968), 9-15.  
“Motherlogue.” Transatlantic Review 32 (1969), 101-105. 
“Eyes That Watch Behind the Wind.” A Signature Anthology. London: Calder and 
Boyars, 1975, 131-149. 
“Ghostworm.” Tak Tak Tak 6 (1993) 61-89. 
 
Unpublished manuscripts 
“The Unmapped Country.” Box 52, folder 2-5, Calder & Boyars mss., Lilly Library, 
Indiana University. 
 “There’s a Party.” Private collection. 
Popcorn, Private collection (with Billy Apple). 
 
B.B.’s Second Manifesto. Private collection (with Billy Apple). 
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